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CHAPTER 1
Reforming The Public Sector in Africa 
- Local Adjustments and The Public 
Auditors
Establishing mechanisms of accountability is a central idea for how a 
democracy is organized. Rules and regulation that provide procedures 
for limiting the power of the government are commonly understood 
as the organizing of free and universal elections, where the people can 
vote the government out of power (see for instance Fukuyama 2011, 
p. 14). Another fundamental part of democratic accountability is the 
establishment of oversight authorities, to verify how public resources 
are spent and how public officials working within the government 
administrations follow the rules and regulation, i.e. audit.
 Audit of the public administration as a mechanism of 
democratic accountability has long historic roots, and its importance 
already was noted by John Stuart Mill ((1861) 2001), and by Max 
Weber ((1922) 1978, p. 968), who both argued that public officials 
need to be controlled and limited so their powers would not be too 
extensive: 
… in regard to the constitution of the executive departments of 
administration. Their machinery is good when … a convenient and 
methodological order established for its transaction, a correct and 
intelligible record kept of it after being transacted; when each individual 
knows for what he is responsible, and is known to others as responsible 
for it. … But political checks will no more act of themselves than a 
bridle will direct a horse without a rider. If the checking functionaries 
are as corrupt or as negligent as those whom they ought to check … 
little benefit will be derived from the best administrative apparatus. 
(Mill, John Stuart (1861) 2001, p. 24)
As illustrated by the quotation, Mill claims that in order to establish a 
well working public administration the mere use of rules, procedures 
and individual responsibility would be as inadequate as believing 
that a bridle would solely direct a horse, without the assistance of a 
rider. To make the administration work, “checking functionaries” are 
essential. Apart from Mill, mechanisms to create accountability of the 
public administration have largely been neglected in discussions of 
democratic theories (for a review see Ahlbäck 1999).
 This study concerns the development of such accountability 
mechanisms within the state, i.e. state audit institutions, and how this 
development may be understood in Sub-Saharan African contexts. As 
will be illustrated in this chapter and further developed in the second 
chapter, there are different understandings of the character of public 
administrations in Sub-Saharan African countries and consequently 
also diverse understandings for how the establishment and 
development of state audit institutions should be regarded in these 
contexts. These dissimilar ideas constitute the basis for the aim of this 
study, which is presented more explicitly further on in the chapter. 
 The role of auditors in public sector development may be 
regarded as twofold; on the one hand, auditors are the “checking 
functionaries” who control the rest of the public administration, 
ensuring and verifying the action of other public officials; thus, they 
are a part of the development of other public sector organizations. 
On the other hand, being public officials themselves, public auditors 
constitute a part of the central state administration; consequently, the 
state audit institutions may also be regarded as a part of the general 
development of the public administration in a country. In this study, 
the focus is on the development of the state audit institutions per se, 
however although it is not investigated here, due to their central role 
in the state administration the attitudes and actions of state auditors 
most probably affect the rest of the public sector organizations. In a 
significant amount of research, public sector performance has proved 
to be important for the overall development in a country (Holmberg, 
Rothstein & Nasiritousi 2009). For instance, studies demonstrate how 
well performing public administrations create increased economic 
growth (Mauro 1995), which does not only favor small groups of elites 
but also benefits the entire population. For instance, through general 
reduction in poverty, reduced income inequality and increased 
resource allocation to areas of education (Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-
Terme 2002; Mauro 1998). Also in the area of health, the performance 
of public organizations has proved to be significant, where better 
quality in public sector organizations leads to improved health among 
citizens (Azfar & Gurgur 2005), a reduction in infant mortality as well 
as higher life expectancy (Holmberg, Rothstein &Nasiritousi 2009).  
Moreover, the quality of public institutions appears to be significant 
for democratization, where successful democratization processes 
in African countries have proved to be highly correlated with the 
regulatory qualities in these countries (Berg-Schlosser 2008).
 The significance of well performing public administrations 
is noted also by international actors like the World Bank, and 
the donor community. Since the end of 1980s, the World Bank 
has acknowledged the importance of the state and the public 
administration in the development process (World Bank 1989) and 
its report from 1997 is recognized as constituting a change of view 
of development in the international community, towards a stronger 
focus on the importance of “good governance” and public sector 
performance (Evans & Rauch 1999). In the report, the World Bank 
(1997) states that:  “Over time, even the smallest increases in the 
capability of the state have been shown to make a vast difference to 
the quality of people’s lives” (p. 15). Although there is no universal 
definition of what “good governance” means, it rests on the theoretical 
fundaments of the importance of sound societal institutions, 
formal and informal, as advanced by theorists like Douglas North 
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(Holmberg, Rothstein & Nasiritousi 2009). In its understanding of 
what encompasses “good governance”, the World Bank defines the 
concept broadly as “traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised”, which includes accountability, through elections 
and replacement but also through processes where governments are 
monitored (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2006 p. 7). In addition, 
the recognition of the importance of the public sector capacity has 
resulted in the World Bank supporting a large number of capacity 
building projects in African countries since the mid-1990s (World 
Bank 2005).
 The significance of the public sector performance is also 
mirrored in the donors’ view of aid and how to create aid effectiveness. 
In order to reach the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, 
the donor community drew up a joint declaration in 2005, the Paris 
agenda, for increased aid effectiveness. The Paris agenda emphasizes 
alignment and ownership as well as the importance of using 
institutions and systems in the partner countries for implementation 
of policies and monitoring activities. Thus, to increase aid 
effectiveness, the agenda prescribes the necessity of strengthening and 
increasing the capacity of public institutions in developing countries 
(OECD 2005).  
The development discourse
– “home-grown” solutions or local adjustments
Although some African countries have experienced significant 
development and general reduction in poverty, the overall 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa shows significantly lower 
improvement in various measures of development than the rest of 
the world.1  The 2010 Human Development Report illustrates how 
1 In this study, Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are used synonymously i.e. the development of 
Northern African countries is not included. This is also common practice in the literature, where 
scholars primarily refer to Sub-Saharan Africa when they discuss the character of the public 
sector in African countries.
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the Sub-Saharan Africa region has the lowest figures for human 
development in the world across various dimensions, and states that 
the region faces the greatest challenges of development in the world 
(UNDP 2010). Although some countries are exceptions, rates of 
growth have generally been lower and income inequality higher, as 
well as improvements in life expectancy, literacy and general poverty 
reduction generally has been lower in Africa than in other regions 
in the world (Englebert 2000; UNDP 2010; Van de Walle 2009). As 
discussed above, a substantial number of empirical studies have 
shown a strong correlation between public sector performance and 
how it impacts on various measures of human development. Hence, 
it is argued that the lower development rates in African countries are 
to a large extent a result of the poor quality of the public institutions 
(c.f. Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001; 2003; Bigsten & Durevall 
2004; Diamond 2004; Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi 2004; Van 
de Walle 2009, World Bank 1989; 1997; 2005). As discussed, since 
international actors and scholars have recognized the importance of 
“good governance” from the middle of the 1990s, a large number of 
capacity building projects in the public sector have been undertaken 
around the world, in order to create good governance. Attempts to 
reform the administration and build capacity in the public sector has 
failed in Africa to a much larger extent than in other regions of the 
world, however (World Bank 2005, p. 20-21).
 In the search for explanations for the poor development of 
African public sector organizations, and the failure of administrative 
reforms, several scholars argue that the historic legacies of colonialism 
are central for understanding the state and the administration in 
contemporary Africa (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001; 
Bayart 1999; 2009; Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Englebert 2000; 
2009; Ekeh 1975; Herbst 2000; Migdal 1988; Van de Walle 2009; 
Hyden 1983; 2006). When European colonial powers arrived in 
Africa, they established new state and administrative structures in 
the colonial territories, and ignored the often complex systems of 
governance existing in African societies (Mamdani 1996). In addition 
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to being based on a racist ideology and practice (Young 1994), these 
administrative structures derived from external coercion instead of 
domestic recognition, which contributed to their lack of legitimacy 
among the African people (Abrahamsen 2000; Englebert 2000; 2009). 
The colonial period created a situation where formal institutions 
became merely artificial, and where loyalty as well as decision-making 
and power structures, instead existed in parallel within informal 
networks. Although loyalties may have changed, from family and 
tribe towards new elites and powerful individuals, it is argued that the 
core, informal particularistic networks override formal structures, has 
survived into present-day African administrations:  
State offices at every level become permits to loot, either for an 
individual or somewhat wider network of family members, ethnic 
kin, political clients, and business cronies. Corruption, clientelism and 
personal rule thus seep into the culture, making the system even more 
resilient. In Africa, contending patron-client networks organize along 
ethnic or sub-ethnic lines, and the president sees his ethnic kin as the 
most reliable loyalist in the struggle for power. This makes the system 
particularly unstable, as conflicts over pelf, power, and identity mix in 
a volatile, even explosive brew.  
(Diamond 2010, p. 54-55)
As the above Larry Diamond quotation illustrates, kinship and other 
particularistic networks are regarded as constituting the specific 
character of contemporary African political and administrative 
culture (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; De Sardan 1999; Diamond 
2010; Ekeh 1975; Fuseini Haruna 2003; Hyden 1983; 2006; Jackson 
& Rosberg 1984; Sandbrook 1986; Young, 1994). Some scholars 
argue that these features of informality and reciprocal networks have 
long historic roots in African societies and despite various efforts to 
reform the administrations throughout history, this specific culture 
has continued beneath the formal structures (e.g. Ekeh 1975; Le Vine 
1980; Mbire-Barungi 2001). Other scholars instead emphasize that the 
tendency to rely on informal networks instead of formal impersonal 
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rules and procedures is a consequence of colonialism and the 
European influence in African countries (e.g. Englebert 2009; Migdal 
1988). The arrival of Europeans on the African continent changed 
traditional procedures of governing African societies, new powerful 
trade networks were established and new administrative chiefs were 
created, who were given extensive powers over traditional rulers. 
These fundamental changes in the societies resulted in the creation 
of powerful individuals, so called “big men” and laid the foundation 
for their surrounding strong reciprocal networks. Although these 
networks are highly unequal, the people involved in the networks 
are dependent on the benevolence of certain individuals and people 
who are not included in the networks may not expect any rights or 
privileges, it is expected these societal structures will survive since 
people are able to rely on them as survival strategies (Bayart 2009; 
Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Mamdani 1996, Migdal 1988). 
 The characteristics discussed above, it is argued, are the 
reason why administrative reforms have failed to such a large extent 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since African public officials have little 
reason to change their devices and their basis for legitimacy are their 
local communities and particularistic networks and not the formal 
administrative structures, originally deriving from the colonial period, 
administrative reforms are not likely to succeed or to be sustainable.
 Other explanations for the failure of administrative reforms 
in Africa, is the lack of attention paid to the capacity level in terms 
of educational levels, infrastructure and technology levels. For 
investments and reforms to be sustainable, there is a need for a 
surrounding context that continuously supports the structures. In 
developing countries, such surrounding contexts may be lacking 
or may be too expensive to establish (Hilderbrand & Grindle 
1998; Klitgaard 1989; Olowu 1999). Consequently, the reason why 
administrative reforms have failed to a large extent in many African 
countries is explained here by the failure to adapt foreign, in particular 
Western, practices to prevailing capacity levels in the country context 
(Turner & Hulme 1997; World Bank 2005).
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The historic legacies and specific features of African states and 
administrations presented above have lead many scholars to draw 
the conclusion that ideas and reforms are unlikely to be understood 
and implemented in African countries in the same way as they are in 
other contexts. Scholars argue that administrative models and reforms 
deriving from international communities or Western countries lack 
domestic legitimacy in African countries and they are ill suited for the 
African context, consequently such reforms are likely to fail. Instead, 
it is argued that African countries primarily ought to develop their 
own administrative structures and models, which better encompass 
the unique character of their societies (e.g. Abrahamson 2000; Ake 
1996; Bayart 2009; Dia 1996; Englebert 2009; Jones & Blunt 1993; 
Leonard 1987). Though some scholars do not completely reject the 
idea of using Western models in African administrations, they still 
emphasize that foreign models are in great need of adjustment to suit 
the prevailing specific local circumstances, in order to be sustainable 
(e.g. Diamond 2004; Grindle 1998a; Hyden 2006; World Bank 2005).
 These arguments and conclusions are not only based on the 
historic legacies of administrative reforms and present day statistics 
demonstrating low levels of public sector performance in African 
countries, they are also closely connected to a moral dimension in 
the relationship between Western countries and the rest of the world. 
In this line of argument, Western world hegemony is regarded as 
problematic since Western standards and norms are spread and 
viewed as “development” and “modernization”, at the expense of 
other cultures and traditions (e.g. Ake 1996; Ekeh 1975; Hettne 
2009; Said 1978; Young 2001). Thus, also from a moral perspective, 
the importance of each society building their own state structures is 
regarded as crucial. In particular this may be considered essential for 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the experience of imposed 
structures has been severe and depraving. 
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Organizations and professions in the public sector
- also in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Another approach to public administrations in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is to regard them primarily as organizations, and if we turn to a body 
of literature examining the behavior of organizations, the picture 
presented is very different. The literature on organizations focused 
on here is less normative than the development literature discussed 
above, since there are fewer discussions on whether administrative 
structures are compatible or not with underlying societal values, 
norms and informal structures or whether their introduction is 
appropriate or not from a moral perspective. This may be compared 
to the development literature where this constitutes a major part of 
the explanation for why development in many African countries has 
been poor, and administrative reforms have failed. In this strand of 
organization research, the theoretical assumptions are based instead 
on empirical observations of how organizations have responded to the 
actions of other similar organizations and how administrative reforms 
have spread among organizations, within regions as well as across 
countries. 
 This strand of research on organizations takes its point 
of departure from an influential article by two organizational 
sociologists, Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1983), who 
started by questioning the, at the time, mainstream organizational 
theory, which primarily focused on explaining why organizations 
were so different. Since DiMaggio and Powell found that several 
empirical studies had actually proved significant similarities among 
organizations, they turned their attention to why such homogeneity 
occurred. In their article, they argued that when new types of 
organizations are created they might start out with diversified modes 
of organizing. However, when several other organizations in the 
same category, i.e. within the same organizational field, eventually are 
established they would gradually all end up being strikingly similar:
16
For reasons that we will explain, highly structured organizational fields 
provide a context in which individual efforts to deal rationally with 
uncertainty and constraint often lead in the aggregate, to homogeneity 
in structure, culture, and output. 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p. 147) 
To explain this behavior, DiMaggio and Powell identify three different 
forces, a coercive, a normative and an imitative pressure, which they 
claim influence organizations to become homogenous, in structure 
and in practice. They label the mechanisms institutional isomorphism, 
stressing the pressure for organizations to adapt to key institutional 
elements as the primary reason for change, rather than competition 
for resources and profit. Since the influential work of DiMaggio and 
Powell, isomorphic mechanisms and how organizations accordingly 
adapt to them have been studied extensively, and the theoretical 
as well as the empirical scope of the research has been broadened 
considerably (for a review see Greenwood et al. 2008). 
 The coercive isomorphic mechanism refers primarily to 
how organizations have to adapt to binding rules and regulation. 
Such regulation is normally issued by the government and through 
similar regulation for organizations within the same field, it will create 
similarities among the organizations (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). The 
other two forces, the normative and the imitative pressure, operate 
differently. The normative mechanism operates primarily through 
professions that, several scholars argue, are of substantive importance 
for understanding the behavior of organizations (e.g. Abbott 1988; 
Meyer et al. 1997; Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings 2002; Scott 2001). 
Professions normally share the same educational background and 
they, in addition meet in professional associations and networks, 
nationally and internationally (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Gibbons 
2004). Such professional associations and networks often become 
arenas for spreading ideas and norms, and the common professional 
identity is argued to make adapting the ideas of their professional 
peers very likely (c.f. Berger & Luckmann 1967; Borrás & Jacobson 
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2004; Gibbons 2004; Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings 2002; Mörth 
2008; Sahlin-Andersson 2000). Likewise, processes of imitation often 
build on identification with others. Scholars argue that organizations 
tend to imitate other organizations with which they identify, as well 
as tending to imitate organizations that they would like to resemble, 
i.e. more successful organizations (e.g. Frumkin & Galaskiewicz 2004; 
Haveman 1993; Tolbert & Zucker 1983; Sauder &Landcaster 2006; 
Sevón 1996; Slack &Hinings 1994). What is to be regarded as success 
among the organizations may well be defined and spread by various 
actors, such as consultant agencies (Deephouse 1996; Slack & Hinings 
1994) professional associations (Wedlin 2007), the state, or the general 
public (Deephouse 1996). 
 Although several studies have been conducted within 
the same national context, a substantial number of scholars argue 
that normative and mimetic pressures in particular, impact on 
organizational behavior at the international level as well (for a review 
see Dobbin, Simmons & Garret 2007). Similarly, the impact of 
international norms on domestic level policies has been illustrated in 
several studies in the literature on international relations (e.g. Checkel 
2001; Cortell & Davis 1996; 2000; Finnemore 1993; Greenhill 2010; 
Holzinger, Knill & Sommerer 2008; Ikenberry & Kupchan 1990; 
Johnston 2001; Kelley 2004;). For instance, studies demonstrate how 
domestic actors, such as activists or professional groups, are able to 
appeal to international conventions in order to promote their ideas 
and work for a change in domestic policies (Cortell & Davis 1996; 
Finnemore & Sikkink 1998), or how membership in international 
organizations has led to the adaptation of norms and the creation 
of similar structures and policies in states over time (Greenhill 
2010; Holzinger, Knill & Sommerer 2008; Sandholtz & Gray 2003). 
Although this literature provides valuable insights to understanding 
how international norms impact the behavior of individual states, the 
analytical level of these studies in general is still at the level of national 
policies and state structures. Since the focus of this study is at the level 
of individual public sector organizations, the organization theory 
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strand as presented above, and further developed in chapter two, is 
likely to provide a more suitable theoretical framework for the study, 
than the literature on international relations. 
 Another strand of research on organizations is the “translation 
literature”, which has become dominant in Scandinavian research on 
organizations, in particular regarding the spread and adaptation of 
ideas and reforms in the public sector (c.f. Greenwood et al. 2008). 
Since this theoretical approach has become popular in Scandinavia for 
explaining the travel of global ideas, how they land and are translated 
in various places, it may be relevant to discuss why this theoretical 
approach was not found to be appropriate in this study. Scholars 
within this tradition regard isomorphic mechanisms as drivers for 
why public organizations do implement reforms when they are not 
forced by regulation; however, they emphasize the differences in 
outcome between organizations. In various case studies, these scholars 
illustrate that, despite claiming adaptation of reforms, all organizations 
use (or translate) ideas and adopt reforms differently. In this strand 
in the organization literature, it is argued that all organizations do 
things differently, regardless of whether it is two public health care 
organizations within the same city, two municipalities within the same 
country or two cities in different countries (Czarniawska & Sevón 
2005). This may be compared with the development literature, where 
scholars argue that there is a difference between Western countries and 
African countries, which makes transfer of organizational models and 
ideas from Western countries to Africa problematic.  
 Hence, in the development literature, public administrations 
and their environment in Western countries are all regarded as being 
fairly similar, and their specific characteristics are regarded as different 
from their African equivalences. In contrast, the translation literature 
considers all organizations and all their local contexts as different 
regardless of where they are located geographically. Against this 
background, to develop new knowledge about public administration 
reforms in African countries, the theory of translation,as well as the 
theoretical approach of considering practices in all organizations 
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around the world as different,couldnot be considered to be especially 
useful. Instead, the application of the theory of isomorphism, as 
argued by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and scholars following their 
theoretical argument is more likely to generate a better theoretical 
framework for a fruitful description and analysis of the features 
of administrations and the behavior of public officials in African 
countries.
The puzzle
As illustrated above, the theory of isomorphic mechanisms claims 
that apart from coercive pressures, normative as well as imitative 
mechanisms are highly influential on organizations, and their 
impact on organizations within the same fields will cause them 
to become homogenous in structure and practice, even across 
national boundaries. According to this theory, state audit institutions 
around the world should turn out to be similar in structure and 
in practice. The ambition of this theory is universal, consequently 
these mechanisms are supposed to operate in similar manners in 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as they do in Western countries. Yet, 
there are few studies of these mechanisms on organizations in Sub-
Saharan Africa; rather studies within this tradition have been mainly 
conducted on organizations in Western countries. Consequently, we 
know little about if and by what means this theory is accurate for Sub-
Saharan African contexts.  
 Turning to the literature describing and analyzing 
African public sector organizations, the picture presented of these 
organizations is very different. In contrast to what organization 
scholars argue is the nature of organizations, namely to be affected by 
the actions of similar organization regardless of geographical location, 
the adoption of foreign, in particular Western, models and practices 
in Sub-Saharan African organizations is regarded as problematic. 
Within this body of literature, it is argued that the behavior of African 
public organizations and public officials is determined mainly by their 
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local political and socio-economic contexts. Administrative reforms 
with Western origins are regarded more as part of coercive pressure, 
consequently, there is little discussion on the impact of voluntary 
isomorphic mechanisms and how that may affect public officials’ view 
of what is considered appropriate practice. 
 In cases where similarities with Western public organizations 
are found, such as the resemblance of formal administrative 
structures in African public sector organizations to Western 
administrations, these features are claimed to be merely artificial 
and to have no real impact on the organizations (c. f. Bratton & Van 
de Walle 1997; Diamond 2010; Ekeh 1975; Hyden 2006). Likewise, 
it is claimed that small groups of elites in African societies are 
willing to imitate Western behavior; however, they are regarded 
as small exclusive groups, in general educated abroad in Western 
countries. Consequently, the actions of elite groups are not regarded 
as representing general public officials, educated in their own 
country, nor are their actions discussed as influencing African public 
administrations to any great extent (c.f. Bayart 2009, p. 27; Ekeh 1975; 
Englebert 2000; Young 2001). 
 Due to the large differences in context, political and 
administrative cultures and due to the moral dimension of the 
relationship between West and Africa, scholars within development 
literature argue that it is inappropriate to transfer Western or 
international structures and practices to public organizations in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Public sector reforms rather need to encompass 
the specific character of the African administration and build on 
domestic solutions. Alternatively, at least, it is strongly emphasized 
that Western or international models are in great need of adjustment 
to suit prevailing African local contexts, in order to be sustainable 
over time. Despite the argumentation and conclusions drawn by 
development scholars, there are in reality few empirical studies 
demonstrating how public officials handle foreign administrative 
reforms and international practices and ideas, in relation to their 
local circumstances. The literature may be normative but we know 
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less of the views of African public officials, in this case the public 
auditors, and how they regard the relationship between Western or 
international practices and their local context. Is it their ambition to 
build their own structures in line with their national specific context? 
Alternatively, if African public officials use Western or international 
administrative practices as a role model, what adjustments do they 
find necessary to make considering the local context? 
 The two bodies of literature presented here provide different 
understandings of public administration reforms in countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. It may well be difficult for both theories to be 
equally correct in their descriptions and analysis; but, which theory 
provides the most accurate understanding of African public sector 
organizations, and for which aspects? Thus, the aim of this study is to 
test these two theoretical approaches in an empirical study, within the 
field of state audit. A further clarification of the aim will be presented 
in the next section. 
The state audit case
As argued in the introduction, having an independent actor to 
verify how public resources are administered is a central idea in how 
we think about democracy, which has long historic roots in how 
the democratic state is organized. Already in the early Athenian 
democracy, public officials were held accountable for their actions. 
Public officials informed the elected assembly of their performance 
on a regular basis, and in cases of unsatisfactory reports, they could 
be held accountable in front of a jury of citizens (Day & Klein 1987). 
To monitor how public officials administered public funds, there 
were specific public servants, the auditors, who were entrusted with 
this specific duty. The establishment of a mechanism such as audit, 
however, has not only been the practice in democratic societies, 
throughout history queens, kings and other rulers have also used 
officials as auditors to control how other officials used the resources 
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with which they were entrusted (Normanton 1966; see also Frisk 
Jensen 2008). 
 Although the significance of audit has been neglected by 
democracy theorists (Ahlbäck 1999), a considerable amount of 
research has noted a general increase and growing trust in audit and 
inspection activities. Deregulation and decentralization of the public 
sector has increased demands for measurable results and verification 
of public sector activities. As a part of this growing demand for 
verification, scholars argue that various kinds of audit have increased 
in scope as well as in significance (Dye & Staphenhurst 1998; 
Gendron, Cooper & Townley 2007; Guénin-Paracini & Gendron 2010; 
Hood et al. 1999; Johansson 2006; Pentland 2000; Power 1999; 2005; 
Rose-Ackerman 2005; Skaerbaek 2009). 
 While the choice of audit institutions, as an area of public 
administration reform, could be regarded as manifest due to their 
central position in the organization of the state in a democratic 
society, it is of particular significance for this study that state audit 
can be regarded as a Western administrative practice, established 
among other administrative structures on colonial territories by the 
colonial powers (Wunsch 2000, p. 505). Consequently, state audit is 
an example of a Western administrative structure that, it is argued, is 
incompatible with African societies, or which needs to be significantly 
adjusted to suit African contexts. As previously discussed, the public 
auditors are the “checking functionaries”, i.e. they are the public 
officials who control the separation of public and private resources 
as well as ensuring that public officials within the state follow the 
formal rules and procedures. If we consider the description of public 
sector organizations in African countries given in the literature 
where the absence of formal rules and regulation as well as the use of 
public office and public resources for private or particularistic group 
(like kinship) benefits are claimed to be the essence of how African 
bureaucracies operate. Then, the character of the audit profession 
should mean that if there were any group of public officials, where the 
differences claimed in norms between the Western “Weberian” public 
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auditor and the African reality and behavior would conflict and be 
made apparent, it is reasonable to believe it will be among auditors.
 Additionally, in general, public sector organizations 
consist of professions, in some respects similar to state auditors, 
for instance doctors, nurses, firemen, teachers and police officers 
(Lipsky 1983). Consequently, there are reasons to believe that the 
results from this study of state auditors should be applicable to other 
public sector professionals. Moreover, within audit there are several 
development programs, multilateral through their professional 
organizations, as well as bilateral arrangements between state audit 
institutions in Western countries and developing, including African, 
countries. Consequently, the question of the possibilities for transfer 
organizational models and ideas between countries is likely to 
be raised, considered and handled in these organizations.   
 An aspect, which may distinguish auditors from other public 
officials, is that beyond national regulation and national standards, 
their profession is governed by international audit standards, 
established by an international professional organization, the 
International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI).  
Standards are a particular form of rules, which are often spread via 
professional transnational organizations and are directed towards 
certain groups of professionals (Brunsson & Jacobsson 1998). In 
addition, standards and standard-making organizations are based on 
the principles of voluntarism, i.e. membership in such organization is 
normally voluntary and there are no possibilities for standard-making 
organizations to impose standards on individual organizations. 
Likewise, it is not possible to impose sanctions in cases where there 
is no compliance with the standard (c.f. Abbott & Snidal 2000; Ahrne 
& Brunsson 2008; Knoke 1986). The mechanisms for how standards 
and voluntary regulation are spread and adopted by organizations are 
much in line with the arguments for how isomorphic mechanisms of 
imitation and norms work, and will be discussed further in chapter 
two.  
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Thus, apart from representing an old Western administrative practice 
introduced by the colonial powers, state audit is today very much an 
internationally regulated practice. This does not alter, however, its 
relevance for representing Western structures. Due to an asymmetric 
balance in power between the Global South and the Global North, 
international policies are regarded in general as being products of 
the industrialized Western countries rather than being constructed 
and developed by developing countries, subsequently the concepts 
“international” and “Western” are often used in parallel in the 
literature (c.f. Fergusson 2006; Turner & Hulme 1997; Wunsch 2000).2
 As discussed previously, the development literature on public 
administration reforms in Sub-Saharan African countries creates an 
understanding for how African public auditors could be expected 
to treat international audit standards, which differs greatly from 
the understanding emerging from the literature on organizations 
and standards. The picture presented in the development literature 
concerns both what the auditors could be expected to express in terms 
of what it is possible to introduce in their countries and what actions 
they undertake. Following this literature, African auditors could be 
expected to express a wish to have their own method for conducting 
audits, which they would argue would be more suitable for their 
local conditions, and their actions would also demonstrate that they 
relate to audit in a different way than prescribed in the international 
standards. Moreover, if the auditors were to use international audit 
standards, it is reasonable to believe that these auditors would argue 
there were difficulties in using these standards and, most likely, the 
international standards would need to be adjusted to suit the auditors’ 
local African environment. The auditors’ actions could also be 
expected to illustrate similar attitudes towards the standards. 
2 See also Fuseini Haruna (2003; 2009) who discuss the difficulties in transferring management 
practices between Western and African countries. Fuseini Haruna (2003) argues that manage-
ment ideas accepted on an international level and “sweeping in the world” (p. 348) have Anglo 
American roots, which he regards as representing a Western tradition and culture of manage-
ment. 
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As argued above, this body of literature can be contrasted with other 
studies that focus on the behavior of organizations and professionals. 
These studies demonstrate that organizations and professionals 
seek to imitate each other and how they are largely affected by their 
peers’ norms, which are mechanisms resulting in similarities among 
organizations of the same kind, i.e. within the same field, within 
countries and around the world. Following this literature, African 
auditors could be expected primarily to express a wish to adapt to the 
internationally outlined professional standards and imitate other audit 
organizations, and the auditors could be expected to take actions in 
line with this direction. Consequently, African state auditors could 
be expected to behave in a similar manner to that demonstrated in 
studies of organizations in Western countries. Both of the pictures 
given are unlikely to be accurate when tested on African auditors, but 
which theory is the most suitable for understanding how international 
audit standards are treated by African auditors, and out of which 
aspects? Are parts of one theory more relevant for understanding 
and analyzing their situation than others? Alternatively, could a 
combination of the two theories be most truthful for understanding 
public administration reforms in African countries, from the auditors’ 
perspectives?
 The aim of this thesis is to contribute to an understanding 
of how African public auditors handle international public audit 
standards in relation to their context, by testing how the two 
theoretical approaches suit the empirical data collected in the 
study. The aim is further to analyze how and why African auditors 
respond to the international audit standards in the way the data 
collected shows. In the study, context is understood from the two 
theoretical perspectives. Accordingly, it includes their organizational 
environment with standards and professional norms as well as their 
African environment, where it is argued that culture and capacity are 
important aspects of the context. 
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Design of the study
Although theory testing approaches are commonly associated with 
quantitative studies (c.f. Merriam 1994), this is not agreed by all. 
For instance, De Vaus (2001) argues that in the social sciences, 
the empirical fieldwork in case studies should be guided highly 
theoretically: “Without having some idea of what we are looking 
for we will not know what we have found” (p.244). As the quotation 
illustrates, in order to be able to find and include all relevant aspects 
in the empirical context and make generalizations possible, theoretical 
guidance is significant for qualitative as well as quantitative studies 
(ibid). For this study, the character of the questions raised by the two 
bodies of literature, where the focus is on a deeper understanding of 
the complexity of the phenomenon, leads to choosing a few qualitative 
cases, rather than a larger N study (Merriam 2009). 
 In the study, three cases are selected strategically due to 
their relevance for the theoretical propositions, yet the study is not a 
comparative case study in the sense that various factors are singled 
out to explain similarities and differences in outcome (c.f. Lieberson 
1992). The reasons for not conducting such study are firstly, the first 
case is very different in character from the other two. It consists of an 
arena where public auditors from African countries meet, while the 
two other cases are studies of individual state audit organizations in 
two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, focusing on explaining 
similarities and differences in public institutions in two different 
countries, with different historical legacies, would require a much 
deeper historical process-tracing analysis (c.f. George & Bennett 
2005), which is not the ambition of the study. Having said this, 
using more than one single case reduces the risk of choosing a very 
particular case and instead enables the study to discover similarities 
and differences in the empirical data from the cases. Consequently, it 
will provide a more robust test of the theories (De Vaus 2001, p. 226-
227). 
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Moreover, if several cases support the same theory, it increases the 
possibilities that the empirical results are also valid in other similar 
cases (Yin 2009). 
 The first case in the study is the arenas, where public 
auditors from African countries meet. The arenas constitute African 
regional groups in the standard making organization for state audit 
organizations (INTOSAI). These organizations have to administer 
the international standards in relation to their African member 
organizations, and the activities within the arenas could be expected 
to expose how the international standards are discussed and treated 
by participants from various African countries. Arena in the study 
is defined as organizations that: “produce and provide information 
and comparisons, report and propose initiatives for change and 
generally facilitate exchange of experiences, ideas, and ideals” (Sahlin-
Andersson 2000, p. 100). The two African regional organizations 
that were used as arenas were the African Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions in English-speaking Africa (AFROSAI-E) and the 
African Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAI). 
The empirical study focuses on a number of activities and individuals 
within these organizations, as a consequence the study has a stronger 
focus on the sub-regional group, AFROSAI-E, since they performed a 
larger number of activities in the region. 
 The second and third cases in the study consist of studies 
of the state audit institutions, or more precisely, the Supreme Audit 
Institutions (SAIs) in Namibia and Botswana. Although the study 
of the arenas provides valuable information about the Sub-Saharan 
African context of public auditors, it is at the level of individual 
organizations that auditors actually have to handle their domestic 
circumstances in relation to the international standards. Within the 
individual SAI, they have to make adjustments to the standards so 
they will suit their local circumstances, alternatively promote their 
local unique audit models. Thus, in order to be able to capture how 
public auditors in Sub-Saharan Africa handle international audit 
standards, it was judged that a combination of country cases and a 
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study of the arenas would provide a rich and informative basis for the 
empirical study.   
 For the selection of SAIs in two countries, some criteria 
were central. The most important aspect was to provide a situation 
where the auditors could respond in accordance with both theories. 
Consequently, the auditors needed to be aware of the existence and 
the content of the international public audit standards. To enable 
the auditors to argue for adjustments to the standards to suit their 
local circumstances as well as defining what such adjustments would 
consist of, alternatively rejecting the use of international standards 
and instead promoting models more in line with their circumstances, 
the selected SAIs needed to have handled the standards to some extent 
in their organizations. By choosing countries that had been exposed to 
the standards would make it possible for the organizations to make a 
conscious choice between constructing their own unique solutions or 
following international audit standards as far as possible. 
 Another important aspect was to select countries that were 
not among the poorest. In accordance with the theory, as will be 
discussed in chapter two, the fact that many countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa suffer from a lack of resources naturally affects their public 
institutions to a great extent. However, the more interesting part of 
the literature on public administrations in African countries is where 
scholars describe these organizations as fundamentally different from 
their Western equivalents, which implies that Western models suitable 
for Western public institutions are not suitable for countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Thus, country cases were also selected on the grounds 
that it would be not only lack of resources that would influence the 
organizations to act in certain directions, since that would overshadow 
other aspects of how and why the standards are handled in various 
ways in the two organizations.  
 The SAI of Namibia and the SAI of Botswana are both 
members of the AFROSAI-E and during the study of the arenas 
it became apparent that these organizations had been exposed to 
international public audit standards through several regional events. 
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This made it likely that both SAIs would have reflected on the 
implementation of international standards and the extent to which the 
standards are appropriate in their countries; consequently, Namibia 
and Botswana were expected to be informative cases. Additionally, 
Namibia and Botswana are both regarded as middle-income 
countries: thus, although the lack of resources isalso likely to affect 
the SAIs in these countries, in the selection of Sub-Saharan African 
countries they belong to the countries where the situation is likely to 
be better. 
 In addition, the countries are geographically adjacent to 
each other in Southern Africa, they differ to some extent in size 
but both countries have large deserts and populations of about 
the same size, around two million citizens. Likewise, Namibia and 
Botswana are placed roughly equal on the human development 
index and, in an African context, the two countries have rather low 
levels of corruption. Both countries use the Westminster system as 
their audit system and the two SAIs are about the same size with 
roughly 80 auditors working in the organization. By using country 
contexts, which to some extent are similar in levels of development, 
size and population, the reasons for similarities and differences in 
how their audit organizations handle the standards may be more 
comprehensible.  
 Naturally, Namibia and Botswana differ in several aspects, 
and a more detailed description of each country is given in chapters 
five and six. For the design discussion, it may be interesting to note 
that Botswana is regarded generally as a successful African country. 
Botswana was not a colony in the traditional sense, but constituted a 
British protectorate for a period between the end of the 19th century 
and 1966, when it became independent. Botswana is also recognized 
by scholars to be country with high levels of good governance (c.f. 
Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2003). Namibia, on the other hand, 
has a history of oppressive colonial rule under the Germans, and later 
during its annexation by South Africa. Namibia became independent 
as late as 1990, after a long war for independence and with deep 
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conflicts along ethnic lines (Du Pisani 2010; Lindeke 1995; Melber 
2010). However, it is difficult to predict how the above differences 
will affect how international public audit standards will be handled by 
public audit institutions today. Although it would be possible to argue 
that it is likely Botswana would implement the international audit 
standards to a large extent, due to its reputation of good governance, 
having a strong domestic government may just as well imply a limited 
interest in supporting a resilient audit office, monitoring the work of 
the government. As discussed above, the cases are chosen primarily 
because they are likely to be informative and interesting cases based 
on the two different theoretical approaches, accordingly two audit 
organizations within Sub-Saharan Africa have been selected that were 
judged to constitute such cases. 
 The methodology chosen in the three cases slightly differ 
among them. To create initially a broad picture of the Sub-Saharan 
African context for public auditors, multiple sources were used in 
the first case study of the arenas (Burgess 1984; Yin 2009). In the 
arenas, there were possibilities to conduct several days of observations 
at conferences, training courses and meetings, as well as to have 
more informal conversations with the auditors during coffee and 
lunch breaks. In addition, personal interviews were conducted and 
documents produced within the regional corporation were studied. 
These combined methodologies, carried out for the first case study 
provided a rich initial picture of the Sub-Saharan African public audit 
context. 
 At the two individual SAIs in Namibia and Botswana, 
personal interviews with the auditors were conducted and documents, 
to some extent, were studied. The choice of personal interviews was 
made because of the qualitative nature of the study: “Interviewing is 
necessary when we cannot observe behavior, feelings, or how people 
interpret the world around them” (Merriam 2009, p. 88). Hence, to be 
also able to capture the auditors’ thoughts and possible feelings about 
the relationship between the standards and their local conditions, 
personal interviews were chosen as the main methodology in Namibia 
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and Botswana. The interviews conducted were semi-structured, 
which allowed for aspects within the theoretical approaches to be 
covered well, as well as being flexible enough to respond to and 
explore new aspects revealed during the interview situation (c.f. 
Merriam 2009). The reason for not continuing with a combination of 
methodologies, where observations would also be included, was due 
to the time constraints. The analytical framework for interpreting how 
the two audit institutions act in relation to what is described in the 
international standards was judged to provide sufficient information 
to test the two theoretical approaches empirically, at the level of 
individual organizations.3
Chapter plan
The theoretical framework, on which the study is based, which 
was presented briefly in the first chapter, is developed further in 
chapter two. In that chapter, a historic overview of the introduction 
of various Western administrative structures in African societies 
is also provided, starting in colonial times until the era of reforms 
to achieve “good governance”. This historic background adds to 
the understanding of the normative character in the development 
literature as well as to its suggestions for creating unique African 
models or the importance of adjusting imported ones. In the second 
chapter, organizational theories of isomorphism, standards and 
standard-making organizations are also presented. Each section in the 
chapter ends with an outline of a theoretical proposition, which acts as 
a prediction for what the auditors may be expected to express and how 
they are expected to act, according to the two theories. 
3 A more detailed discussed of the methodology in the study of the arenas is held in the 
beginning of chapter three, where the results from this study is presented. Similarly, a more 
detailed description of the methodology in the cases of the individual SAIs is provided at the 
end of chapter four. In addition, a list of all interviews and observations conducted, documents 
studied and interview guides used are found in the Appendix. 
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In the third chapter, the study of the arenas is presented. In the 
introduction to the third chapter, there is a detailed discussion of the 
methodology and the data collected in this part of the study. There 
is a more detailed discussion about audit and international public 
audit standards in chapter four, where the organization that issues the 
standards for Supreme Audit Institutions, INTOSAI, is also presented. 
The theoretical discussion of the character of audit and what is argued 
to be important features for state audit institutions in the international 
audit standards is operationalized into model of a Supreme Audit 
Institution, presented at the end of chapter four. The model is then 
used as an analytical framework for the case studies conducted in 
Namibia and Botswana. At the end of chapter four, there is also a 
methodological discussion of the case studies of the SAIs in Namibia 
and Botswana. The reason for chapters three and four being presented 
in this order is because the Supreme Audit Institution model was 
created as a theoretical framework for the SAI cases and was not used 
for the arena study. Consequently, it becomes more appropriate to 
present the framework in connection to the chapters presenting the 
results from the SAIs in Namibia and Botswana. 
 Chapters five and six start with country presentations, 
followed by presentations of the results integrated with a theoretical 
analysis. The seventh chapter gives an overall analysis of the main 
results in the study and a discussion with regards to the propositions 
outlined in chapter two. The eighth chapter summarizes the main 
results and discusses their implications for theory and practice, as well 
as providing suggestions for further research within the field. 
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CHAPTER 2
Development and Organizations
As presented in the previous chapter, in the literature on development4 
there is a widespread assumption that it is not possible or desirable 
to transfer organizational practices and ideas from industrialized, i.e. 
Western countries to African countries. This assumption also includes 
so called international ideas and practices since, due to the global 
asymmetric power balance, they generally represent Western standards 
and norms. According to scholars representing this view, African 
countries should primarily develop their own organizational models 
and frameworks, in line with their local traditions and their own local 
circumstances (e.g. Abrahamsen 2000; Abutudu 2001; Ake 1996; Dia 
1996; Jones & Blunt 1993; Leonard 1987; Morrison-Knowles 2010; 
Zhang & Thomas 2009). If Western models were to be implemented in 
African countries, they would need to be adjusted and adapted to fit the 
local contexts in these countries (e.g. Diamond 2004; Grindle 1998a; 
Hettne 2009; Hyden 1983; 2006; World Bank 2005) 
In another body of literature, a number of organizational 
scholars try to explain organizational behavior and why organizations 
commonly show similar characteristics (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; 
Deephouse 1996; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz 2004; Greenwood, 
4 What is defined here as the “development approach” started as critique against mainstream 
development thinking, where Western societies represented modernization, and other countries 
would follow in their paths (c.f. Hettne 2009). This critique, I argue, now constitutes a dominant 
part of the literature, where the view of implementing Western models and structures without 
considering the local context is disserted by scholars as well as practitioners.  
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Suddaby & Hinings 2002; Haveman 1993; Kennedy & Fiss 2009; 
Meyer 2000; Meyer et al. 1997; Slack & Hinings 1994; Tolbert & 
Zucker 1983). 
 These scholars argue that the same kind of organizations, 
regardless of where they are located geographically, strive to imitate 
each other. Due to various mechanisms, organizations engaged in 
similar assignments will eventually end up harmonized in structure, 
policies as well as in practice. Organizational scholars claim that 
this behavior is valid for organizations worldwide, i.e. they do not 
differentiate developing or African countries from industrialized 
countries. However, the empirical studies on which they base their 
assumptions are conducted mainly in industrialized, i.e. Western, 
countries. Therefore, there is little knowledge of whether the theories 
are valid for public organizations in developing countries. 
 The two bodies of literature create different understandings of 
how public organizations in developing countries respond to foreign 
ideas and practices. According to organizational theorists, there 
should be no major differences in how organizations in developing 
countries handle foreign structures compared to organizations 
in various industrialized countries. In contrast, according to 
development scholars, public organizations in developing countries 
are facing a context so different that it would be difficult to implement 
foreign organizational models. In particular, it would be difficult 
to implement administrative structures and models that originated 
in Western countries. If there were an attempt to implement such 
models, major adjustments would have to be made to make them suit 
local circumstances in these contexts. 
 The aim with this chapter is to provide a review of the two 
bodies of literature, and to outline two propositions accordingly. The 
propositions are predictions for how we could expect the international 
audit standards to be handled by public auditors in an African context 
according to each theory. The chapter starts with a short overview 
of Western administrative reforms in African countries in modern 
history. Naturally, this overview is brief, and it is intended primarily to 
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create a background to understanding the context for the discussion 
of public administration reforms in African countries today.  
Western administration structures in Africa
Since the colonial period, there have been various efforts to introduce 
Western structures and models into African societies. During 
colonialism, the European colonizing powers introduced their 
governmental structures in their African colonies. The European 
public administration had its roots in the formation of state structures 
in Europe during the nineteenth century. The character of this 
administration is often referred to as a “Weberian bureaucracy”, due to 
its base in the professionalism of public officials and legalism in terms 
of how the public affairs are supposed to be handled. The difference 
between the structures established in Europe and the ones transferred 
to the colonies was the racist ideology and practice of the structures 
(Young 1994). Africans had to comply with European laws and 
administrative regulations, although they had no access to any rights 
as European citizens had. Within this direct rule, where European 
structures were established in the colonies, very few of the traditional 
African institutions were recognized (Mamdani 1996). In addition to 
direct rule, the colonial powers also exercised their control indirectly, 
through the use of existing traditional structures and through 
controlling the local chiefs. The two ways of ruling were often used in 
parallel, where indirect rule was common in rural areas and the direct 
rule was practiced in the larger towns and capitals (ibid). 
 A breaking point for the colonial administrations was 
the Second World War, where Africans participated on the side 
of their colonial powers. After the war, there was no possibility of 
returning to the conditions before the war, since Africans had made 
significant contributions to the war and their expectations had 
changed. Nationalist movements started to grow and they demanded 
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expanded rights as well as independence. Accordingly, the colonial 
powers began to increase the rights for Africans in their colonies. For 
instance, the British established ways enabling educated Africans to 
work in the central and local administrations as well as extending 
their possibilities to education (Young 1994 p. 182-186). Although 
there was a change of attitudes among the colonizing powers after 
the war, naturally the gradual expansion of rights was not only due to 
the generosity of the colonial powers, but also a result of struggle and 
resistance from the African people. 
 Although a significant amount of aid projects had been 
carried out by voluntary organizations, mainly churches, and by 
governments throughout the colonial period, the period after the 
Second World War is generally regarded as the starting point for 
larger amounts of aid to the developing countries (Riddell 2007 p. 
24-29). Taking inspiration from the Marshall plan, and how well it 
proved to work in Europe, the aim was to create the same success in 
the developing world.5 The main focus of the Marshall plan in Europe 
was infrastructure, which also became a large part of the development 
programs in African countries. In addition to infrastructural 
programs, technical assistance programs to strengthen the capacity 
of institutions in the developing countries also characterized the 
first period of aid (ibid). At that time, the predominant idea was 
that administrative state structures in African countries could be 
developed mainly by transferring and replicating models from 
industrialized, i.e. Western, countries. No account was taken of 
possible specific characteristic in the African context; instead, what 
had been proven to be successful in Western countries was assumed to 
have the same effect in these countries (Hyden 2006; Turner & Hulme 
1997).6
5 The Marshall plan was an initiative from the US secretary of State, George Marshall, who in 
1948 held a speech in which he presented his very ambitious plan of aid for the reconstruction of 
Europe after World War II (Riddell 2007, p. 24) .     
6 See also Messick (1999) for a discussion of similar efforts to transfer juridical models from the 
United States to developing countries. 
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After several African countries had become independent, during 
a short period in the 1970s, there was an attempt to reform the 
governmental administrations in African countries into development 
administrations. The character of the colonial administration had 
been a stiff and bureaucratic organization and in the 1970s this kind 
of organizational structure was considered to having difficulties in 
handling the new challenges of development after independence. The 
new development administration was supposed to be more flexible 
and more like an entrepreneur in the role of developing society 
(Hyden 1983 p. 76). 
 The new development administration approach did not 
last very long. Nor was it possible to return to the old bureaucratic 
structures, even if there were African public officials who argued 
for the advantages of a more “Weberian” bureaucratic structure. 
Since these structures were considered to represent the old colonial 
system, such voices were ignored in general. Hyden (1983) argues 
that this period created room for new patrimonial structures to 
be established, where public officials did not separate private from 
public and where the reliance was on informal relationships instead 
of formal institutions ( p. 75-79, 2006 p. 65-66, see also Young 1994 p. 
290-292). Others argue that this parallel system, where informal rules 
override formal structures, was already established at the beginning 
of the colonial period. Since the public administration represented 
a Western colonial system, the loyalty of African public officials 
was directed instead towards informal networks, in terms of family 
ties or tribe affiliation. This created a situation with two structures 
existing in parallel (Ekeh 1975), which continued to exist even after 
independence. Even though new informal rules and networks based 
on new loyalties, were then created (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997). 
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Structural adjustment programs
Due to the deep economic crisis in many African countries during the 
late 1970s and 1980s, the international community encouraged the 
introduction of economic reforms, in terms of structural adjustment 
programs, in several African countries. These economic reforms were 
defined and created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank and in brief, they implied demands for a diminished 
state and public administration, as well as a more limited state 
regulation of markets (Van de Walle 2001). Similar reforms had been 
implemented with the results expected in Latin America and Asia and 
thus, it was thought that the programs would have the same effects in 
Africa (Hyden 2006). 
 The adjustment programs did not turn out well in the African 
countries. Their effects were viewed by critics as increasing poverty 
and harsher living conditions for many Africans (Abrahamsen 2000). 
However, the IMF and the World Bank defended their programs, 
claiming that failure and negative effects was not a fair description 
of the programs, since the adjustment programs were never fully 
implemented in many of the countries (Van de Walle 2001). The 
critics claim that the structural adjustment programs were not the 
appropriate solutions for economic problems in Africa. For example, 
it was argued that they made the markets more inflexible due to the 
decreased ability of the state to use economic instruments. 
 Furthermore, it was argued that it was not an over-
dimensioned public administration in Africa that was the problem; 
rather its lack of efficiency (Van de Walle 2001). Thus, despite the 
success of the programs in other regions, the criticism emphasized 
that these programs failed to a large extent to take the specific features 
of African societies into account (Olowu 2003; Hyden 2006; Van de 
Walle 2001).  In the words of Hyden (2006):
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Structural adjustment packages were often quite rigid and even 
though they may have worked in Latin America or Asian economies, 
the structural conditions in Africa are sufficiently different that it is 
necessary to consider the problem of design of these policies. 
(Hyden 2006 p. 131) 
Hence, as illustrated by the quotation by Goran Hyden, the failure to 
take the context into consideration contributed to the failure of the 
reforms, regardless of the degree of implementation.  
Good governance
Poor governance became the international community’s explanation 
for the failure, or lack of implementation, of the structural 
adjustment programs (Van de Walle 2001). For actors like the 
World Bank, poor governance soon became an explanation for the 
overall weak development in the African countries as well: “Even 
more fundamental in many countries is the deteriorating quality 
of government, pervasive rent seeking, weak juridical systems, and 
arbitrary decision-making” (World Bank 1989 p. 3). The solution 
became to increase capacity and improve quality in the public 
administrations. Although the importance of governance was brought 
up the World Bank report in 1989, it was not until the late 1990s that 
the international community started to focus more heavily on the 
importance of good governance. Evans and Rauch (1999) state that 
the bank’s World Development Report in 1997 constituted a change 
in the view of development. Now, the importance of the state and the 
administration was much more in focus in the development discourse. 
The World Bank (1997) expresses its view as follows: 
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Over time, even the smallest increases in the capability of the state 
have been shown to make a vast difference to the quality of people’s 
lives, not least because reforms tend to produce their own virtuous 
circles. Small improvements in the state’s effectiveness lead to higher 
standards of living, in turn paving the way for more reforms and future 
development. 
(World Bank 1997 p. 15)
The way good government is described and measured, in terms 
of improvements in the public sector, resembles much of the 
bureaucratic systems in Western countries. Good government is 
characterized by meritocratic recruitment (Evans & Rauch 1999), 
professionalism (World Bank 1997) as well as efficiency and 
effectiveness (Grindle 1998b), which is usually how the traditional 
Western bureaucracy is also described. 
 One way of realizing good governance in developing 
countries has been through various capacity building programs 
in the public sector. In donor countries, several public authorities 
have development cooperation programs with their counterparts in 
African countries. Swedish authorities undertaking such programs 
are for instance, the Swedish Tax Agency, Statistics Sweden and as 
the Swedish National Audit Office. The idea is not just to increase the 
capacity through technical solutions and an increase of resources. 
Rather the focus is on the transfer of knowledge and practices 
between the authorities. 
 One could argue that these administrative reform efforts 
and capacity building programs are similar to the efforts made to 
introduce Western structures throughout history (c.f. Abrahamsen 
2000). However, there is now a change in the discourse, and the idea 
that structures and practices need to be adjusted to suit the prevailing 
local circumstances is emerging. In reports from the World Bank, they 
claim that if good governance is to be realized, it has to be built on 
local traditions and be adjusted to the prevailing circumstances in the 
country (World Bank 1989; 2005). This approach is also mirrored in 
the donor community, through their increased focus on partnership 
and ownership. In the 2005 Paris Declaration, the donor community 
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agreed upon terms for increased aid effectiveness. In the declaration, 
ownership and alignment were recognized as principle concepts upon 
which development aid should be built (OECD 2005). According 
to the declaration, ownership should be understood as leadership 
and it is emphasized that leadership of developments programs 
should be taken by the partner countries. The programs should be 
incorporated into their national plans, and the partner countries 
should coordinate them between different donors. Furthermore, all 
projects should be aligned to the national institutions and practices, 
i.e. development programs should be based on the countries’ own 
views of development, and follow those directions (OECD 2005; see 
also Sida 2005). 
 Despite the attention to ownership, alignment and 
adjustments to local circumstances, critics claim that the international 
community is still only interested in introducing its own ideas of 
what constitutes good government. Abrahamsen (2000) expresses 
it as follows: “On the face of it, these suggestions are very seductive 
and almost common-sensical. The expressed desire to build on a 
society’s own values rather than imported ones, would today be 
endorsed by both the political left and right” (p. 49). In Abrahamsen’s 
(2000) critique, she claims that this approach is problematic since it 
decouples the new agenda from earlier efforts to introduce foreign 
structures in African societies. She argues that the international 
community believes that it now has discovered “the real solution to 
Africa’s problems”, and despite previous mistakes, it continues to claim 
the “moral right” of developing the African societies. Furthermore, 
Abrahamsen (2000) argues that the good government imperative is 
problematic since its model, the Weberian bureaucracy, is “alien to 
Africa” and that attempts to implement such models “delegitimizes 
state-led development” (p. 49). Other scholars are perhaps more 
nuanced saying that reforms to improve the public institutions are 
necessary for development in African societies. However, despite their 
positive view of these reforms, they also focus on the necessity of 
taking the context into consideration and adjusting the reforms to the 
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local circumstances (e.g. Hyden 2006; Diamond 2004; Grindle 1998a; 
Olowu 2003). For instance, Diamond (2004) stresses that for reforms 
to succeed there is a need for “home-grown” initiatives (p. 279). 
Moreover, he argues that coercive pressure on developing countries 
to adopt certain policies and practices will not be sustainable. Instead, 
he emphasizes that, to create long-term sustainable reforms, it is 
important for the country itself to create, “a package of reforms that is 
unique to and owned by the country” (ibid). 
 In sum, when public administration reforms in African 
countries are discussed, many scholars within the development 
literature draw the same conclusions, i.e. that it is not possible or 
desirable for organizations in developing countries to converge 
on the same practices that are used in Western countries. If they 
were to borrow models, these models would have to be adjusted to 
the prevailing specific context in their countries. To support this 
conclusion, various arguments of differing character are used in the 
literature. The arguments are often mixed and combined within the 
same discussion, but to clarify why scholars and practitioners in 
the field draw this conclusion, I have separated the arguments into 
different categories. 
Avoiding imperialism – each society should 
develop on its own terms
A first argument for why foreign or Western structures should not 
be implemented in African countries rests on the idea that each 
society should determine its own development. This argumentation 
is primarily moral, and constitutes a general critique against the 
concepts of development and modernization. The claim to moral 
superiority from Western countries on the African continent in 
particular has a long history. Ekeh (1975) asks:  “What were the 
ideologies invoked by the colonizers to legitimate their rule of 
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Africa?” (p. 97) and he focuses in his explanation on how missionaries 
claimed their moral superiority over Africans. The missionaries 
claimed to be saving Africans from their ancestor worship, as well as 
from the rest of their past and their culture. Africans were supposed 
to forget about their past and instead openly, in the words of Ekeh 
(1975): “embrace the present in the new symbolisms of Christianity 
and Western Culture”.  Modernization is regarded here as a part of 
the Western worldwide cultural hegemony, where being modern 
implies resembling Western countries (e.g. Hettne 2009; Ake 1996; 
Abrahamsen 2000). As a consequence, modernization in terms of 
what Western countries define as good government, or other reforms, 
are viewed as ways of imposing Western lifestyles on other societies. 
Ake (1996) describes this argument illustratively:
Without exception, modernization theory used an evolutionary 
schema that regarded the ideal characteristics of the West as the end of 
social evolution … When modernization theory came in conflict with 
the divergent social structures in the third world, the modernization 
theorists talked simply of making the structures of the backward 
country identical to Western ones. When the theorists encountered 
cultural resistance, they proclaimed the need for the modernization of 
attitudes.
(Ake 1996 p. 10) 
Here, it is claimed that there is no fundamental difference in 
attitudes towards African societies during colonialism and how good 
government and modernization of these countries are discussed 
within the international community today. In addition, critics of 
development aid claim that the underlying rationalities of aid have 
not really changed from the colonial idea of modernizing “uncivil” 
societies. Despite the ideas of ownership, partnership and adjustments 
to local circumstances, it is argued that ideas of development aid 
today are the same as they were during colonialism, i.e. there is one 
type of progress; African societies should be more like Western ones 
(Abrahamsen 2000; Hasselskog 2009). 
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Likewise, structural adjustment programs have been criticized 
on moral terms. Abrahamsen (2000) argues that even if we don’t 
know how the economic conditions would have turned out without 
these economic reforms, the programs were problematic since 
international actors interfered in national domestic politics. The 
use of these programs thus undermined the legitimacy of national 
politicians. In a similar vein, Hyden (2006) claims that one problem 
with the structural adjustments programs was the foreignness per se: 
“Although these reforms could be convincingly defended on economic 
grounds, they were politically painful, especially on a continent where 
the perception of national sovereignty was so highly valued because of 
its colonial experience” (p. 129). 
 The moral aspects of the relationship between West and 
the rest of the world are well developed within postcolonial theory. 
For postcolonial scholars, the worldwide dominance of the West, 
which was created during the colonial period, is still highly relevant 
within economic structures, politics and culture in our contemporary 
world(Young 2001). The influential postcolonial scholar Edward 
Said argues that this dominance is founded on the way Western 
societies control the production of knowledge and thereby have 
succeeded to claim their superiority over other people, making 
other cultures, traditions and structures constitute “the other” 
(Said 1978). The creation of the “other” and the West’s own claimed 
superiority within post colonialism is argued to have justified the 
West’s worldwide cultural, political and economic hegemony and its 
various interventions in other countries, such as the colonial projects 
and more recent welfare or modernization interventions, as discussed 
above (Young 2001).
It has been proven not to work …
Irrespective of whether the introduction of Western structures in 
developing countries is regarded as morally justified or not, scholars 
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argue that external reforms that have been introduced have been 
proven not to function in African societies (e.g. Brinkerhoff & 
Morgan 2010; Grindle 1998a). A significant example of such failed 
external administrative reform is the so-called “law and development 
movement”. This was an effort in the 1960s by large donor agencies 
in the United States to reform the formal juridical institutions in 
developing countries, which after a few years were recognized to have 
failed. Among various explanations, scholars argue that the most 
important aspect for understanding the failure of these programs was 
the unrealistic underlying belief that legal frameworks, as they had 
developed in the United States, could be transferred and work in these 
very different contexts (Messick 1999).
 The programs within the law and development movement 
are not the only failed administrative reforms in African countries. 
In an evaluation capacity building projects in the public sector, 
financed by the World Bank between 1994 and 2004, the outcome and 
institutional development impacts of these projects were significantly 
lower in African countries than in other regions of the world (World 
Bank 2005). The World Bank report states that this failure to succeed 
with capacity building projects in Africa is due to the failure to 
design projects so they are compatible with the conditions in the 
countries (ibid). The same line of thought is articulated by Grindle 
(1998b) when she argues that many failed reforms in the public sector 
in African countries could be explained as a consequence of not 
giving the local conditions enough consideration. She summarizes 
the lessons of experience as follows: “analyses and prescriptions for 
reform must be attuned to the unique character of economic, political 
and social conditions” (p. 10). 
 If the first argument is of moral character, this view represents 
a more pragmatic view of development in African countries. The 
failure of public sector reforms, regardless of whether it is right or 
wrong to transfer foreign structures to African countries, indicates 
that these foreign models and the local circumstances in Africa are 
not compatible. Accordingly, the reforms have to be adjusted so they 
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will better fit the local contexts, or reforms have to be built on the 
domestic traditional institutions already existing in the country (Dia 
1996). Primarily, two different kinds of reasons for why Western 
administrational structures are not compatible with an African 
context are provided in the literature; one line of argument focuses 
on resources and the other on political and administrative culture. 
The main focus for this study however is on the latter argument, 
since these normative statements about the features of African public 
administrations demonstrates them as being so fundamentally 
different from their Western equivalences that reforms needs to 
be significantly different in order to be sustainable in the context. 
If this argument is proved to be accurate, it will have significant 
implications; the development theory advancing this argument would 
be more empirically grounded and the organizational theory would 
be shown to be “West-centric” and not appropriate for an African 
context. Although recognizing how public institutions in African 
countries are different to the Western public sector due to lack of 
resources and lack of capacity may be significant, it provides fewer 
theoretical implications, however. This study was also designed to 
limit explanations for how audit institutions act so they would be 
onlyrelated to resources. Yet, this aspect still constitutes a part of the 
literature, and thus it deserves to be discussed in the literature review. 
… due to lack of capacity
When discussing the general socio-economic context in Africa 
specific arguments, relating to the lack of capacity, are common 
explanations for failed reforms. Due to the discriminatory colonial 
structures, there were a limited number of highly educated African 
citizens at the time of independence. Ake (1996) argues that the 
lack of such human resources contributed to the Western driven 
development agenda in African countries. At independence, there 
were simply not enough domestic resources in terms of universities, 
human resources, or Africans with higher education, such as 
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economists, for them to develop their own agendas. This made the 
African countries after independence dependent on the old colonial 
powers for these types of resources (p. 19). 
 Although levels of education have increased, low salaries 
in the public sector in comparison with private companies, as well 
as attractive positions abroad have resulted in a continuous lack of 
human capacity in the African public sector. Well-educated and 
qualified public officials leave their positions in the public sector for 
better jobs elsewhere, which is a well-recognized problem in several 
African countries (Hilderbrand & Grindle 1998; Klitgaard 1989; 
Olowu 1999). In trying to paint a slightly more positive picture of 
development in African countries, Gyimah-Boadi (2004) claims 
that there has been an improvement in the quality of governance. 
However, he adds that one reason why improvements have not 
been greater is due to a lack of capacity: “It is also true that Africa’s 
new legislature remain deficient in physical infrastructure and 
basic equipment, as well as technocratic and analytical capabilities” 
(p. 10). Foreign organizational models often imply a surrounding 
context including certain levels of infrastructure, technologies 
or maintenance of the investments made. Such complementary 
capacities have frequently turned out to be lacking or too expensive to 
maintain in developing countries. Therefore, these kinds of changes 
have been difficult to sustain in these societies. Thus, when using 
models from industrialized countries they have to be adapted to 
weaker administrations, where the number of qualified officials as 
well as the technological capacity is much lower (Turner & Hulme 
1997). When the World Bank discusses how to consider the context 
in capacity building projects, they mainly refer to these kinds of 
features. Although they state that underlying cultural norms impact 
the implementation of reforms, when examining the failure in African 
countries they argue that insufficient training and wrongly designed 
training programs as well as gaps in the levels of education and levels 
of technologies are the main reasons for the failure of the reforms 
(World Bank 2005). 
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Still, lack of resources may be used as official reasons for failed 
implementations. Mavima and Chackarian (2002) argue that this 
was the case in their study of a civil service reform introduced by 
the Zimbabwean government in 1991. The official explanation, 
presented by senior civil servants, for why the reform had failed 
focused on issues such as the lack of finances and lack of personnel 
recourses. However, when they interviewed more junior officials, the 
authors received a different picture of the implementation failure; 
i.e. the reform failed due to centralized power structures and corrupt 
networks. 
…or due to specific features in the African political and 
administrative culture
The last line of argument for why Western administrative structures 
are to be regarded as incompatible with African contexts relates to 
what scholars claim are specific features of African societies and its 
politics and administration. In this strand of the literature, it is argued 
that African societies are different from Western ones to such an 
extent that bureaucratic structures that are created to suit Western 
countries will not work in an African context. Evidently, the aim 
here is not to give a full description of African societies, but rather 
to discuss what in the literature is referred to as specific features, 
which have large consequences for politics and administration in 
contemporary Africa. Discussing societies’ “typical features” may 
be problematic, it could become dogmatic as well as prejudiced, 
there is of course a width of variety. Likewise, these features are not 
to be regarded as static, as Bayart (2009) puts it nicely: “This is not 
to say that this form of ‘governmentality’ belongs to a traditional 
culture whose contours cannot possibly be avoided, nor that it 
avoids the critique of a growing number of African citizens” (p. 
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268).7 These characteristics however constitute a major part of the 
explanations in the literature for why it is not possible to transfer and 
implement Western administrative structures in African countries. 
I am aware of the extensive literature in the area, describing features 
such as patronage, neopatrimonialism, clientelism, its causes and 
consequences on African societies. The aim here is not to dig deeply 
into each of them, but rather to illustrate the core features. 
 Scholars argue that African politics and administration are 
based on informal rules and particularistic networks, which are more 
important than formal rules and regulations (e.g. Ake 1996; Bratton 
& Van de Walle 1997; Hyden 2006; Van de Walle 2001). Hyden (2008) 
expresses it the following way:
[Characteristic for African politics is] the tendency to rely on informal 
rather than formal institutions. In societies where face to face relations 
and primary forms of reciprocity prevail, there is no need for external 
rules and impersonal authorities to enforce social action … The 
abstract nature of the system underlying the ideal of a rational-legal 
type of bureaucracy is ignored in favor of the local-specific pressures 
and interests associated with individual communities.
(Hyden 2006 p. 56) 
As the quotation by Hyden illustrates, at the expense of formal 
institutions, informal particularistic networks are claimed to have a 
large influence on the way African bureaucracies operate, i.e. how 
decisions are made, contracting of projects, recruitment and career 
possibilities in the public sector, to mention a few common examples. 
These informal networks are commonly organized in so called 
patrimonial structures. The term patrimonialism derives from Weber’s 
description and analyses of what he categorized as authoritarian rule 
in more traditional societies, where rule was highly personalized 
and organized around one ruler and his kinship and where there 
was no separation between public and private (Weber (1922) 1978 
7 See also De Sardan (1999) who, despite explaining corruption as being embedded in social 
norms in the African society, also explicitly wants to avoid his argument as being cultural 
deterministic.
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p. 1010-1031). In contemporary Africa, it is argued that patrimonial 
structures have taken a new shape, where African countries and 
their public institutions have modern façades, i.e. Weberian legal-
rational administrations based on impersonal rule and regulations, 
but in reality, they still operate under an internal patrimonial logic. 
This specific nature of the state has led many scholars to describe the 
African state and administration as neopatrimonial (e.g. Bratton & 
Van de Walle 1997; Diamond 2010; Van de Walle 2004).
 Patrimonial structures in Africa are regarded as organized 
through ethnicity, kinship or linage, primarily around a “big man”. 
Bayart (1999) argues that although it first may appear as such, 
ethnicity is rarely the social fabric in these networks, instead he claims 
that these “shadow structures” of state are organized in kinship groups 
that are not based on particular ethnicities, but rather on notions 
of trust (p. 39-40). Le Vine (1980) describes kinship in African 
patrimonial systems in a similar way: 
If patriarchy is the commonwealth of biological kinship, patrimonialism 
grants fictive kinship to those whose ties with the head of the household 
may be based on other than biological or family liaisons – for example, 
contract, alliance, coercion, or titular service.
(Le Vine 1980, p. 658)
Patrimonial systems are highly unequal and the rules are highly 
personalized around, what in the quotation by Le Vine (1980) above 
is described as the “head of the household”, more commonly known 
as the “big man”. People in these societies who are not included 
within these networks may not expect any rights or any privileges, 
and the persons included in the network are highly dependent on the 
benevolence of the “big man” (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997, p. 62). 
Bayart (2009) suggests that these networks ought to be understood as 
political and economic power relations that are products of, as well as 
producing, inequality: “However, the strategies of heads of networks 
resemble the capture, accumulation and partial redistribution of 
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wealth” (p. 228). The struggle for power and wealth between various 
kinship groups and “big men” has given rise to expressions describing 
African politics as the “Politics of the Belly” (Bayart 2009) or “It is our 
turn to eat” (Wrong 2009), illustrating the principle of how access to 
power entitles and obliges giving privileges and making the kinship 
richer. 
 So called “big men” exist in various positions within the 
African political system, and the relationship to those included 
in their personal network is often described as a patron – client 
relationship, where patrons give favors to their clients in return for 
unconditional loyalty, such as political mobilization and support. 
Within public administration, patronage favors might comprise public 
sector employment, contracts, licenses or distribution of other public 
resources (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Diamond 2010; Jackson & 
Rosberg 1984; Sandbrook 1986). Patronage networks in general are 
interlinked, where the patron in one relationship may become the 
client in another and so on, and this fills the African public sector 
with personal loyalties and informal relationships distributing favors 
(Sandbrook 1984, p. 324). Frequently, the high tendency for strong 
Presidents in African countries is regarded as representing this 
centralized personal rule of “big men”, where the President becomes 
the “biggest big man”(Diamond 2010, p. 54) and where the kinship of 
the presidency will distribute state resources to their clients, in return 
for continued political support. 
 The dominance of a presidency and of single strong parties in 
many African countries has allowed political elites to perpetuate their 
influential control of the system, leading to continuous strengthening 
of these patronage networks (Lewis 2010). Although several scholars 
claim that these are typical features of African politics, which has 
led to economic stagnation, lack of development and redistribution 
of public goods turning them into private goods in many African 
countries (c.f. Diamond 2010; Sandbrook 1984; Van De Walle 
2004), others argue that these are not specific African characteristic 
but features that exist and have existed in many political systems 
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throughout history (e.g. Szeftel 1998). Instead, the reason why the 
effects of these structures are so devastating for African countries is 
to be understood as being due to their general underdevelopment 
and lack of individual opportunities outside these structures (Szeftel 
1998). Regardless of the extent to which similar structures may exist 
in different parts of the world, these informal patrimonial networks 
constitute powerful structures for how the African state operates, 
where positions within public institutions are not held solely by 
individual officials but instead by kinship groups (Ake 1996). This has 
given rise to names for the African state such as the “shadow state” 
(Reno 1995) or the “rhizome state” (Bayart 2009), implying that real 
politics and decisions are made by a myriad of informal networks, in 
the shadow of the formal institutions. 
 It is argued by some scholars that the features of informality 
and reciprocal networks described above have long historic roots in 
African societies and are a part of the African political and societal 
culture (e.g. Ekeh 1975; Le Vine 1980; Mbire-Barungi 2001). Le Vine 
(1980) argues for instance that the more traditional patrimonial 
structures existing in traditional African societies have been merely 
adapted to the more modern structures of society, where traditional 
chiefs have been translated into modern politicians. Yet, a significant 
difference between traditional patrimonial systems and the modern, 
neopatrimonial, versions, noted by Le Vine (1980), is that traditional 
African patrimonial systems were less personalized in terms of the 
exercise of power and within the traditional systems, there were 
limitations and constraints for the rulers built in. In a similar vein, 
Ekeh (1975) discusses the double nature of African public institutions 
as one primordial public and one civic public. The primordial public is 
founded on networks existing before the colonial period, and to which 
public officials demonstrate their true loyalty. The civic public, on 
the other hand, consists of the contemporary state and its resources, 
to which there is little loyalty among public officials. The civic public 
is regarded rather as a source to exploit: “The unwritten law of the 
dialectics is that it is legitimate to rob the civic public in order to 
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strengthen the primordial public” (Ekeh 1975, p. 108). Ekeh (1975) 
emphasizes that the commitments toward the primordial public 
are not merely economic, it contains deeper moral obligations and 
members of the primordial public are expected to give generously 
to the group without necessarily receiving any material benefits in 
return. Here, public officials in African bureaucracies are described 
as being caught between two different logics, where the organization’s 
formal structures have Western, Weberian features, while the way 
operations are expected to proceed is expected to follow African 
norms, in terms of informality and loyalty towards particular 
networks (De Sardan 1999). Thus, although many scholars argue 
that the powerful structures of informality are problematic, others 
claim that informal reciprocal networks should not be regarded as 
a problem, which African countries can or should overcome, their 
importance is much greater and they may be regarded as being 
typically African (Mbire-Barungi 2001; Peterson 1998).
 Another understanding, rather than being deeply rooted 
in African societies, is to explain the importance of informality and 
personal rule on behalf of the more impersonal, formal rule of law, 
in terms of the historic legacies of colonialism and the European 
influence in Africa. Mamdani (1996) illustrates how Europeans when 
they arrived on the African continent, ignored complex traditional 
systems in which chiefs and kings governed and which contained 
sophisticated procedures for restricting the power of the rulers. 
Instead the colonial powers selected ordinary members in the societies 
to become administrative chiefs, superior to the traditional, hereditary 
rulers. These new administrative chiefs held extensive powers over 
their societies:
Every moment of power – legislative, executive, juridical, and 
administrative – is combined in this one official. Here there is no 
question of any internal check and balance on the exercise of authority, 
let alone a check that is popular and democratic.
(Mamdani 1996, p. 54) 
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This created tensions within colonial societies between the 
administrative authority and the rest of the kin groups and as 
Mamdani (1996) argues, such all-encompassing authority merged 
into to one public position inevitably leads to abuse. For instance, 
administrative chiefs often increased taxes heavily for their personal 
enrichment, and people unable to pay their taxes were exploited 
to work on the chiefs’ personal farms, or their land was simply 
confiscated (Mamdani 1996, p. 56-57). These administrative chiefs 
gained the positions of what eventually became to be the so-called 
“big men”, and their patronage networks developed and grew into 
the contemporary political systems (Fukuyama 2011, p. 69). Migdal 
(1988) further adds to these explanations of strong societal networks 
in weak African states by stressing that the changed economic and 
infrastructural conditions the Europeans brought, also profoundly 
changed the societal structures in African societies. New possibilities 
were created for new groups in these societies to become influential 
traders with the Europeans and their strong positions and networks 
created a situation with fragmented social control. As Migdal (1988) 
argues, as long as these “big men” provide sustainable survival 
strategies for those included in their networks there is little reason 
today for people in these states to change their strategies. Thus, the 
states’ capabilities to replace such structures with state institutions and 
political support for the state will continue to remain limited (p. 210).
 This is naturally a simplified picture of the relationship 
between the colonial powers and African societies; the variation in the 
influence the colonial powers exerted on African societies was large. 
Herbst (2000) argues for instance that in many colonies the colonial 
administrations were not in touch with the African societies to any 
great extent. The vastness of the geographical areas and difficulties in 
physically travelling into many of the areas and thereby controlling 
the land, left many territorial areas and societies established in those 
areas inaccessibleto colonial control and influence. Herbst (2000) 
however emphasizes that underlining the colonial powers’ limitations 
does not deny the brutal violence by which they ruled, a brutality 
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that may be understood as a consequence of their lack of control (p. 
90-92). A fundamental consequence of colonialism in Africa was the 
establishment of states with geographical boundaries. Traditional 
societies in Africa were not divided into given geographical areas, 
rather people and tribes gave their loyalty to certain rulers and 
the land was owned in common (Mamdani 1996; Herbst 2000; 
Hyden 2006). This may be regarded as a natural consequence of 
the geographical situation in Africa where there were vast areas of 
land with limited populations. This situation was in great contrast 
to Europe, where limited land availability due to higher population 
densities created a situation where geographical boundaries and land 
property rights became central features of the societies (Herbst 2000). 
At the Berlin conference, in 1885, when the colonial powers decided 
on how the African continent would be divided amongst them, 
the Europeans created geographical boundaries forAfrican states, 
which were accordingly extremely artificial to the traditional African 
societies (Young 1994). 
 It is argued that artificial geographical boundaries, and the 
violent and racist means by which the African states were created by 
external actors, are one of the roots of the explanation for why the 
state in so many African countries is considered to be very weak and 
malfunctioning (e.g. Englebert 2009; Mamdani 1996; Herbst 2000; 
Young 1994). For instance, Englebert (2009) suggests that the main 
reason for state failures in Africa is due to their lack of domestic 
legitimacy, which in turn derives from the externally imposed nature 
of the state. He claims that African state sovereignty does not derive 
from domestic acknowledgment or from a social contract between the 
citizens and the state. Instead, the legitimacy of African states is only 
based on international recognition, and consequently their citizens 
offer little support and loyalty towards them (ibid).  
 In the section above, specific features of contemporary 
African politics and administration as well as their historic legacy 
have been discussed. This specific political culture and history leads 
many scholars to draw the same conclusion as Bayart (2009), who 
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claims that African societies have a specific history that makes their 
institutions work differently than in other societies and that it would 
be wrong to believe that concepts and ideas would be understood 
in the same way in these societies as they are in another context, 
due to this specific historic legacy (p. 268-271). Since the Western 
models do not reflect the basic values of African societies, there will 
be little loyalty and legitimacy for them (Ayittey 2006; Carlsson 1998; 
Englebert 2009). In a similar vein, Leonard (1987)8 claims that due 
to the social realities in African societies, it would be naïve to believe 
that Western administrative practices could be transferred to this 
context: “A great deal of thought and experiment is needed to help us 
find administrative reforms that flow with rather than against the logic 
of African social reality (Leonard 1987, p. 908; see also Dia 1996).
 To conclude, in this first part of the chapter, the development 
literature has been reviewed, and the arguments used in the literature 
as reasons for why it is to be regarded as problematic to introduce and 
implement Western, or international, structures in African countries 
have been outlined and discussed. As illustrated in the literature 
review, these arguments have a moral as well as a more pragmatic 
character and although they were separated in this discussion, they 
are commonly applied in combination. As previously argued, these 
arguments have led many scholars to draw the conclusion that in 
order to make the administrative practices of the state institutions 
work, they primarily have to be compatible with and legitimate in 
the local African political and socio-economic contexts. Preferably, 
the administrative structures and practices should be domestic 
solutions built on traditional institutions and, if foreign models were 
to be used, they would in general need large adjustments to suit the 
local circumstances. In accordance with the arguments in this body 
8 Similar to this study, Leonard (1987) argues that there are organizational theorists and, what 
he labels, environmentalists who study the African bureaucracies from different perspectives. 
Although Leonard argues that organizational theorists propose that it is possible to introduce 
Western models in African countries, there is no discussion or analysis of how and why orga-
nizational theory would propose such ideas. Likewise, there is little discussion of what in the 
African societies would resist such an introduction, and there is no empirical study from which 
he draws his conclusions.    
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of literature, the following proposition for how African auditors 
would respond to international public audit standards is outlined as 
proposition 1:
Auditors in African countries could be expected to express 
the importance of conducting audits in line with the 
circumstances in their local context, and they would primarily 
seek legitimacy within their local context. If they attempted 
to implement international audit standards, the African 
auditors would express the difficulties of introducing such 
foreign models. Most likely, major adjustments would have 
to be made to make the standards suit the local environment 
of the African Supreme Audit Institutions.
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The behaviour of organizations -and why they 
commonly show similar features
As discussed in chapter one, in research on organizations the 
new institutional approach has provided various explanations for 
organizational behavior. Unlike earlier theories of organizations, 
this approach has focused primarily on cultural cognitive aspects of 
organizations, instead of technical aspects and resources, to explain 
how organizations act. Within this field of research, one strand of the 
literature has focused on explaining why organizations show such 
similar characteristics to such a large extent. The work of the two 
sociologists, DiMaggio and Powell (1983), within this tradition has 
become very influential. The main reason for using this particular 
strand of the literature within organizational research is that it 
provides a significantly different picture for how public officials in 
African countries could respond to foreign ideas and practices than 
presented in the development literature, which could then become 
a fruitful counterpoint for investigation and analysis. While the 
development literature has focused mainly on coercive mechanisms 
for understanding how administrative reforms have been introduced 
in African countries, the organizational research tradition presented 
here also includes other aspects, such as norms and imitation, as 
important explanations for why organizations act in certain directions, 
aspects that are discussed to a lesser extent within the development 
literature.9
9 Bayart (2009) does argue that Africans import and sometimes mimic Western ideas, however 
when he discusses the state and administration in Africa he explicitly states that the nature of 
the state in Africa is so different that is it not comparable with the Western Weberian model. 
Additionally, he claims that Western and African institutions may appear similar on the surface 
but act very differently in practice (p. 27, 243-270). Likewise, some development scholars (e.g. 
Ekeh 1975; Englebert 2000; Young 2001) argue that elites in African societies imitate Western 
behavior, mainly because they have been educated in Western countries. Nonetheless, this is 
regarded as the behavior for a small exclusive group, which does not influence African public 
institutions to any great extent.
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In their article, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) question the, at the 
time, mainstream organizational theory, which mainly focused on 
explaining differences in structure and practice among organizations. 
Since empirical investigations also proved significant similarities 
among organizations, they started to focus on mechanisms 
driving such homogenization. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claim 
that although various structures and practices may exist among 
organizations when they are established, organizations in the same 
category, i.e. within the same organizational field, will become 
eventually very similar in structure and practice. The organizations’ 
desire to be legitimate within their institutional environment is 
argued, within this literature, to be the main mechanism driving 
homogenization among them. In their analysis, DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) identify three different kinds of institutional homogenizing, i.e. 
isomorphic, forces: a coercive, a mimetic and a normative pressure. 
 Coercive isomorphism is defined as pressure imposed 
on organizations, for instance binding regulation issued by the 
government. Since organizations within the same field often are 
subject to the same laws and regulations, coercive isomorphism will 
consequently lead to the same structures within the same kind of 
organizations. Likewise, resources may be regarded as a coercive 
pressure, where organizations adopt certain structures in order to 
attain crucial resources. In the discussion on coercive mechanisms, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) mainly refer to the national context 
where coercive rules and regulation are issued, as well as the cultural 
context within the country that leads organizations to adopt structures 
and practices that are connected to resources. However, coercive 
pressures may also be found on an international level.  In a study 
into how ISO 9000 Quality Certificates were spread and adopted in 
organizations around the world, Guler, Guillén and Muir Macpherson 
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(2002) argue that it was mainly a process of coercive pressures.10 
They argue that adoption of the ISO 9000 Quality Certificates 
was important for the organizations’ opportunities to make trade 
agreements, and as a consequence retain crucial resources. Hence, 
adoption of international standards may be a result of coercive 
pressures if the standards are linked to critical resources for the 
organization.
 There is however an important difference between their study 
and this thesis. Here national state audit institutions are in focus, and 
although they are involved in an international context, their main 
activities are directed towards public sector organizations in their 
country, and their main stakeholders are found at the national level. 
In addition, being a national public sector organization, they obtain 
their funding from their government, and they are also required to 
follow national rules and regulation. This may be compared to the 
international public audit standards, whose observance is voluntary 
and where there are no resources or sanctions connected to the 
standards. Moreover, the international professional organization 
(INTOSAI) that issues the standards states that observance of the 
standards is voluntary and that each state audit institution should 
adjust them to their national context and the national prevailing rules 
and regulations.11Against this background, I argue that although 
coercive isomorphism has been proven to influence organizational 
behavior, it is not the main mechanism within this study. Accordingly, 
the following sections will focus on how isomorphic mechanisms lead 
organizations to adapt to structures and practices without coercive 
pressures. 
10 Quality certifications are used for guaranteeing that particular organizational practices are 
used by organizations. These practices aim for improvement, and thereby quality, in the produc-
tion processes. One of the most influential certificates globally is the ISO 9000 certificates, which 
are sponsored by the International Organization of Standardization (ISO) (Guler, Guillén & 
Muir Macpherson 2002, p 208). 
11 See for instance INTOSAI ISSA 1 The Lima Declaration, section 18; 30a The Code of Ethics, 
chapter 1, or ISSAI 100 Basic Principles in Government Auditing
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Imitation
When organizations imitate the structures or practices of other 
organizations, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) describe it as a case 
of mimetic isomorphism. They argue that imitation among 
organizations may occur intentionally, when organizational models 
are spread and introduced, for example by consulting firms, as well 
as unintentionally, when diffusion occur more randomly (p. 151). 
Since their article was published, a number of studies have been 
conducted on how organizations conform to mimetic isomorphism 
(see for instance Deephouse 1996; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz 2004; 
Haveman 1993; Tolbert & Zucker 1983; Slack & Hinings 1994; 
Wedlin 2007). One reason for organizations to conform to mimetic 
isomorphism is their desire for legitimacy in their institutional 
environment. Already Hannan and Freedman (1977) argued about 
the importance for organizations to align to isomorphic pressures, 
where they claimed that such alignment creates a natural competition 
where unfit organizational structures and practices would eventually 
vanish. Likewise, Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that legitimacy in 
their institutional environment is crucial for organizations, without 
such legitimacy it will be difficult for organizations to survive. Survival 
in this sense is not only about attaining resources, although this 
may be an important factor (c.f. Sauder & Lancaster 2006), rather 
it is concerns the manner by which the surrounding environment 
accepts and validates certain organizational structures and practices as 
legitimate. 
 The acceptance of certain practices by the environment makes 
organizations conform to these, without necessarily any financial 
incentives or regulatory obligations being involved. However, as 
pointed out by Kennedy and Fiss (2009), organizations’ aim to become 
legitimate does not have to contradict their wish to become more 
efficient. In their study, in addition to social motives, performance 
improvements proved to be important motives lying behind why 
certain practices were adopted by the organizations (Kennedy & Fiss 
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2009). Imitation to a large extent is an identification process, where 
organizations imitate those with whom they identify themselves. 
Or as Sevón (1996) illustratively expresses it: “Imitation is a process 
which begins with identification and results in transformation” (p. 61). 
Through such an identification process, the organizations strengthen 
their own identity as part of a community of similar organizations, 
i.e. their organizational field.  They also identify themselves with 
organizations they would like to resemble (Sevón 1996; see also 
Sahlin & Wedlin 2008). Therefore, when imitation occurs among 
organizations, they do not imitate just any organization. They tend to 
imitate organizations that are perceived as being the most successful 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Haveman 1993).
 What is perceived as success in an organization may be related 
to how much profit that organization makes (Haveman 1993), but 
success may also be defined by actors such as the state (Deephouse 
1996), consultancy agencies (Slack & Hinings 1994; Deephouse 
1996) their own associations (Wedlin 2007) or the general public 
(Deephouse 1996). In their study, Slack and Hinings (1994) show 
how national sports organizations have changed their organizational 
structures and become more similar to a traditional bureaucracy. 
The initiative to introduce more bureaucratic structures, including 
professionalization of the staff and an increased number of employees, 
was taken by the state. It was then spread by means of a number 
of consultants traveling around the organizations. The consultants 
hosted seminars and workshops, attended by personnel from all of 
the organizations, where representatives from organizations identified 
as the most successful were invited as speakers. The consultants 
also created guidelines that were based on the practices of the 
more successful organizations. These guidelines were universal and 
supposed to be applicable to all of the organizations in the country. 
Consequently, all national sports organizations eventually ended up 
becoming more alike. In addition, they all came to resemble what 
was recognized initially as the more successful organizations (Slack & 
Hinings 1994). 
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The perceptions of which organizations are to be regarded as the 
most successful are spread through various routes; through ranking 
lists (Wedlin 2007; Sauder & Lancaster 2006) through guidelines and 
handbooks of  “best practices” (Deephouse 1996; Slack & Hinings 
1994) or just through facts about the organizations that are the most 
profitable (Haveman 1993). Wedlin (2007) discusses the impact of 
ranking lists in the following way: “The rankings are also specific in 
the sense that they provide clear guidance of the expectations and 
demands placed on organizations in the field” (p. 36). Wedlin studies 
business schools and she argues that it is by means of the ranking 
lists that schools obtain information on what is perceived as the best 
behavior for their kind of organizations. The schools’ responses to 
this information were various efforts to comply with the requirements 
stressed in the rankings, as well as regarding the top-ranked business 
schools as their role models (Wedlin 2007).  
 What is perceived as appropriate behavior for organizations 
is also spread through associations and networks. Galaskiewicz 
and Wasserman (1989) demonstrate in their study that networks 
and personal connections were important when organizations 
decided which organizations to imitate. When it was not clear for 
the organizations how to act, and when there was no clear guidance 
in terms of guidelines or ranking lists, managers and persons 
in decision-making positions used their networks and personal 
connections to find the perceived appropriate practices, to which they 
eventually conformed. Galaskiewicz and Wasserman describe their 
“network effect” as follows: 
Our theoretical rational for this “network effect” is quite simple: 
decision makers are more likely to mimic those whom they know and 
trust, and it’s through the networks of boundary-spanning personnel 
that they come to know and trust one another.
 (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman 1989, p. 456)
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The role of networks and associations has been highlighted in 
particular when professionals conform to norms and standards, which 
are viewed as legitimate among their professional peers, i.e. normative 
isomorphism. 
Professional norms
Several scholars consider professions and professional associations to 
be important factors in understanding the behavior of organizations 
(e.g. Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings 2002; Meyer et al. 1997; Scott 
2001). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that in particular two 
aspects of professions are important for normative isomorphism. 
First, professionals often share the same educational background. 
The common ground found in the same formal education socializes 
professionals into a common cultural cognitive framework. Second, 
professionals often participate in professional networks and 
associations, which create arenas for ideas and norms to spread 
and to be reinforced. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claim that the 
socialization taking place in such professional environments will in all 
probability affect professionals in a way that will make them receptive 
to the ideas and views of their professional peers. 
 In research on non-binding regulation such as soft law, 
soft regulation and standards, peer pressure is often highlighted as 
a significant mechanism for why these regulations are adopted by 
organizations (e.g. Borrás & Jacobsson 2004; Collier 2008; Mörth 
2008). For instance, Scott (2001) argues that the possibility to spread 
and maintain practices depends on the extent to which socializing 
processes have been successful. Simply put, the more similar a group 
is, the easier they will adopt the practices. Furthermore, Scott notes 
that in particular professions to a high degree “exercise their control 
via cultural-cognitive and normative processes” (p. 129).
65
In their description of socialization processes, Berger and Luckmann 
(1967) stress the identification with significant others as a central 
factor when the identity of individuals is formed. Such identification 
is a dual process between the subjectively experienced identity and the 
identification of the individual made by others (Berger & Luckmann 
1967). Research that is more recent also stresses the relationship 
between the work carried out and the subjective identity, as something 
of importance when professional identities are constructed.  
 Professional individuals tend to change their self-experienced 
identity to fit better with the work they perform, whenever there is 
a conflict between the two (Pratt, Rockmann & Kaufmann 2006).To 
maintain one’s identity, there is a need for continuous confirmation 
of one’s role as being the one appropriate (Berger & Luckmann 
1967). Reconfirmation of their identity as a professional occurs 
not only during education, but also continuously by means of 
meetings and activities within their professional associations. Since 
professional associations create interaction among professionals, 
they are important in creating and maintaining a collective identity. 
Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings (2002) make the following comment 
on how professional collective identities are created: 
Collective beliefs are seen as emerging from processes of repeated 
interactions between organizations. Organizations develop 
categorizations (or typifications) of their exchanges, which achieve the 
status of objectification and thus constitute social reality 
(Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings 2002, p. 59) 
This collectively constructed social reality through normative 
influences as well as “regulatory processes” is continuously sustained 
(ibid). Moreover, professions to a large extent are self-regulated, 
where professional associations often have self-remedial mechanisms. 
Through these mechanisms, individual professionals are monitored 
and it is ensured that they comply with the norms and standards 
created within the profession (Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings 2002).   
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How normative pressures affect organizations has been examined 
by several scholars (e.g. Casile & Davis-Blake 2002; Gibbons 2004; 
Greenwood Suddaby & Hinings 2002; Pratt, Rockmann & Kaufmann 
2006). In their study of accreditation standards, Casile & Davis-Blake 
(2002) investigated how organizations are linked to their normative 
environment. Their results illustrate that the closer the connection 
was to the association that issued the standards, the more likely it 
was for an organization to respond to the new norms by adopting the 
new standards. The impact on networks for professional norms is also 
showed in the Gibbons’ (2004) study on teachers, where networks in 
terms of personal networks, based on friendship, as well as “advise 
networks” (p. 241), based on people whose expertise is valued by 
others, played a significant role, both in sustaining and changing 
professional norms. 
 Which groups may then be regarded as a profession? 
Evidently, not all occupations are professions. Typically, professions 
comprise occupations such as doctors, teachers, police officers as well 
as auditors. The distinction for determining which occupations to 
include within the concept however is not clear. Professionalization 
can be an important strategy for a group to increase the status and 
legitimacy of their work. Nevertheless, even if all kinds of worked-
based groups would like to be regarded as professions, this is 
unlikely to be the case. Abbott (1988) gives a clarifying definition of 
professions. He argues that to be a profession three factors have to 
be in place: exclusiveness, the claim for abstract knowledge, and the 
application of abstract knowledge to practical cases. In other words: 
“professions are exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat 
abstract knowledge to particular cases” (Abbott 1988, p. 8).
 The exclusiveness in an area of knowledge is an important 
factor for professions. Normally, they claim the monopoly of 
knowledge and practice in one specific area. Within this area, the 
profession then constitutes the legitimate authority in defining 
problems as well as providing appropriate solutions. Abbott 
(1988) defines this connection, between the work conducted 
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and the monopolized area in which the professionals operate, as 
the jurisdiction. According to him, there are three parts in how 
professions claim their jurisdiction: “claims to classify a problem, to 
reason about it, and to take action on it: in more formal terms, to 
diagnose, to interfere and to treat” (p. 40). The claim to jurisdiction 
on its own would allow any kind of specialized skill to be defined as a 
profession. The difference lies in the claim of abstract knowledge. The 
professions’ classifications of problems and provision of solutions are 
not only practical; they are also made on an abstract level. However, 
just abstract knowledge is not enough, the application of the abstract 
knowledge to practical cases is equally important in becoming a 
profession. 
 Professions and their associations do not normally issue 
binding regulations in society. Naturally, professionals may have 
decision-making positions where, through formal authority, they 
issue binding regulation. Nevertheless, that kind of position is not 
included in the construction of the profession, i.e. belonging to a 
profession does not per se imply this type of authority. Despite lack 
of formal authority to formulate binding regulations, professions 
and professional associations still possess high authority in our 
contemporary society (Drori & Meyer 2006). Though their authority 
derives from another source, in Meyer et al.’s (1997) words: ”their 
authority to assimilate and develop the rationalized and universalistic 
knowledge that makes action and actorhood possible” (p. 165). Hence, 
the authority of professions in society derives from their position of 
producing knowledge within their jurisdiction, which appeals to the 
rationales of science, and consequently is universal and applicable to 
all cases around the world. 
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Across national boundaries
According to the theory of isomorphism, organizations within the 
same organizational field are subjects to similar isomorphic pressures, 
and will eventually end up similar in structures and practices. 
However, how far does an organizational field actually reach? Should 
it be viewed as a national phenomenon or should the same kind of 
organizations around the world be viewed as being part of the same 
organizational field, and thereby subject to the same isomorphic 
pressures? A fundament in the theory of isomorphism is that these 
mechanisms work due to organizations’ desire for legitimacy from key 
elements in their environment. It could then be asked, what should 
be considered as key elements providing legitimacy for individual 
organizations that face both a national and an international context. 
 Kostova, Roth and Dacin (2008) argue that individual 
organizations, which are part of larger multinational corporations, 
face an institutional environment so complex that it is not useful 
to speak of isomorphism and organizational fields. They give 
examples such as language and culture barriers as well as the lack of 
interaction among the organizations, which makes the institutional 
environment fragmented and conflicting. This complexity allows 
individual organizations to choose more freely the pressures to 
which they will respond (p. 998-999). Another solution would be to 
view the organizations as embedded in several organizational fields, 
international as well as national and regional fields (Phillips & Tracey 
2009). This does not answer however, the question of what national 
public institutions regard as being their organizational field, and how 
they balance international ideas in relation to their national context 
in response to what may be a conflicting, ambiguous institutional 
environment. The definition provided by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
does not provide a clear answer to how organizational fields should be 
viewed in an international context: 
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By organizational field, we mean those organizations that, in the 
aggregate, constitute a recognized area of organizational life: key 
suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and 
other organizations that produce similar services or products.
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p. 148)
Furthermore, in their article they explain that fields are difficult 
to define in advance, rather whether or not an organizational field 
exists is an empirical observation (ibid). Although the question of 
how far organizational fields reach is not discussed explicitly in the 
article by DiMaggio an Powell (1983), the examples given of mimetic 
isomorphism concern how Japanese companies imitated European 
and American companies, as well as how American companies at the 
time of the article imitated successful Japanese and European models 
of organization (p. 151). The examples given indicate that the authors 
considered organizational fields and isomorphic mechanisms also to 
be prevalent on the international level.  
 Despite a national identity, several national public authorities 
also face an international context through membership in large 
international associations. These international organizations are 
pointed out by scholars as being influential for understanding 
similarities around the world (see for instance Boli & Thomas 1999; 
Meyer et al. 1997). Sahlin-Andersson (2000) highlights international 
organizations as arenas, where professionals from different countries 
meet and share ideas, practices and experiences. Through such 
arenas, ideas and practices are spread among organizations on a 
global level (Scott 2001). Since public organizations do not face 
market competition and customer orientation to the same extent 
as private companies, they are likely to be more receptive towards 
these normative and mimetic pressures (Casile & Davis-Blake 2002; 
Frumkin & Galaskiewicz 2004). However, being a national public 
organization, there is also a national context to consider, which may 
influence the behavior of the organization to a larger extent than 
would be the case for a private company.  
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Despite recent attention to the lack of clarity in how to define 
organizational fields on an international level (Kostova, Roth & 
Dacin 2008; Tracey & Phillips 2009), a large numbers of scholars have 
identified as well as explained similarities among organizations across 
national boundaries, where mimetic as well as normative pressures 
were found to make organizations more similar, also on a global scale 
(for a review, see Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett 2007). 
What a standard is and how it spreads
Since international public audit standards are the focus of this study, 
there is also a need to clarify what is defined here as a standard as well 
as to discuss the dynamics of how standards are spread and followed. 
A standard may be explained as a type of rule, since they define 
boundaries for how we ought to behave. As for other rules, standards 
are general, i.e. they include everyone towards whom the standards 
are directed, as well as being valid on a repeated number of occasions 
(Brunsson & Jacobsson 1998 p 13; 2000 p. 1). To distinguish standards 
from other rules, Brunsson & Jacobsson (1998) classify all rules into 
three different categories; directives, norms and standards. They argue 
that standards are explicit, more often than not written down and have 
a distinct sender. This makes standards different from both norms 
and directives. Norms, they argue, do not have a distinct sender and 
are in general not written down, instead norms are common sense 
knowledge rules we follow even though they are not mandatory. 
Directives on the other hand are mandatory, explicit and most 
commonly written down, such as legislation issued by states (ibid). 
 In empirical cases, the difference Brunsson and Jacobsson 
(1998) make between norms and standards may not always be clear, 
rather it may be viewed as a process with different stages. A norm 
could most likely become a standard, and there may be a range of 
policy documents more or less explicitly expressing these norms, such 
as policy documents from international organizations (e.g. Finnemore 
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1993; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). Nor does the sender of the 
standard need to be the actor where the norm emerged. For instance, 
the emergence of norms could start in activist organizations such as 
the women rights movement. The new norms expressing women’s 
rights eventually attract a response on an international level, and end 
up by being expressed in various international policy documents 
(Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). Thus, the difference between norms and 
standards should be viewed rather as a scale of the formalization of 
norms. 
 Standards are created by a wide range of standard setting 
organizations, national as well as international, nongovernmental 
as well as inter-governmental organizations (Ahrne & Brunsson 
2008). The emergence of these international nongovernmental 
and inter-governmental organizations has increased exponentially 
since the Second World War (Boli & Thomas 1999; Meyer et al. 
1997). On an international level, it is through these organizations 
standards are spread globally (Scott, 2001) but they may also be the 
actor formulating explicit standards out of more scattered norms 
(c.f. Finnemore 1993). In this way, international standard-making 
organizations impact on political and administrative behavior, on a 
global level. Some scholars even claim that international organizations 
and standards per se are essential for understanding the similarities 
among countries, organizations and individuals around the world 
(Loya & Boli 1999; Boli & Thomas 1999; Meyer et al. 1997).
 Sahlin-Andersson (2000) highlights that some of the 
international organizations have the purpose of constituting arenas; 
although they are not formally standard-making organizations, 
they still undertake activities that generate standards. As presented 
in the first chapter, according to Sahlin-Andersson (2000) arenas 
are organizations that: “produce and provide information and 
comparisons, report and propose initiatives for change, and generally 
facilitate exchange of experience, ideas, and ideals” (p. 100). 
Moreover, she argues, particularly international organizations have 
had the objective of constituting such arenas where exchange among 
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people from different countries takes place. Although it is not their 
purpose, in general these kinds of exchanges generate guidelines, 
recommendations and other non-binding regulations (Sahlin-
Andersson 2000).
 Characteristic for international standard-making 
organizations is voluntarism, in membership as well as in the 
regulations they issue (Ahrne&Brunsson 2008; Knoke 1986). No 
organization, individual or state is forced to become a member and, 
in addition, they are allowed to leave the organization whenever 
they wish. Furthermore, there is no payment or profit attached to 
membership (Knoke 1986) rather it is usual for organizations to 
pay membership fees to participate (Tamm Hallström 1998). In 
a similar vein, Boli and Thomas (1999) claim that international 
nongovernmental organizations are founded on strong principles of 
universalism, i.e. the needs and desires are considered to be the same, 
regardless of where in the world the member is located. Thereby, the 
same regulation is regarded as universally applicable. 
 Similar to standards per se, standard-making organizations 
are normally directed towards a certain group, where membership 
is based on some kind of similarity among the members (Ahrne, 
Brunsson & Garsten 2000). The associations are often established to 
strengthen similarities among the members and thereby strengthen 
their identity (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008; Knoke 1986). Weaker 
organizations, which have a greater need for legitimacy, have proven 
more willingly become members of these associations. Moreover, they 
also tend to comply to a larger extent with the international standards 
(Ahrne & Brunsson 2008). As a consequence, even if membership as 
well as the regulation provided is voluntary, it may be experienced as 
more or less compulsory for those organizations, due to their larger 
need of legitimacy (Tamm Hallström 1998). 
 Standard-making organizations are in general not able to 
impose any sanctions if their regulations are not followed. Nor is 
exclusion a realistic alternative, it is rare for members to be excluded 
in these contexts (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008). The dependence of the 
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members makes it difficult for the organizations to maintain a central 
authority, which is the normal basis for compliance with rules in 
organizations. Rather, the autonomy of the members and the aim 
of the organization have to be balanced. Consequently, the solution 
has become to issue non-binding regulations (ibid). This does not 
imply that the decision-making process is conflict free. A wide range 
of standards within an area, as well as vaguely formulated standards, 
could demonstrate that various interests have been compromised 
(Botzem & Quack 2006). When accepting a commitment there is 
always a certain degree of uncertainty, in terms of how much it would 
cost as well as what it actually implies. The strength with issuing non-
binding commitment is that they make it easier for the committing 
parties to deal with such uncertainty. They may agree and accept then 
later think in more detail about the consequences, which makes it 
easier to accept the commitment (Abbott & Snidal 2000). 
 To sum up, research on organizations has shown that 
organizations of the same kind over time end up harmonized in terms 
of structures and practices. Since standards are voluntary regulation, 
the focus has been on normative and mimetic mechanisms. 
Organizations have been proven to imitate each other; in particular, 
they tend to imitate the structures and practices of what are perceived 
to be more successful organizations. When organizations consist of 
professionals, not only mimetic but also normative influence creates 
similarity. Professionals tend to be receptive to the views of their 
professional peers, and thus adopt practices accordingly. Professionals 
also have their own associations, on the national as well as the 
international level, where they share their ideas and practices and 
reinforce their common identity, as well as facilitating the spread of 
their practices.    
 Studies of isomorphism have been conducted mainly 
within and among European countries, the United States and other 
industrialized countries, i.e. Western countries. Very few studies, if 
any, on these mechanisms have been conducted in countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Despite the lack of empirical studies in other parts of 
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the world, there are no arguments made in this body of literature that 
normative and mimetic processes are specific for Western countries.12 
Rather the basis for the theory is that all organizations within the 
same field, regardless of where they are located, will be subjected to 
the same isomorphic mechanisms and eventually become similar. 
In line with theories of isomorphism and organizational fields, the 
following proposition for how the auditors in African countries would 
respond to international standards of auditing is outlined. Proposition 
2: 
Auditors in African countries could be expected to express 
the importance of conducting audits according to the 
international audit standards. They would primarily seek 
legitimacy within the international professional audit 
community and regard the international audit standards as 
the most appropriate way of conducting audit, as well as 
imitating more successful audit organizations. Most likely, 
the African Supreme Audit Institutions would adopt the 
standards with as little adjustment as possible.
Similarities and differences 
Above in this chapter, a review of two bodies of literature was 
provided, which also resulted in two contrasting propositions for how 
public auditors in African countries could respond to international 
public audit standards. As demonstrated, the organization literature 
and the development literature differ in several ways, but they 
also share some aspects in common, and in this section, such 
similarities and differences will be discussed. Although resources 
12 The research on organization has also been criticized for claiming universality, since it may be 
regarded as very “Westernized research” (see for instance Özkazanç-Pan 2008)
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have been proven to be a significant mechanism for explaining 
organizational behavior (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Guler, Guillén & 
Muir Macpherson 2002 ), scholars within this strand of literature on 
organizations argue that resources and aspects regarding the technical 
capacity and the production are no longer the main drivers for 
reforms in organizations; rather organizations adapt to more cultural 
cognitive ideas of what is the proper behavior for an organization 
of their kind, through norms and imitation (c.f. Meyer & Rowan 
1977). In contrast to the situation in industrialized Western countries, 
where these arguments are developed, it is argued in the development 
literature that lack of resources and limited technical capacity remain 
significant explanations for how African public organizations respond, 
and are able to respond, to foreign ideas and practices (e.g. Grindle 
1998b; Turner & Hulme 1997; World Bank 2005). In addition, the 
high dependency of resources is also argued to be a major mechanism 
for why African public organizations through the years have adopted 
certain, more Western-like, structures (e.g. Ake 1996). 
 Organization scholars argue that organizations respond 
to certain structures and practices primarily as a consequence of 
their need for legitimacy within their institutional environment, the 
legitimacy may concern professional ideals well as other aspects of 
what is considered appropriate behavior within their organizational 
field (c.f. DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Scott 2001). 
As a result of this search for legitimacy, some organizational scholars 
argue that organizations decouple structures from practices, i.e. they 
use the structures they need for legitimacy as mainly ceremonial 
and do not necessarily change their practices. This may lead to a 
situation where organizations look similar on the surface but act very 
differently in practice (Meyer & Rowan 1977). Here, the organization 
literature is similar to how development scholars argue that as a result 
of external pressures African public administrations have adopted 
Western structures merely on the surface and they argued act very 
differently in practice (e.g. De Sardan 1999; Ekeh, 1975; Bratton & 
Van de Walle 1997). Although the arguments are fairly similar in this 
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aspect, there is a significant difference between the two traditions. 
Within the development literature, scholars make a distinction 
between Western and African countries, where they argue that Western 
structures are difficult to implement in African organizations. 
Development scholars do not argue that all organizations separate 
structure from practices rather they argue that this phenomenon is to 
be regarded as specifically African (ibid). In contrast, in the literature 
on organizations, no distinction is made between Western and African 
organizations, rather all organizations around the world are argued to 
search for legitimacy within their institutional environment and as a 
consequence also decouple structures from practices.13
 Although the mechanisms driving action and change in 
organizations in both bodies of literature are regarded to be the result 
of an underlying search for legitimacy within their environment, in 
the development literature legitimacy is primarily directed towards 
and restricted to the organization’s African environment. Here, the 
actions of the public officials are a consequence of their need for 
legitimacy within their African social structures, thereof the different 
actions than those prescribed by the foreign structures (c.f. De Sardan 
1999; Ekeh 1975) In addition, scholars emphasize the importance 
of reforms being legitimate in the African context (Abrahamsen, 
2000; Hyden 2006). In the development literature there is thus little 
discussion of how African public officials as professionals have 
also an interest in searching for legitimacy within a professional 
community, internationally. Similarly, there is little discussion of how 
public officials in Africa may regard their organization within a field 
of similar organizations around the world, and accordingly search 
for legitimacy within their field by imitating organizations that are 
more successful and being sensitive to ranking lists and notions of 
guidelines of best practice outlined on an international level.  
 An exception is when Hilderbrand and Grindle (1998) 
discuss factors in successful public administration reforms in 
developing countries, where they found in their various case studies 
13 C.f. the discussion regarding literature on “translation of ideas” in chapter one 
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that in administrations where a professional identity and a sense 
of a professional community existed among the public officials, the 
organizations performed better. Additionally, Leonard (1987) argues 
that many African managers have a professional commitment, 
which may be reinforced through networks and conferences where 
these professional values are shared. However, he also argues for 
the importance of the African managers’ local social identity and, 
although he claims that African public administration is best 
understood by a combination of universal organization theory and 
the sociology of Africa (p. 906), he argues strongly throughout 
his article that it is difficult to transfer Western management 
techniques, since they are not appropriate solutions in African public 
administrations (Leonard 1987). To highlight the professional role 
for public officials in African countries is however an exception in 
the development literature. The main approach is rather that foreign, 
more Western like, structures are adapted in African administrations 
mainly as a consequence of coercive pressures, where the literature 
illustrates how administrative reforms from the days of colonialism 
to economic reforms as structural adjustment programs have been 
forced externally upon the African continent. Alternatively, reforms 
are regarded as a result of coercive pressures from donors. As 
Leonard (1987) states: “Thus real reform is likely to occur only in 
circumstances such as credible donor threats to terminate support and 
severe financial stringency for the state” (p. 907).
 To conclude, the main similarities between the two bodies 
of literature are their recognition of how adaptation of reforms may 
be separated from the actual practice in the organizations and within 
both bodies of literature scholars argue for the need for legitimacy 
concerning how organizations are structured as well as how they 
work in practice. However, the arguments for why a separation of 
structure and practices occur and where organizations search for 
legitimacy differ greatly between scholars. Within the organization 
literature, it is argued that separating formal structures from practice 
occurs in all organizations, while in the development literature this 
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is a consequence of, for African contexts, the inappropriate Western 
organizational structures that have been imposed externally on African 
public organizations. Likewise, development scholars argue that 
public officials in African countries search for legitimacy primarily 
within African socio-political contexts, while organization scholars 
emphasize that they search for legitimacy primarily within the context 
of organizational fields. 
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CHAPTER 3
The Sub-Saharan African Context of 
Public Auditors
The first case in the study consists of the arenas for public auditors in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. meeting places and forums where auditors 
from Supreme Audit Institutions in African countries meet and 
interact. The fieldwork conducted consists of observations, personal 
interviews, document studies, as well as a number of informal 
conversations. The idea of starting the study with an open approach 
using multiple sources was to create a broad understanding of the 
context, in order to avoid a too narrow approach and instead, with the 
two theoretical approaches as guidance, enable a more open approach 
for variety within the empirical setting. 
 To gain access to arenas for African public auditors, a 
visit was made to the secretariat of the African Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institution in English-speaking Africa (AFROSAI-
E). Through the regional secretariat, there were opportunities to visit 
and observe conferences, training courses and meetings within the 
regional coorporation, conduct personal interviews, more informal 
conversations, as well as to examine their documents. The sources 
were used in parallel for confirmation and to identify possible 
alternative explanations or contradictions (Burgess 1984; Yin 2009). 
The multiple sources were also used additively, i.e. the information 
from one interview, or reflections from an observation, was used 
in the next interview. Examine their documents in parallel with 
conducting the interviews also created possibilities for questions 
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concerning the information provided by the documents and thereby 
broaden and deepen the understanding of the arenas (Yin 2009). 
 The observations provided a fruitful starting point for the 
study where interaction among the auditors could be observed, 
and the understanding for if and how the auditors discussed the 
relationship between the international standards and their local 
contexts, outside an interview situation, could be revealed. In the 
field notes from the observations, attention was paid to, and extensive 
notes were taken on how the auditors talked and acted, about the 
relationship between the Sub-Saharan African context and the 
international audit standards. In addition, my own reflections on the 
situations were written down (Burgess 1984). Throughout the study, 
in interviews, informal conversations and during the observations, 
the purpose of the study was always made clear, and coffee and lunch 
breaks were used for informal conversations with auditors about 
their views and opinions of the standards and the situation in their 
countries, as well as the activities they participated in. In addition, 
access to all events was permitted by the regional secretariat. In this 
sense, the observations are to be regarded as open. However, in the 
larger events, such as the AFROSAI assembly or the AFROSAI-E 
performance audit course, the events were so large that it was possible 
to blend in with the participants and since I was not introduced, 
those I did not talk to were probably unaware of the observation (c.f. 
Burgess 1984).  
 The personal interviews were semi-structured around the 
theoretical approaches and the activities of the organization, in 
order to cover the theoretical aspects as well as capture a variety of 
responses and open up for new aspects (Merriam 2009). In addition, 
follow up interviews were conducted with some of the respondents 
to clarify various statements and to ask about features, which had 
crossed my mind while transcribing their interview, examining 
documents or conducting an observation. In the interviews, questions 
regarding facts and their situation as well as questions about their 
views and opinion were included (Burgess 1984). In addition to 
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the more formal interviews, informal conversations with some of 
the respondents were held, in general when we met in connection 
with the events observed. The information provided during the 
informal conversations was written down in the field notes from the 
observations. All data collection concerning the arenas was conducted 
in South Africa, October - December 2008. To create a situation where 
the people interviewed could speak more freely about their thoughts 
and experiences, they were promised confidentiality, i.e. that no 
names would be written in the thesis, instead all interviews would be 
numbered.
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The regional groups
To promote regional cooperation between state audit institutions, 
the international professional organization for public audit, the 
International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, (INTOSAI), 
has created seven regional working groups: one for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, established in 1965; one for the African continent 
(AFROSAI) and one for the Arab countries, both established in 1976; 
the Asian Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions was established 
in 1978; the Pacific Association was established in 1987; and in 1990, 
the youngest among the organizations, the group for the European 
countries was established (INTOSAI 2004). 
AFROSAI 
The African Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAI) 
was created in 1976, and, in accordance with the aims of the 
INTOSAI, the organization aims to promote the exchange of ideas 
and knowledge within public auditing among the African states. 
Membership in AFROSAI is open to SAIs in all member countries 
of the African Union. The organization has a general assembly that 
is held every three years, a governing board, a permanent secretariat 
and technical committees, where representatives from various 
countries work on selected issues in between the assembly meetings. 
In addition, within AFROSAI there are three sub-regional groups, 
one for each language group; French, Arabic and English (INTOSAI 
2004). These sub-regional groups were created as a result of a special 
development initiative within the INTOSAI. 
 The INTOSAI has a clear aim with the organization, which is 
that mutual experiences benefit all (Fiedler 2004, p. 140).  In order to 
realize this aim, the idea of having an international body to provide 
assistance, such as training and guidance material, for public auditors 
at the SAIs around the worldemerged within INTOSAI at the end of 
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the 1970s, and in 1986, the INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI) 
was established. The aim of the IDI was to assist developing countries 
and to become a “focal point” to which these countries could turn for 
guidance and assistance with auditing training programs (INTOSAI 
2004, p. 32). The focus for the programs was training on the basics of 
accounting and auditing, and the programs were to be implemented 
in the various regions based on the needs in each region. INTOSAI 
(2004) explains that: “IDI would be a clearing house for the collection 
and dissemination of information, development of materials, and 
training of trainers and training managers” (ibid). At the beginning 
of the 1990s, there was a demand for stronger regional structures for 
training, in order to improve the training’s long-term sustainability.  
Consequently, the IDI developed a program to strengthen the regional 
and sub-regional groups, which was named the Long Term Regional 
Training Program (LTRTP). The aim of the LTRTP was to diminish 
the role of the IDI and, instead, promote the regional and sub-regional 
groups as the actors responsible for training and capacity building 
in the region. The IDI would thus merely coordinate and provide 
guidance and assistance to the groups (INTOSAI 2004). 
AFROSAI-E
As a result of the IDI’s Long Term Regional Training Program,the 
heads of the SAIs, the Auditor Generals in English-speaking southern 
Africa, formed an association in 1996 named AFROSAI-E (the 
African Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions in English-
speaking Africa). However, in the region, cooperation between the 
Supreme Audit Institutions was already established within SADC (the 
Southern African Development Community). The SADC in 1991 had 
founded an organization for SAIs in the region, the Southern African 
Development Community Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(SADCOSAI), which was an independent organization, collecting 
membership fees and developing statues for the organization. 
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In addition, SADCOSAI received funding from the Swedish 
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), and support in terms of 
technical assistance from the Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO). 
AFROSAI-E, on the other hand, was sponsored by the Netherlands 
Ministry for Development Cooperation as well as receiving technical 
support from the Netherlands Court of Auditors (NCA). Hence, the 
two organizations existed in parallel and both secretariats were located 
at the Office of the Audit General in South Africa until they merged in 
2004. The new organization was given the name African Organisation 
of English-speaking Supreme Audit Institutions, AFROSAI-E.14
 AFROSAI-E comprises the twenty-one English and two 
Portuguese-speaking SAIs in Africa. The Auditor Generals from all 
member countries compose its governing board, which meets once 
a year along with their sub-committees. Within AFROSAI-E, four 
sub-committees are established; 1) a capacity building committee, 
2) a human resource committee 3) a finance committee, and 4) an 
audit committee, and each Auditor-General is assigned to serve on 
one of the committees. Another part of the organization is a technical 
committee, which serves as a control mechanism for the quality of 
the material produced by the organization’s secretariat. The technical 
committee consists of managers from the secretariat, auditors 
from member countries as well as auditors from the institutional 
partners, who regularly meet and review documents produced by the 
secretariat. The secretariat is currently located at the SAI of South 
Africa in Pretoria, and there are around eight permanent positions in 
the office. Additionally, individuals may be appointed to the office on 
shorter terms.15
 The South African SAI sponsors three positions in the 
regional secretariat, the others are financed by AFROSAI-E’s three 
institutional partners; the IDI, the SNAO and the NCA. The role as 
an institutional partner involves providing support for the office, not 
14 AFROSAI-E (2006) Corporate Plan and Budget for 2007-2009; AFROSAI-E (2006) Report on 
Independent Mid-term Review
15 AFROSAI-E (2006) Corporate Plan and Budget for 2007-2009; AFROSAI-E (2006) Report on 
Independent Mid-term Review
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only with resources but also with knowledge and experience.16 In 
addition, the member-SAIs pay an annual membership fee, and the 
organization receives funds from the Sida. Specific projects may also 
be financed by other actors,such as the World Bank, and bilateral 
projectswith member-SAI or donors, with whom the member-SAI has 
an agreement.17
African public audit arenas 
Guidance
An important part of the work in AFROSAI-E has been the 
production of various types of guidance material. The organization 
develops a wide range of audit manuals and guidelines, for instance 
manuals on regularity audit, performance audit, environmental 
audit, guidelines on the implementation of the INTOSAI standards, 
reporting guidelines and guidelines for detecting fraud while auditing. 
In addition to the extensive range of manuals and guidelines, and 
in order to share experiences between the SAIs within the region, 
the AFROSAI-E has developed documents in whichit describes 
the experiences and “lessons learnt” from one or several SAIs in 
the region. For instance, the process by which the SAI of Botswana 
developed a performance audit unit is presented in the report 
“Developing Performance Audit. Lessons learnt from the Office of 
the Auditor-General of Botswana.” The guidance material is produced 
by the secretariat, which views guidance material as an important 
aspect for creating the same systems in all countries in the region. 
At a meeting with representatives from the secretariat and auditors 
from other associated countries (AFROSAI-E Technical committee 
16 AFROSAI-E (2006) Corporate Plan and Budget for 2007-2009
17 AFROSAI-E (2006) Corporate Plan and Budget for 2007-2009; AFROSAI-E (2006) Report on 
Independent Mid-term Review; AFROSAI-E (2008) Annual report for 2007 and Work Plan for 
2008 
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meeting) the design of reporting guidelines was discussed. From 
listening to the discussions throughout the observation, it became 
evident that there was an aim to get all the SAIs in the region to start 
working according to the same procedures, regardless of whether they 
used other reporting systems:
Participant A: “People are doing this in many different ways that is why 
we have created this guideline. We shall not encourage the norm of 
reporting. The norm is to produce one report on the entire government. 
We write that they should do it differently, even if we know that they do 
it in a different way in the region. We will write this now and try to make 
it go in that direction.” The discussion continues about practices in the 
various countries. Participant A: “The motive for guidelines is for us to 
use the same system. We have to check the IBSAs and say [to the SAIs] 
that you are doing the wrong thing” All the other participants disagree: 
“We shall not say that they do ‘the wrong thing’, rather say ‘you don’t 
comply with the standards’.” After some more discussions participant 
B says: “We should do make it compulsory to have a separate opinion 
for each ministry”. Participant A: [We should] start by talking about 
what the purpose of financial auditis, start basic, and then move to the 
standards and then end up with what we actually are doing is not the 
proper thing, and make them understand. And then go out and assist 
the countries that are ready, maybe also discuss it at the General Board 
meeting, because on the technical update there are only experts, we 
may need some formal support from the top.
(Observation AFROSAI-E Technical committee meeting)
As well as constituting an arena, the AFROSAI-E may also be 
characterized as a meta-organization, i.e. an organization with other 
organizations as members. A significant feature of such organizations 
is their ambition to create similarities among their members, for 
instance by creating guidance material. AFROSAI-E’s production of 
large amounts of guidance material clearly shows that the AFROSAI-
E has such ambitions. As the above observation illustrates, in its 
ambition to harmonize structures and practices among its members, 
AFROSAI-E has to balance between authority and voluntarism 
(Ahrne & Brunsson 2008). The secretariat is aware of its limited 
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authority over the members, at the same time as it want the members 
to move in a certain direction and carry out certain activities in order 
to strengthen their common identity as part of the meta-organization. 
As illustrated by the above discussion quoted from the technical 
committee meeting, the secretariat cannot tell members that their 
way of conducting audits is “the wrong way”, instead they agreed to 
try to convince the members through more voluntary mechanisms, 
such as appealing to the professional norm of following international 
standards (c.f. Borrás & Jacobsson 2004; Scott 2001). 
 The production of guidance material within the AFROSAI-
E, and how the secretariat and members of the technical committee 
discuss audit standards, corresponds well with the proposition drawn 
up according to the theory of organizations. It has a strong ambition 
to harmonize the audit structures and practices in the region so 
members will better follow what is prescribed in the international 
standards, which it regards as the most appropriate way of conducting 
audits. 
 As illustrated in the observation above, the reporting 
procedures in the region were identified as not complying with the 
international standards, hence the organization wanted to try to 
change the practice, regardless of the circumstances in each country. 
However, in the guidance material there is also an awareness of the 
possible necessity of adjusting to specific circumstance in different 
countries. For instance, in the introduction to the Regularity 
Audit Manual, from 2008, the importance of customizing to the 
circumstances in the country is highlighted: 
The guidance and working papers of the regularity manual reflect 
international requirements, or draw on best practices to enhance 
the efficiency of the audit performed. However, there are numerous 
differences between SAIs in terms of mandate, legislative environment, 
organisational structures etc. the manual may need to be adapted to 
the individual circumstances of each SAI. The extent to which the 
manual will be customised the template depends on that SAI’s specific 
conditions and demands. 
(AFROSAI (2008) Regularity Audit Manual, p. 10) 
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The quotation illustrates that the secretariat recognizes variation 
among the SAIs in their region, similar to the way the INTOSAI states 
that there may be specific circumstances in each country that needs 
to be considered in the adaptation of standards. The recognition of 
differences among the countries within the region however does not 
indicate that there are any particular differences between African 
countries within the region and the international standards as such, 
or that there are particular differences between the way standards are 
adopted in Western countries and how they are adopted in the sub-
regional African group. 
 The introduction continues with a reservation: “the impact 
of not using the prescribed working papers should be considered in 
the light of the ISA requirements that the working paper are linked 
to” (p. 10). Thus, the members are reminded of the importance of 
following the international requirements as outlined in the standards. 
A few specific sections in the manual are then mentioned where the 
SAIs may customize and make the manual more country specific.18 
Likewise, in the Performance Audit Manual it is explained that the 
manual is a “template manual”, which may be used as a whole by 
SAIs that are introducing performance audit. Moreover, the manual 
states that as the SAI gains experience it may eventually adjust the 
manual to its own local needs, there then follows a list of sections in 
the manual which the SAI is recommended to customize.19 Hence, 
in the two manuals the sections that should be customized are 
prescribed and as a consequence, what is required to follow more 
closely in line with what is written in the manual. The idea of the 
necessity of customizing to local circumstances is also pointed out 
in interviews, where the Regularity Audit Manual is described as a 
“generic manual”, which the countries may adjust to their context.20 
At the technical update workshop, during which the updates of the 
manuals are presented and discussed among the member countries, 
the importance of customizing the manuals to the circumstances 
18 AFROSAI-E (2008) Regularity Audit Manual 2006 (amended 2008) 
19 AFROSAI-E (2007) Performance Audit Manual  
20 Interview 12
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in each country is emphasized in the presentations of the manuals.
However, the presenters as well as the participants at the workshop 
continuously emphasizeat the same time the importance of following 
international standards.21 As illustrated in the quotation above, 
local circumstances are described here as different mandates for 
each SAI, or different legal systems that may lead to variation when 
standards are implemented, this was also confirmed during informal 
conversations in discussions on customization with participants at the 
technical update workshop as well as the performance audit course.22 
Yet, when asked in the interviews for more specific features, to which 
the international standards would have to be adjusted in the various 
countries, the differences do not appear to be particularly large. A 
manager at the AFROSAI-E secretariat expressed it as follows:  
There are some differences, for example if you write a report on the 
ministries, some countries write individual reports on each ministry, 
some write one overall report for all ministries. In financial audit, there 
is not much difference. The British rules, the systems are the same, 
the same structure of government. After independence, maybe some 
differences but pretty much the same. 
(Interview 12)
Adjusting the guidance material to the local circumstances could be 
regarded as supporting the development theory and what was outlined 
in the first proposition, i.e. if foreign structures are to be implemented 
they would have to be adjusted to local circumstances in the country. 
There are however, some differences between what are said to be local 
circumstances in the guidance material and in the literature. In the 
guidance material and in the interviews regarding these documents, 
no specific African political or administrative cultural features are 
discussed. Neither is resources used as an argument for adjusting 
21 Observation AFROSAI-E Technical update workshop
22 Observation AFROSAI-E Technical update workshop; AFROSAI-E Training course for man-
agers in performance auditing
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international practices to the local contexts in African countries.23 
Instead, necessary local adjustments in the guidance material refer to 
the legal mandates or organizational structures at the individual SAIs. 
For instance, how the reporting system is structured in each country, 
as shown in the quotation above. Furthermore, what may be adjusted 
and what must be kept from the manual, in order to comply with 
international standards, is laid out in the manual. 
 Consequently, I interpret adjustment here as being somehow 
different from the way adjustments to local circumstances are 
presented in the development literature. Here adjustments do not 
appear to be specifically connected to African circumstances, as they 
are claimed to be in the development literature. Similarly, the manager 
quoted above also argues that the systems in the countries are quite 
similar and that there are no large differences amongst them, which 
demand larger adjustments, and she uses the reporting system as an 
example of differences. As illustrated above in this chapter, the same 
reporting system is discussed at the technical committee meeting as 
an area where the AFROSAI-E should work for harmonization among 
the countries, since it was regarded that these reporting systems were 
not in line with what is prescribed in the international standards. 
Consequently, changing the reporting system and making countries 
in the region use the same system does not appear to be considered 
problematic by the regional secretariat.24
 Since its establishment in 1996, the AFROSAI-E secretariat 
has produced a significant number of guidance materials. Although, 
the degree of implementation of these guidelines and manuals 
in the SAIs in the region is acknowledged as insufficient by the 
secretariat, and it claimsit now primarily needs to focus on ensuring 
the implementation of the documents. A key issue brought up in 
interviews and during observations as an important factor, impacting 
on the possibilities to implement the guidance material,was the 
23 Resources are however used as accepted reasons for not following standards amongst the 
Auditor Generals, as we will see later in this chapter. 
24 Observation AFROSAI-E Technical committee meeting
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difference between senior and junior staff.25 Junior staff is argued 
to be more technical skilled, which enables them to adopt new 
work procedures more easily. Senior staff, which often is found in 
management positions, in general has a lower level of education and 
thereby has difficulties in adopting new working methodologies. 
Due to hierarchic structures in the organizations, it is difficult for 
the junior staff to influence the organization if the management does 
not support the change.  In observations and in interviews it was 
argued that the management as well as the Auditor Generals agreed 
several times on the importance of following various standards and 
committed to the implementation of manuals and work procedures, 
but on a shallow level, i.e. they did not actually change anything in 
practice:
Participant C: “Some at the top feel insecure about new developments. 
They will pretend that they support when they are at meetings, but in 
reality they will not support. You also have cases when the AG supports, 
but then there is a vacuum”
(Observation AFROSAI-E Technical committee meeting)
To meet the difficulties experienced with management, the AFROSAI-
E planned to hold a course specifically designed for managers at the 
SAIs in the region, in order to increase their level of competence. 
Although management was regarded as an important issue, the failure 
to implement the guidance material was not only referred to as a 
management problem, it was also argued that a lack of motivation 
among the ordinary auditors was a reason. This is illustrated in 
the following interview, where the respondent refers to above 
quoted participant C when discussing implementation of working 
methodologies according to standards: 
25  Observation AFROSAI-E Technical committee meeting; AFROSAI-E Long-term advisors 
meeting; AFROSAI-EPlanning meeting with donors; Interview 13, 14
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They [top management] normally are quite aware of the current 
availability of standards and also other things. So, they are up to date. 
But in terms of reaching the people who are actually performing the 
audit, that is difficult. Because you sometimes find that implementing a 
standard will require a complete change in work methods and also a lot 
more than what they normally do and it is difficult to explain why you 
need to do that. The only answer is yes, you need to have a consistent 
methodology and you have to comply with the standards because 
a decision has been made for you by your employers. But this is not 
enough in most cases, that is why what participant C was saying this 
morning that there is a perceived acceptance, but behind the scenes 
there is rejection.  
(Interview 11)
How organizations differentiate between what they say they do 
and what they actually do in practice is argued by organizational 
theorists as well as by development scholars to be a common feature 
in organizations. As discussed in the second chapter, explanations for 
this occurs differ however between the two theoretical approaches. 
Organization scholars claim that this is something all organizations 
do regardless of context, while development theorists argue that the 
superficial adaptation of structures is due to the differences between 
the Western structures and the African societies.
 Although the superficial adaptation of standards is discussed 
as a problem within the AFROSAI-E, it is not argued that the reasons 
for lack of implementation are due to any specific cultural features 
or connected to the fact that the audit practices are not African but 
international. The problems of implementation were referred to 
instead as lack of motivation among the auditors, as well as a situation 
where management has lower levels of education than junior staff. 
Lack of motivation to adapt the standards could be regarded as 
supporting the development approach i.e. that to African auditors the 
international standards are inappropriate for their local environment 
as well as being externally imposed, which is why they lack motivation 
to actually adopt them in practice. However, when the lack of 
motivation was discussed in the interview, the auditor argued that in 
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reality implementing audit methodologies according to the standards 
required a complete change in working methodologies and that the 
auditors had to do more work than they normally did. It is difficult 
to interpret this as something particularly African, i.e. resistance to 
changes in work methodologies, especially if it means an increase in 
the workload and it is unclear why the changes are necessary.
 It is argued that the situation where levels of competence 
differ between management and more recent employed officials 
with higher education is common in Sub-Saharan African countries 
(Hilderbrand & Grindle 1998). The AFROSAI-E is trying to change 
the prevailing situation by arranging various training courses designed 
for the management as well as arranging bilateral agreements, in order 
to assist the SAIs “on the ground”, 26 showing the auditors in practical 
training courses how the work is supposed to be conducted. Thus, 
the ambition from the AFROSAI-E was for the SAIs to obtain higher 
compliance with the international standards, not to seek specific 
solutions for audit methodologies in each member country. 
Education and exchange of ideas and knowledge
As discussed above, staff in the AFROSAI-E are aware of the 
difficulties in implementing all their guidance material, consequently 
they assist the SAIs with “on the ground training” as well as planning 
to hold a specific management course. These courses and training 
events however are not exceptions; significant parts of the activities 
conducted within AFROSAI-E are various arrangements to advance 
the competence in the region. Such arrangements not only include 
providing education and training, but also constructing arenas for 
exchanging ideas and experiences among the auditors. Education, 
training and places for the exchange of knowledge and ideas are 
integrated in many casesinto the same events. For instance, the 
training course for managers in performance audit, which was 
26 Interview 13
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observed in the study, contained clear elements of education and 
practical exercises, at the same time as exchanges of ideas and 
experiences from the different countries flourished among the 
participants.  
 Moreover, training may be conducted within a bilateral 
agreement between an individual SAI and the AFROSAI-E, i.e. 
training courses as “in house support” or “on the ground training” 
where the secretariat send a team to conduct training at the individual 
SAI.  In such training arrangements, several of the auditors at the 
SAI are normally involved. The bilateral support is mainly financed 
by the individual SAI, which takes the initiative and definesthe area 
they would like to improve and then fund the project themselves, or 
find a donor to sponsor them. The secretariat then provides trainers, 
normally auditors working at the secretariat or working in other SAIs 
in the region.27 The fact that the individual SAIs take the initiative and 
define their need for “in house support” is emphasized in interviews as 
an important aspect of how the AFROSAI-E works. A manager from 
the regional secretariat expressed it in the following way: 
We keep emphasizing that we are an enabling organization; we are not 
here to dictate to them, we are not here to prescribe to them. We are 
doing what they asked us to do. 
 (Interview 16)
As expected of a meta-organization, it keeps emphasizing the 
voluntarism in its work directed towards its members (Ahrne & 
Brunsson 2008). The focus on voluntarism when defining the need 
for support at the individual SAIs, as well the emphasize on the 
importance for the individual SAI to design and express those needs, 
could also be interpreted as a result of the moral dimension, as argued 
in the development literature; i.e. imposing structures on the African 
countries is problematic per se, regardless of the actual possibilities 
for implementation (Abrahamsen 2000; Hyden 2006). In order for the 
27 Interview 13, 16, 17
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structures and working methodologies introduced to be regarded as 
legitimate in the country, it is important that the SAI in each country 
definesits needs, instead of an external actor such as the AFROSAI-E 
secretariat, prescribing the kind of support it needs. 
 The in-house support started when AFROSAI-E realized that 
training large parts of the staff at the same time would have a larger 
impact on the SAI. The changed approach was due to the difficulties 
it saw in the traditional regional training courses carried out in the 
region. The regional training courses were originally the foundation 
for one part of AFROSAI-E, namely the Long Term Regional Training 
Program(LTRTP) established by the IDI. In these regional courses, the 
SAIs in the region send one or two auditors to participate who, after 
the course, are expected to return to their SAI and implement the new 
methodologies,as taught at the course. In order to create competence 
sustainability for in the region, the teachers on the courses are in 
general auditors from the member SAIs, who have been educated as 
trainers by AFROSAI-E, sometimes with support from experts from 
the institutional partners.28 The problems the secretariat noticed 
were the limited opportunities for the newly trained auditors to 
implementactual changes in their organizations:
And we started to realize that when they get back to their office they 
don’t really have the authority to change anything. And nobody would 
actually listen to them because they were all busy with their own 
work.
(Interview 16)
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the problem of implementation is 
described partly as a consequence of the lack of competence among 
managers in the SAIs. Lack of resources could be regarded as an 
explanation for the inadequate management competence, as well as 
serve as an explanation for the lack of resources for developing the 
organization based on a few individuals trained on a regional course. 
28 AFROSAI-E (2006) Corporate Plan and Budget for 2007-2009
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Instead of creating room for change, everyone had to continue with 
their ordinary work in the organization. This supports the proposition 
formulated according to the development literature, where scholars 
argue that resources and lack of competence are reasons for the 
difficulties in implementing foreign structures. However, the strategy 
for managing the situation was to change the way of educating the 
auditors, from just a few in the organization to the majority of the 
staff. Consequently, the ambition was still to follow international 
standards to the greatest possible extent, in accordance with the 
proposition outlined from the organization literature. 
 Despite their claimed limited impact, regional courses are still 
carried out within AFROSAI-E and, apart from serving as education, 
they also constitute arenas where auditors meet and exchange 
knowledge and ideas. The following observation was made on day 
one of the performance audit managers training course, where the 
participants presented exercises they had carried out,since the time 
when the course was held last: 
Country A is presenting their report. They are starting to establish a 
performance audit unit. “Now when we start we have to look at other 
SAIs and what they have done. Like country B, they have been doing 
this for fifteen years, also country C, we must learn from them. What 
were their restraints and difficulties, we have to look at how they did 
things. From their experiences, we have to create a strategic plan. In 
the report, the experiences from country B and C are presented, and 
also a SWOT analysis. Under opportunities [we have written]: an 
international trend, everyone else is doing it, why not us? Now we want 
your help to identify how we should set up this unit”. 
(Observation AFROSAI-E Training course 
for managers in performance auditing) 
During the course, all of the participants presented reports from their 
countries, in some cases auditors from two countries had written a 
joint report. After the presentation, participants from other countries 
commented and criticized the reports presented. My impressions 
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from the course was that the atmosphere was friendly, open and 
that participants did not fear criticizing each other, the following 
reflections were written down in the field notes: 
The participants do not seem to have a problem with saying what 
they think and criticizing each other. To be compared with what was 
mentioned in interview 17, that it is African culture not to criticize … 
does not seem to apply to this group.  
[During a discussion about a report presented] People in the public are 
critical and they also spell it out. There does not seem to be any “fluff ” 
around their comments, they are direct and tough, the atmosphere 
seem open and sincere.
(Observation AFROSAI-E Training course 
for managers in performance auditing) 
In informal conversations during coffee breaks and lunches, the 
participants told me how they experienced this type of event and these 
informal conversations strongly confirm the observations made at the 
course:
Conversation at lunch with country D and E, they think they learn much 
and that experience sharing and knowledge sharing is very valuable. 
They all have the same problems, such as high staff turnover, [problems 
with] management etc. all have the same problem but they are at 
different levels. As in country D, they have carried out performance 
audits for a long time, but they are not independent. While in country 
E, they have recently gained independence but they have just started 
with performance audit. 
(Observation AFROSAI-E Training course 
for managers in performance auditing) 
As illustrated in the above observation notes, much of the course was 
structured around discussing experiences from the countries in the 
region, learning from each other and gaining new ideas for how to 
proceed in their own country. In addition, the auditors argued that 
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they were strengthened in their determination to work for changes 
in their organizations thanks to meeting fellow auditors from the 
region.29
 The above quotations, from the observations made at 
the performance audit training course, supports the proposition 
formulated according to the organizational scholars. In the 
observations and informal conversations, the auditors appeared to 
regard it as natural to study how their peers have handled a situation, 
in this case setting up a performance audit unit, and then imitate 
their procedures. As argued by organization scholars, people in 
organizations are likely to imitate organizations within their field, 
when there are no clear instructionson how to act (c.f. Kennedy & Fiss 
2009; Sahlin & Wedlin 2008; Sevón 1996). In particular, individuals 
in organizations are likely to imitate those they know and trust and, 
as argued by Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989), it is through 
networks, in this case a performance audit course, that this trust and 
friendship is built. Consequently, among organizations in a network, 
practices of appropriate behavior are likely to spread. 
 At the performance audit course, the importance of 
customizing the manuals to the circumstances in each country was 
also noted. A teacher at the course emphasized that SAIs should not 
just “copy and paste” the manuals, instead they should look at the 
situation in their countries and customize the manual accordingly.30 
It is difficult to interpret what kind of customization to which she 
referred. However, when more specific differences between SAIs 
were discussed, the auditors claimed that the only thing that differed 
between the countries was their size and differences in the levels 
of development in the organizations, as well as what they argued 
were minor issues, such as their legal mandate to conduct audits in 
certain areas.31 This may be regarded as supporting that part of the 
development literature that argues that differences in development 
29 Observation AFROSAI-E Training course for managers in performance auditing
30 Observation AFROSAI-E Training course for managers in performance auditing
31 Observation 11th AFROSAI Assembly; AFROSAI-E Training course for managers in perform-
ance auditing; Interview 12, 15, 17
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require adjustments to the support and models that are introduced 
(c.f. Glenday 1998; Turner & Hulme 1997; World Bank 2005). 
However, the auditors themselves claimed that necessary adjustments 
to local circumstances were primarily minor matters and did not 
imply any large deviations from the standards. As illustrated by 
the quotation above, the auditors appear to be more interested in 
emphasizing their similarities, for instance that as public auditors 
they face the same problems of high staff turnover and problems with 
management, as well as regarding practices that are not in line with 
the international standards as obstacles they will try to overcome.32
 The idea of developing their own unique solutions “in flow” 
with their local circumstances, as would be the appropriate practice 
according to the development literature (c.f. Diamond 2004, p. 279; 
Leonard 1987, p. 908; see also Dia 1996), was not present during 
the observations or interviews. By contrast, the auditors rather 
appeared to regard the use of practices and experiences of other SAIs 
as helpful, when they were to develop their own organization, not 
only for practical advices but also for legitimizing the new practices 
in relation to the SAI in their own country. Moreover, the auditors 
regarded the use of international standards as guaranteeing “best 
practices” accepted around the world and, in order to be professional, 
they considered it necessary to comply with these standards.33 Hence, 
the professional community of auditors is regarded by the African 
auditors as an essential source of legitimacy, where they view the 
international formulated standards as the most appropriate audit 
practices and they continuously imitate the other SAIs. These features 
confirm what have been outlined in the theory of organizations of 
how isomorphic mechanisms work. 
 Knowledge sharing and discussing best practices was also a 
dominant feature of the AFROSAI congress, where Auditor Generals 
from all of the African countries met. The congress had three audit 
themes, which they discussed on one of the days, 1) audits in the 
32 Observation AFROSAI-E Training course for managers in performance auditing; AFROSAI-
E Technical committee meeting
33 Observation AFROSAI-E Training course for managers in performance auditing
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health sector 2), training and 3) corruption. A committee was 
responsible for each theme and the committees had to summarize 
the information on the situation in each country. At the congress, 
a general plenary discussion was held after the presentation of the 
summery report and the following quotation is an extraction from 
the field notes, which were taken when audit in the health sector was 
discussed: 
Country A: What is the solution to our problems?
Country B: The doctors prefer to work in the private sector than in 
public. They work at both the public hospital and their own private 
clinic. But they spend more time at their private clinic… what shall 
we do? They say they improve their remuneration, how shall we make 
them do this in public sector instead, higher salaries, more education?
Country C: The patients are sent for health care abroad instead, to 
country X and V... But when we checked, not all patients had actually 
been in these countries, only a few. Who should we hold accountable 
for this? What should we do?
Country D: We have developed the skill of performance audit. That is 
what is most important … If any country needs help, we can help.
Country E: Donors send medicines and equipment to different clinics. 
How should we audit this? It is a mixture of own funding and donor 
funds. It is difficult to follow and to audit. Then, donors want to know 
how the money or equipment is used, it is difficult when there are 
several different donors involved. /…/ Then, not everything is reaching 
where it is needed. How should those who most need the help, the poor, 
know what they are entitled to? So we have large problems with this.
Country F: We go to the hospital ourselves, and see with our own eyes 
how patients are care for. We must look beyond financial audit. We 
must have performance audit to create change.
(Observation 11th AFROSAI Assembly) 
The discussion continued and the Auditor Generals shared their 
questions and their experiences, as well as discussing ideas for 
how to handle the various situations. This was also the structure in 
the discussions on the other themes. The above observation notes 
from the congress illustrate their professional community, where 
they are interested in their fellow auditors’views and opinions of 
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their situation, and hence, this supports the organization literature 
(c.f. DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman 1989; 
Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings 2002; Scott 2001). Yet, as the above 
notes from the observation illustrate, there was a development 
and an African dimension in their discussions. The discussion 
concerned specific problems they have as developing countries; with 
high levels of corruption, low salaries giving rise to problems in the 
healthcare sector and how to regarddonor-funded equipment when 
they audit. Thus, supporting the development theory, there appears 
to be a specific African dimension to auditing, where they have to 
consider these specific problems when they audit (c.f. Grindle 1998b; 
Hilderbrand & Grindle 1998; Olowu 1999). 
 Despite this interpretation of the discussion of specific 
African problems, no Auditor General expressed a need here for 
adjusting the international audit standards or working methods 
to their local circumstances in their country, or claimed that the 
international audit models were inappropriate for their contexts. 
Instead, the solution presented by country D and F, to the problems 
with auditing donor-funded equipment, was to start using 
performance audit, which is an internationally established audit 
approach not specifically designed for developing countries. However, 
the picture is not entirely clear. Occasionally, the delegates at the 
congress pointed out the importance of each country examining its 
own situation and developing units and methodologies accordingly. 
For instance, in the presentation of the second theme concerning 
training, the responsible committee emphasized that the needs of 
each SAI has to be assessed, and adequate methods and interventions 
then have to be chosen in accordance with those needs.34 Similar to 
the performance audit course, when differences between countries 
were sometimes specified, they appear to refer primarily to levels 
of development and the size of the countries,implying they were 
all aiming at the same development, in the same direction. This 
was specifically evident in a speech concerning the strategic plan 
34 Observation 11th AFROSAI Assembly
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for AFROSAI 2006-2011, held by the Auditor General of South 
Africa, who would be the next President of AFROSAI. In the speech, 
he pointed out that countries in Africa were at different levels of 
development as well as differing in size, which could imply that they 
had different needs. However, he continued by saying that different 
government structures should not inhibit knowledge sharing, 
development or implementation of the international standards. In 
addition, several other speakers at the congress expressed an ambition 
to work for harmonized audit structures around the world.35
 The sensitivity for differences in development when 
implementing international standards may be regarded as supporting 
the development literature. Still, as pointed out above, no one 
expressed that any adjustments to the international standard were 
necessary to make them suit the local African environment, or argued 
that the internationally formulated standards were inappropriate 
solutions for their problems. Rather the auditors’ sensitivity for the 
context is interpreted to concern what kind of capacity needs to be 
strengthened as well as the type of support they would need in order 
to comply better with the requirements in the international standards. 
This professional ambition together with the strong call for every SAI 
to follow the internationallyformulated standards may be regarded as 
supporting the organization literature.
Assessments and peer reviews 
In its documents, the AFROSAI-E state that in order for a SAI to 
be able to move forward there is a need for the SAI to know its 
position, in relation to international standards as well as in relation 
to other SAIs in the region. As a part of this work, AFROSAI-E 
conducts assessments of member SAIs in the region, to establish 
the level of the SAI within various areas and to establish what needs 
to be done in order for the SAI to move forward. The assessments 
35 Observation 11th AFROSAI Assembly
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conducted are self-assessments as well as assessments by means of 
peer reviews, where professional auditors from other member SAIs 
as well as auditors from AFROSAI-E’s institutional partners conduct 
the latter. AFROSAI-E’s ambition is that peer reviews should be 
held on a regular basis, and that each SAI should be peer reviewed 
every three years.36 The AFROSAI-E has constructed an institutional 
framework with five levels where the SAIs are evaluated in areas such 
as independence, human resources, training and audit standards 
and methodologies. This assessment is intended to function as a 
“benchmark” for the SAIs in the region and the performance of the 
SAIs are ranked and published.37 In interviews, the managers at the 
secretariat pointed out that they are careful when they handle this 
information, they do not release reports that say for instance that 
country X and Y are not following the manual. Instead they present 
an overview of how each SAI correspond to the different levels.38 In 
interviews, it was also emphasized that the quality assurance reviews 
are voluntary for the individual SAIs:
Nothing was pushed on to them, everything was at their own request, 
even with the quality assurance… we didn’t say we are coming, we 
said … this is the advantages, guys we are here for you, this is your 
organization, we are able to help you … we have this, that and that, but 
it is for you to use the services, it is for you to ask for it. 
(Interview 16)
This confirms what was discussed earlier in this chapter regarding 
the features of AFROSAI-E, i.e. it lacks authority and focuses instead 
on voluntary mechanisms in order to make its members move in 
the right direction. Here it also uses ranking lists and benchmarks to 
enable comparisons between organizations and create peer pressure,  
36 AFROSAI-E (2006) Corporate Plan and Budget for 2007-2009
37 AFROSAI-E (2007) Transversal Activity Report of the Supreme Audit Institutions in the 
AFROSAI-E region.
38 Interview 12
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which it argues impact the SAIs.39 One auditor at the secretariat 
expressed it in the following way: 
Some of them are quite competitive. When Tanzania heard of Botswana 
for example they only wanted to know, how far ahead are they ..or ..so 
they have this competition with each other, which is good because it 
helps a lot. 
(Interview 13) 
The use and impact of ranking lists and the professional pressure to 
imitate more successful organizations which follows, confirms what 
is outlined by organizational scholars. However, while some auditors 
in interviews argued that these mechanisms affect the organizations, 
other respondents were more skeptical saying that this effect is 
limited, it may be evident immediately after a workshop but eventually 
the effect subsides and there will be no changes in the organization.40  
In peer reviews, experts from the institutional partners outside the 
region are invited to participate in the assessment teams. This is also 
the usual procedure when the secretariat aims at assuring the quality 
of its work. The technical committee, described earlier in this chapter, 
consists of experts from within the region as well as from outside the 
region who, together with the managers at the secretariat, discuss all 
the guidance material produced by the secretariat, as a part of assuring 
its quality.41 The idea of peer review in order to improve the quality 
was also evident during the training course for performance auditors. 
At the course, participants reviewed and commented on the reports 
from the other participants. During this part of the performance audit 
course, I made the following reflection in the field notes: 
39 Interview 13, 16 
40 Interview 10, 15
41Observation AFROSAI-E Technical committee meeting; Interview 16
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I  cannot see any difference here compared to when I listen to discussants 
on papers [at the university] in Sweden. The discussants vary in their 
approaches; some give positive feedback in the beginning and then are 
more careful in their critique, while others are more directly critical.   
(Observation AFROSAI-E Training course 
for managers in performance auditing)
The interviews and observation above illustrate how they shared a 
common professional understanding of their work, which enabled 
them to read and review the work of auditors from other SAIs in 
the region. The process of reviewing and assessing each other’s work 
in various contexts appearedto be part of how their professional 
community works. In addition, in the observations from the course 
the auditors gave the impression of being receptive to their peers’ 
opinions on their own work. I interpret these features as supporting 
the outline in the literature on organizations. In an interview with 
an auditor at the regional secretariat, I was told that it is typical of 
African culture not to criticize.42 However, in the group of African 
auditors participating at the performance audit course, this did not 
seem to apply. As illustrated by the quotation from the performance 
audit course, some comments were harsh and directly critical of the 
work of auditors from other countries, without anyone specifically 
reacting to those comments.43
 Peer reviews may be considered as an aid for auditors to 
improve their work, which was the impression from the observations 
made during the performance audit training course and the technical 
committee meeting, as well as being how peer reviews were described 
in interviews and informal conversations.44 Still, peer reviews may be 
regarded as a stricter instrument used by the profession to monitor the 
work of auditors in order to create compliance with the professional 
standards. An example of the more disciplinary side of the audit 
profession is a speech held at the AFROSAI congress. Although this 
42 Interview 17
43 Observation AFROSAI-E Training course for managers in performance auditing
44 Observation AFROSAI-ETraining course for managers in performance auditing;AFROSAI-E 
Technical committee meeting; Interview 16, 12
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approach was not the overall impression gathered from the arenas, 
at the congress an invited speaker, from an organization named 
Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA), argued for the 
crucial importance of auditors following standards. He also stated that 
the professional organization he represented monitor auditors and 
punishes those who do not comply with the standards, for instance by 
withdrawing their audit license.45 This statement may be understood 
as a way of creating more external legitimacy for the profession, by 
ensuring that individual auditors follow the professional standards, 
and disciplining those who deviate (c.f. Jonnergård & Erlingsdottír 
2008). 
 It is difficult to interpret which body of literature is support 
by such a statement. On the one hand, to some extent it confirms a 
coercive aspect forcing African countries to comply with international 
practices and hence, supports the development literature. On the 
other hand, the invited speaker was from South Africa, thus he was 
not an external actor imposing standards from outside. Rather he 
could be regarded as representing the audit profession in Africa, 
consequently giving more support to the organization literature on 
isomorphic normative mechanisms, which spread in the kind of 
events represented by the congress. 
 In interviews as well as in informal conversations with the 
auditors at the events observed, the auditors appeared to have an 
unproblematic approach to the international standards, i.e. for them as 
auditors there was an existing best professional practice, as formulated 
in the standards, and they just needed to follow that practice. For 
them, complying with international standards follows as a natural part 
of being a professional auditor.46 
In an interview, this was formulated in the following way: 
When they [the auditors] are doing an audit report, they say, I’ve done 
this, I’ve done this … according to this standard, so they will lie if they 
45 Observation 11th AFROSAI Assembly
46 Observation AFROSAI-E Training course for managers in performance auditing; AFROSAI-
E Technical update work shop
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don’t follow standards. Integrity, ethics … you are doing what you say 
you are doing. Also, the nature of auditing, the auditor tells everybody 
to follow the rules and regulations and when an auditor talks about 
following the rules, he talks about following standards. It is then strange 
if you don’t follow standards yourself, when you tell others to
(Interview 12)
The auditors’ approach to the international standards supports 
what is outlined in accordance with the organization literature, i.e. 
auditors share a common educational background as well as share, 
through their profession, a similar cultural cognitive framework, 
which contributes to their unproblematic approach to following 
internationally formulated standards and working for their 
implementation.
 Apart from the professional commitment to follow standards, 
the auditors mentioned several advantages of using the same 
audit structures and practices globally.  These advantages included 
their approach regarding the international standards as actually 
representing the best way to conducting audits, but they also referred 
to a practical dimension. An example of this practical dimension is 
the quality reviews of the SAIs in the region. The auditors argued that 
if the assessment teams, consisting of auditors from other SAIs in 
the region as well as from other parts of the world, are familiar with 
how the work in the SAI is structured and how they conduct their 
work, it is much easier for them to conduct the quality review.47 Using 
the same terminologies and methodologies also makes it possible 
to conduct joint training in the region, as well as making it possible 
for the auditors to discuss their problems and to help each other.48 A 
manager at the regional secretariat argued that harmonized structures 
were very positive, since the auditors in the region were then able to 
“phone each other, in audit causes, and they might know somebody 
on that side who could help.”49 Naturally, it was added, this also based 
on the auditors in the region knowing each other and having met at 
47 Interview 12
48 Interview 12, 16
49 Interview 16
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training courses and workshops. Likewise, it was added that using 
harmonized audit structures not only could enable stronger SAIs 
in the region to help the weaker ones, harmonizing audit structures 
and practices around the world also enabled stronger regions such as 
Europe to help developing regions like Africa.50
 Disadvantages mentioned with respect to harmonized audit 
structures and practices was the risk for SAIs doing things “just for 
the sake of doing it”, without understanding the reasons.51 One auditor 
argued that if there was no understanding for why a strategic plan 
should be in place, there was no point in having one. It would only be 
beneficial if it was used correctly. This auditor continued and argued 
that due to this risk it is necessary for the SAIs to be given proper 
support when they introduced new methodologies and principles.52 
Likewise, another auditor said that it depended on the legislative 
environment as well as on the SAI’slevel of development to what 
extent harmonized structures and practices could apply.53 
This auditor also added: 
But I think there is a very good feeling out there about harmonizing 
the work and I think they can see the advantages as well as of doing it 
and get a more structured way of working.  
(Interview 13)
With the development literature as the starting point, the attitudes 
expressed above, illustrating the attitudes towards international 
standards and the positive attitude towards harmonized audit 
structures and practices, not only within the region but also around 
the world, were unexpected results that were largely in contrast 
to the expected behavior of African auditors, according to the 
development literature. The auditors did not appear to regard it as 
problematic that the international standards are external and created 
outside the African context. On the contrary, they argued rather for 
50 Interview 16, 17
51 Interview 11
52 Interview 11
53 Interview 13
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the advantages of all SAIs around the world using the same audit 
structures and methodologies. Several respondents had difficulties in 
finding any disadvantages with this. As previously noted, one auditor 
argues that adopting similar standards around the world would only 
be a disadvantage if the standards were adopted “just for the sake of 
doing it”. This could be regarded as supporting the argument in the 
development literature, where superficial adaptation of structures 
does not represent how African organization work in practice (e.g. De 
Sardan 1999; Ekeh 1975). However, when the auditor continued the 
solution was not for the SAI to develop its own practices or adjust the 
ones introduced, as would be the appropriate solution according to 
development scholars. Instead, the auditor’s suggestion was to increase 
and ensure proper guidance and support for the SAIs, so they would 
be able to adopt the practices correctly. 
 The difficulties in harmonization due to levels of development 
and legislative environment among the SAIs, as advanced in one 
interview, may be regarded as supporting the argument outlined by 
development scholars. However, as illustrated by the quotation above, 
the same auditor also argued that working towards harmonized 
structures was positive and the auditor claimed that the SAIs in the 
region regarded working towards more harmonized structures as 
positive. This may instead be regarded as confirming the literature on 
organizations, i.e. where the professional identity and the professional 
community are viewed as being the most legitimate, and practices 
formulated within the profession are regarded as the most appropriate. 
Summary
The results obtained from the African arenas for public auditors 
confirmed several aspects describing how organizations behave as 
outlined in the literature on organizations. The work within the 
regional secretariat is mainly centered on the production of guidelines 
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and manuals based on international standards and encouraging, 
by voluntary means, member-organizations to adopt these to the 
greatest possible extent. Yet, some ambiguity exists, the AFROSAI-
E emphasizes how guidelines and manuals need to be customized 
to the circumstances in each country, which may be regarded as 
contradictory to their ambitions and positive attitudes towards 
harmonizing the audit structures and practices across the region, as 
well as around the world. When asked for more specific features, as 
examples of customization, the auditors argue that it is mainly smaller, 
more technical matters, such as differences in reporting procedures 
or different legal mandates for conducting audits within different 
areas. In addition, levels of development and the size of the countries 
were regarded as areas where the countries differed, which could have 
implications for implementing the standards. However, the suggested 
solution for managing the differences in development levels was 
to increase the support in order to enhance the implementation of 
international standards. 
 Lack of implementation was referred to a lack of competence 
among managers, which in turn could be regarded as a development 
problem where the lack of the right competence could have 
significance for the failure of reforms. Further, a lack of motivation 
among auditors “on the ground” was noted as a reason when 
difficulties in implementing new audit methodologies according to the 
standards arose. A lack of motivation could be argued as supporting 
the development literature, where external standards lack legitimacy 
among the auditors as well as being ill suited to the African context in 
which the auditors work. This however was not the answer provided 
in the interview, rather the auditor claimed that introducing the 
work methodologies according to international standards implies in 
general a large change in how auditors work, as well as increasing the 
amount of work they have to carry out. Accordingly, in contrast to 
what would be expected from the development literature, problems 
of implementation are not discussed as specific African features or as 
a consequence of international audit standards not suiting an African 
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environment. Nor were there any discussions about developing 
unique, “home-grown” solutions “in flow with” a specific African 
logic or domestic traditional institutions, but rather on gradually 
implementing the international standards with increases in the 
support for the organizations. 
113
CHAPTER 4
State Audit Conceptualized
In this study, the key focus is on the relationship between international 
standards of public sector audit and how such standards are handled 
in a Sub-Saharan African context. Due to the extensive range of 
international audit standards, operationalization of the international 
standards is necessary, not only to study what the auditors express, 
in terms of their views and opinions about international standards 
in general, but also the actions they take. In order to sort among all 
standards, the literature on public audit and what is argued there to 
be main characteristics for public audit institutions is used. Then, 
according to the literature and the international public audit standards 
per se, the standards are operationalized into a model of a Supreme 
Audit Institution. The aim with the model is to enable a comparison to 
be made between what is described in the international standards and 
what may be considered national practices at the SAIs in Namibia and 
Botswana. 
 In this chapter, a broad overview of different kinds of 
audit will first be given. Secondly, a description will be given of the 
international public audit standards and the professional international 
organizations promoting these standards, i.e. INTOSAI. Thirdly, an 
operationalized model of a Supreme Audit Institution, based on the 
literature and the international standards will be outlined and, at the 
end of the chapter, there will be a methodological discussion of the 
case studies conducted in Namibia and Botswana
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Audit
As noted in chapter one, the establishment of mechanisms for holding 
public officials accountable has long historic roots in organizing the 
democratic state. Control of public officials was also discussed by 
Max Weber ((1922) 1978) as a significant part to ensure the function 
of the bureaucracy. In the description of the specific characteristic of 
the bureaucracy, Weber ((1922) 1978) emphasized the importance 
of public officials having secure salaries and clear career paths, but 
he also considered control and discipline, as well as being able to 
criticize public officials in public, to be important features for a 
bureaucracy to be maintained and successful. He argued that specific 
characteristics of the bureaucracy, such as the impersonal character 
of the work and the separation between private and public, would be 
advantageous for such mechanisms of discipline. Weber ((1922) 1978) 
did not specify how such discipline and control should be arranged; 
the only suggestions were that control and discipline should show 
“consideration for the public official’s honor”, as well as “possibilities of 
public criticism” (p. 968): 
Taut discipline and control which at the same time have consideration 
for the official’s sense of honor … as well as the possibility of public 
criticism, also work in the direction. With all this, the bureaucratic 
apparatus functions more assuredly than does legal enslavement of the 
functionaries. … The purely impersonal character of the office, with 
its separation of the private sphere from that of the official activities, 
facilitates the official’s integration into the given functional conditions 
of the disciplined mechanism. 
 (Weber (1922) 1978, p. 968)
Although Weber ((1922) 1978) does not explicitly mention audit 
as such a mechanism for discipline and control, considering the 
characteristics of state audit, his description encompasses well the 
role and function of state audits within a democratic state. State audit 
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includes control of the public officials by means of the audit process, 
as well as providing possibilities for public criticism of officials by the 
provision of audit information about public sector performance, to the 
government and the parliament (c.f. Ahlbäck 1999). 
 Although most people are likely to have an idea of what audit 
is about, the role and character of state audit is not as clear as it first 
may appear. The role of audit has changed throughout history and 
different ideas of its role and responsibilities are enhanced in different 
contexts (Flint 1988; Larsson 2005; Power 1999; Öhman 2006). Audit 
as a concept is commonly used in the wider sense of general scrutiny, 
inspection and monitoring. A phenomenon that scholars claim has 
increased during the last years (Dye & Staphenhurst 1998; Gendron, 
Cooper & Townley 2007; Guénin-Paracini & Gendron 2010; Hood et 
al. 1999; Johansson 2006; Pentland 2000; Power 1999; Rose-Ackerman 
2005; Skaerbaek 2009), some even claim we are now living in an 
“audit society” (c.f. Power 1999; 2005). However, the discussion here 
does not concern audit in such a wide sense, instead focus is audit as 
carried out by professional auditors within government. 
 Mainly there are two types of state audit; performance audit 
and financial audit. Value for money audit is a term frequently used 
by scholars and professionals, which describes the same type of 
audit as a performance audit. However, to avoid confusion the term 
performance audit will be used throughout this study, performance 
audit is also the term preferred by the professional international 
organization INTOSAI. In addition, compliance with various laws 
and regulations is a part of auditing,and it is included in financial 
as well as performance audits. Financial and compliance audits 
together are occasionally called regularity audits, for instance in The 
Regularity Audit Manual by the African Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions in English-speaking Africa. In this book, the term 
financial audit will be used to avoid misunderstandings, although it 
includes compliance audit and is sometimes called regularity audit.  
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Performance audit
Performance audit, as a specific type of audit within the public sector, 
is generally regarded to have emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, 
as a result of the expansion of the public sector. With the expansion 
of the public services, it became more difficult for politicians 
and citizens to have an overview of the implementation of public 
policies. Consequently, a demand grew for a different kind of audit, 
focusing more on the performance of the auditee than on its financial 
statements (Ahlbäck 1999; Riksrevisionsverket [the Swedish National 
Audit Office]1998). In addition, several public sector organizations 
changed to program budgeting. Program budgeting aimed to increase 
effectiveness by dividing activities into programs, attached to various 
goals. To meet evaluation demands for determining how well goals 
had been fulfilled, performance audit was developed (The Swedish 
National Audit Office 1999 p. 18-19). 
 Power (1999) claims that despite the historically long interest 
in Great Britain in the performance of public sector organizations, 
the scope and significance of performance audit grew above all in 
the 1980s. As a part of the rise of New Public Management, the 
increased interests in performance audit was linked to a general 
concern over the (in) effectiveness in the public sector. Within New 
Public Management, ideas such as cost control, effectiveness and the 
citizens’ right to value for their money were emphasized, accordingly 
performance audit became an instrument for realizing these ideas 
(p. 42-52). Performance audit is guided by the audit orientations of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Flint 1988 p. 11; Power 1999 
p. 49-50; Swedish National Audit Office 1999). Power (1999) gives 
the following definitions of the three guiding orientations, “Economy 
as accountability for obtaining the best possible terms under which 
resources are acquired. Efficiency as accountability for ensuring that 
maximum output is obtained from the resources employed or that 
minimum resources are used to achieve a given level of output/service. 
Effectiveness as accountability for ensuring that outcomes conform 
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to intentions, as defined in programs.” (p. 50). Hence, performance 
audit concerns the relationship between output and outcome, the 
resources given and the intentions and goals of the activity, aiming at 
maximizing high quality at the lowest possible costs.
 It has been discussed whether performance audit should be 
seen as auditing, given its character it could perhaps be regarded as 
a form of program evaluation (e.g. Barzelay 1997; Roberts & Pollitt 
1994).  Financial audit, including compliance audit, normally covers 
the above aspects as well, though to a smaller extent. The aspects are 
included in the scope of the audit when the activities of the auditee are 
examined. In the financial audit process, the auditor reviews the way 
the auditee has performed pursuant to its regulations and directives, 
which in public organizations includes aspects of economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness. Performance audit evolved as an evaluation and 
extension of these aspects of financial audit (Power 1999, p. 50).
Hence, the focus of performance audit is more on the output and 
outcome of the activity; to be compared with financial audit where the 
main focus is on the processes leading tothe outcome (Barzelay 1997). 
Furthermore, financial audit is based on a wide range of specific 
norms and guidelines for how various situations and valuations 
should be handled.  Beyond the theoretical framework of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness, there are no such specific standards for 
performance audit within the international community. Performance 
audits are often thematic reviews of programs, covering a policy area 
within one ministry or covering a whole sector (Swedish National 
Audit Office 1999). 
 Moreover, the prevalence of performance audit, as well 
as whether national legislation prescribes performance audit of 
the public entities as mandatory, also varies between countries. 
For instance, in Sweden there are legal obligations for the Swedish 
National Audit Office (SNAO) to carry out financial audits of public 
entities. Such legal obligations do not exist for performance audit, 
rather the legal acts concerning performance audit declare that it is 
voluntary for the SNAO to conduct performance audits in the public 
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sector (cf. SFS Lag (2002:1022) om revision avstatligverksamhet [Act 
(2002:1022) on Audit of Government Entities] ).
 
Financial audit
If the expansion in performance audit is more of a recent 
phenomenon, financial audit has a longer history, within commerce 
but also within the state. Despite the rise of the “audit society” and 
“rituals of verifications” (c.f. Power 1999) the desire to verify and 
control how financial transactions are handled goes back for as long as 
resources have been entrusted another party than the original owner 
(Flint 1988):
The state auditor, professional or elected, was one of the first of all 
administrative technicians; in the Nile kingdoms, in Athens as one 
of the Logistai, or in Rome as one of the Quaestores. Similarly, in the 
new civilizations of our European middle ages, we meet again with 
this inevitable official, ensuring that the state receives its due from 
its creditors and that its debts are being measured and met with 
exactitude. 
(Normanton 1966 p. 13)
Normanton (1966), in his pioneer work on government audit, gives 
an historic and a comparative review of the public audit mechanisms 
in Europe and the United States with a start in the Middle Ages. 
As well as officials to collect the taxes, medieval kings had certain 
officials to control that the revenue collected was correct. In Britain 
at this time, these procedures of verification were of juridical arte 
and the public officials were held responsible directly to the king. 
Cassel (1996) claims that the countries where the predecessors of 
the audit in modern times are to be found are within the United 
Kingdom, in particular in Scotland. Already in 1734, Scotland had 
several independent auditors, which in 1853 formed their own 
professional organization (p. 89). Similar systems to the British, where 
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the king held his servants accountable through some kind of juridical 
committee, existed throughout the European kingdoms and republics, 
as in the Venetian Republic, the Kingdom of Naples, and the French 
Crown by the time of the reign of Saint Louis. These permanent 
medieval versions of audit institutions played an important part in 
the general administrations and over the centuries, the various state 
audit systems have altered in statute, function as well as organizational 
placement (Normanton 1966 p. 13-27).
 Today, two different audit systems dominate around the 
world, the parliamentarian system and the juridical system. In the 
parliamentarian audit system, i.e. the Westminster system, the highest 
audit institution (the SAI) in the country reports to parliament. 
In parliament, the report of the Auditor General is submitted and 
discussed in the Public Accounts Committee, whose members are 
representative of the distribution of seats in the parliament. In cases 
where the auditors discover misuse of funds, fraud or corruption, 
there is no possibility for the SAI to take legal action, instead it has 
to submit such cases to the legal authorities (World Bank 2002). In 
addition to the parliamentary report, in the Westminster system the 
SAI writes recommendations for the entities audited, in accordance 
with the findings made during the audit process. However, there is 
no possibility for the SAI to make its recommendations mandatory 
or to impose any sanctions on the auditees in situations where their 
recommendations are not followed; following the recommendations 
of the state auditors is voluntary  (Johansson 2006). The Westminster 
system is used in the English-speaking African countries, as well as in 
several other Commonwealth countries, such as Australia, Canada, 
and India (World Bank 2002).  
 The juridical audit system is built around a court of 
auditors and constitutes part of a country’s judiciary. In addition 
to an administrative authority, the court of auditors also holds 
legal authority and it has the possibility to press charges against the 
entities audited. The role of parliament is less prominent in the legal 
system than in the Westminster system. Despite possible forms of 
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cooperation between the parliament and the court of auditors, the 
SAI is not obliged to report to the parliament. The legal system, with 
courts of auditors, is particularly common in the French-speaking 
countries in Africa, in several Latin American countries, as well as in 
the Latin countries of Europe such as France, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
(World Bank 2002). 
 Considering the rich historical comparative overview of 
public auditing, in particular in Great Britain, Normanton (1966) 
discusses audit arrangements in the British colonies remarkably 
little, within the colonies as well as the audit arrangements between 
the colonies and the audit institutions in the European countries. At 
the end of the nineteen century Great Britain used the Westminster 
system and the British Auditor General worked in close association 
with the Public Accounts Committees in the Parliament. For the 
British colonial territories, a special director of the Oversea Audit 
Service reported to the Auditor General. In 1910, a special Colonial 
Audit Department was created, a function that was attached to the 
Colonial Office (Normanton 1966 p. 294, 294n).
Auditors, fraud and corruption
Financial audit throughout history has focused on control and 
verification of resources, which have been entrusted a party other 
than the owner. The control was to ensure that resources were 
managed in line with prescribed directives and not misused. (Flint 
1988). Consequently, the detection of misuse of resources and fraud 
as an objective within financial audit is not an illogical conclusion. 
However, the role of auditors in detecting fraud and corruption 
is debated, not only among scholars (Power 1999 p. 21), but also 
between the profession and stakeholders such as the state, the 
political parties (Larsson 2005) and the general public (Cullinan & 
Sutton 2002). As Larsson (2005) notes, in a survey carried out by the 
professional organization for authorized auditors in Sweden (FAR) in 
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1979, stakeholders have a different view of the role of auditors than 
the professional organization: “the majority of Swedish corporate 
representatives believed that auditors already had the responsibility 
of preventing tax crime, currency crime, fraud and bribery” (p. 133).  
The response from the profession however was defensive, claiming 
they had no possibilities to include such responsibilities in their 
professional duties (ibid). 
 In the literature, this misconception of the audit role is 
discussed as the expectation gap (e.g. Chowdhury & Innes 1998; 
Cullinan & Sutton; Fadzly & Ahmad 2004; Larsson 2005; Shaikh & 
Thala 2003; Öhman 2006). Cullinan and Sutton (2002) argue that, 
despite efforts from the audit profession to meet some of the demands 
from the general public and bridge expectation gaps, the focus of 
audits is not effective in terms of detecting fraud and corruption. 
They claim that the audit process is focused on detecting fraud among 
lower level employees, but a large majority of fraud and corruption is 
conducted by top management, for whom there is a lack of effective 
control mechanisms (ibid). Cullinan & Sutton (2002) mean that 
auditors are too aligned with top management to meet demands for 
detecting fraud and that auditors are: “paying lip-service” in terms 
of fraud detection (p. 297). In their study of auditors’ view of their 
role and responsibility, Öhman et al. (2006) concluded that auditors 
in general lack sensitivity towards the interests of the general public 
and other stakeholders, and that they were not very interested in 
bridging the expectation gap. Öhman et al. (2006) argue that, due 
to the self-regulation of the profession, there are few chances for 
stakeholders actually to influence this situation. Having an unclear 
situation and differing perceptions of the role and responsibilities of 
auditors however may have consequences for the audit profession, 
such as diminished legitimacy as well as a decrease in the trust of their 
professional judgments (Cullinan & Sutton 2002).
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Professional organizations and international 
public audit standards
To a large extent, audit has been a self-regulating occupation 
(Byington, Sutton & Munter 1990; Öhman 2006), and although 
national legislation outlines frameworks of rules and regulations for 
auditing, much of the guidance is determined by the professional audit 
and accountant organizations. Constituting a profession, auditors 
are required to follow standards prescribed by their professional 
bodies (Flint 1988) and on an international level, the most dominant 
organization setting standards for auditors and accountants is the 
IFAC (International Federation of Accountants). The IFAC issues 
the International Standards on Auditing (ISA), which are primarily 
developed to encompass audits within the private sector. For public 
sector auditing, the organization setting international standards is the 
International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI).  
 INTOSAI was founded in 1953, at an international congress 
for Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs). The congress was preceded by 
a decision to create a forum for government audit, which was taken 
at a post-World War II conference on administrative sciences, where 
several SAIs were represented. At the first international INTOSAI 
congress, delegates representing thirty-four countries attended. Today, 
roughly all the SAIs in the countries who are members of the United 
Nations, are members of INTOSAI. Membership in the organization 
is voluntary and open for SAIs in all countries that are members of 
the United Nations (INTOSAI 2004). Since its foundation, the aim 
of the organization has been to encourage the exchange of ideas and 
practices between public sector auditors around the world (INTOSAI 
2004). Franz Fielder (2004), Secretary General of INTOSAI and the 
President of the Austrian Court of Audit, explains the ambitions of the 
organization through the years in the following way: 
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Inspired by the idea of pooling know-how gained from practical 
audit experiences on different continents and making it accessible 
to all interested SAIs, the young INTOSAI selected a Latin motto, 
Experientia mutual omnibus prodest (“Mutual Experience Benefits All”) 
as it guiding principle, one which still directs its course today. Thus, 
INTOSAI professed its intention to contribute to improving audit on a 
global scale by the transfer and multiplication of know-how. 
(Fiedler 2004, p. 140)
Decisions to adopt new standards or amendments of old standards are 
taken at the INTOSAI congresses, which are held every three years. 
All SAIs around the world, who are members, are represented holding 
one vote each. Prior to decisions to adopt standards at the congress, a 
specific committee, the professional standards committee, has worked 
with the creation or amendments of the standards (INTOSAI 2007). 
The professional standards committee consists of representatives from 
various member countries in the INTOSAI community, advanced 
industrial countries, as well as representatives from the developing 
world (INTOSAI Professional Standards Committee 2007). Between 
congresses, a governing board, with eighteen members runs the 
organization. The members of the governing board are elected on a 
regular basis and the leadership is rotated. On the governing board, 
each of the regional groups as well as each major form of public audit 
system are always represented, to ensure that all members are fairly 
represented (INTOSAI 2007).
 The type of organization, which INTOSAI constitutes, is 
the kind of organization called a meta-organization by Ahrne and 
Brunsson (2008), i.e. an organization with other organizations 
as members. Ahrne and Brunsson (2008) suggest that meta-
organizations typically base their membership on some kind of 
similarity among the organizations and membership is normally 
voluntary. As discussed in previous chapters, meta-organizations 
are often established to strengthen similarities among members 
and thereby strengthen their identity as a part of the association. 
The degree of identity formation among members varies across 
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different meta-organizations. Some of them have extensive rules and 
regulations, where compliance as well as membership becomes an 
important part of the individual organization’s identity (Ahrne & 
Brunsson 2008; Knoke 1986). 
The INTOSAI standards
Since the establishment of INTOSAI in 1953, the organization over 
the years has created common declarations on the role of a SAI, as 
well as standards and guidelines for how to conduct audit in the 
public sector. Already at the congress in 1965, it was decided to 
prepare a glossary for a uniform terminology and in 1977, the first 
common declaration was adopted, the Lima Declaration, which 
is a call for independence in governmental auditing. Gradually, 
the numbers of committees and working groups increased, which 
resulted in an increased adaptation of standards and guidelines. Step 
by step, INTOSAI developed standards to cover practically the whole 
scope of audit (INTOSAI 2004). The new standards as established 
by INTOSAI were regarded nonetheless by several members as too 
general. To improve the guidance of the requirements, a number of 
SAIs used instead the IFAC standards, created for the private sector, 
which they regarded as being more precise. As a consequence of this 
situation, at the congress in Budapest in 2004, INTOSAI decided 
to develop appropriate professional standards for its members and 
made such development the first goal in its strategic plan (INTOSAI 
2005). Since several countries already used the IFAC standards for 
financial audit, INTOSAI decided not to continue producing its own 
standards. Instead, it decided to use the IFAC standard and issue a 
practice note for each standard, which would make the standards 
suitable for the public sector. The development of public audit 
standards is a continuous process, several standards were endorsed 
at the international congress held in South Africa in 2010 and it is 
planned to adopt more standards in the future (INTOSAI Professional 
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Standards Committee 2007).54
 The INTOSAI standards are divided into four different 
levels: 1) Founding principles, 2) Prerequisites for the functioning 
of Supreme Audit Institutions, 3) Fundamental auditing principles, 
and 4) Auditing guidelines, implementation guidelines and specific 
guidelines. In 1977, INTOSAI endorsed the Lima declaration, which 
represents the founding principles of governmental audit. The main 
aim of the declaration is a call for independent public auditing. In 
the Lima declaration, independence includes several aspects of the 
statutes and function of the SAI. It declares that, the SAI should be 
an external audit agency and not part of the government structure, 
recruitment of staff should be independent from government, the 
SAI should be able to report its findings to parliament independently, 
and the SAIs finances should be sufficient for accomplishing its 
assignment and, if necessary, the SAI should be guaranteed its budget 
by the parliament. 
 Furthermore, the Lima declaration stresses that the 
independence of the SAI should be guaranteed in the constitution, in 
particular that the head of the SAI, i.e. the Auditor General, should be 
protected by the constitution. Additionally, as founding principles for 
governmental auditing, the Lima declaration states some requirements 
concerning the audit methodology and the audit staff; such as,that it is 
appropriate for the SAI to provide audit manuals for the auditors, the 
requirements for the auditors to have the appropriate qualifications 
to carry out their assignments, and that the SAI should provide 
for the further development of the staff at the SAI’s theoretical and 
practical skills. Finally, in the Lima declaration the guiding principle 
of INTOSAI is explicitly expressed, and it is stated that exchanges 
of ideas and experiences between the SAIs is the: “effective means of 
helping Supreme Audit Institutions accomplish their tasks”.55
54 In addition to the documents referred to, the information about this process is based on 
interview 33.
55 INTOSAI ISSAI 1, Section 15.1
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The second level is standards that constitute prerequisites for the 
function of a SAI, which are based on the five declarations and 
guidelines; the Mexico declaration on independence,56 guidelines and 
good practices related to independence,57 principles of transparency 
and accountability,58 principles of transparency – good practices,59 
and finally the code of ethics.60 The Mexico declaration on SAI 
independence is a continuation of the Lima declaration, where 
the means of attaining independence are in focus. The means in 
the declaration are illustrated by principles, serving as ideals for 
how independence should be attained. Although the declaration 
recognizes that no SAI currently meets all the principles, INTOSAI 
still aims for them to be applied by SAIs. Accordingly, the declaration 
is accompanied by guidelines for good practices, where various 
examples are given for how the principles in the Mexico declarations 
may be attained.61
 The guidelines were created in order to see how the eight 
principles in the Mexico declaration were met by the different SAIs, 
and they are based upon a case study, including representatives from 
all regions and audit systems, conducted after the first draught of the 
Mexico declaration was drawn up.62 The case study concluded that 
within two areas the respondents regarded themselves as particularly 
vulnerable, in regards to independence. The first area was financial 
and managerial autonomy, where the large majority of the participants 
declared a lack of power to manage their budget and allocate funds 
accordingly. In addition, the lack of available appropriate human 
and financial resources for the SAI, as well as a lack of appropriate 
expertise at the auditee, was argued by the respondents to inhibit 
the SAI from attaining independence. The second area was a lack 
of effective follow up on the audit recommendations, where the 
56 INTOSAI ISSAI 10
57 INTOSAI ISSAI 11a
58 INTOSAI ISSAI 20
59 INTOSAI ISSAI 21
60 INTOSAI ISSAI 30a
61 INTOSAI ISSAI 11a
62 INTOSAI ISSAI 11b
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SAIs desired a requirement for the executive to respond to their 
recommendations.63 
 The standards declaring the principles of transparency and 
accountability were created to assist internal processes at SAIs develop 
into transparent and accountable organizations so, as organizations, 
they could “lead by example” and promote the principles in their 
practices. In order to provide guidance for the SAIs on how to 
become such an organization and meet the principles, a guideline 
with practical examples was adopted. INTOSAI stressed that this 
is a “living” document, i.e. the SAIs were encouraged to share their 
experiences as their practices within the area developed.64
 The fifth and final set of standards, established as prerequisites 
for the function of a SAI, is a code of ethics.65 In its preamble, the 
former Swedish Auditor-General, Inga-Britt Ahlenius, states that 
beyond the fundaments of public audit, as declared in the Lima 
declaration: “the Code of Ethics represents the next level with its 
statement of values and principles guiding the daily work of the 
auditors.” She further states that: “One of the principles outlined in the 
Code of Ethics is the auditors’ obligation to apply generally accepted 
auditing standards.”66 The code of ethics consists of 33 articles of 
ethical principles, covering topics such as integrity, objectivity and 
impartiality for the individual auditor and the auditors’ relationship 
to external parties. Besides, as stated by Ahlenius above, the code of 
ethics, standards of competence and professional development are 
drawn up declaring that part of the ethics as auditors is following 
recognized auditing, accounting and financial standards and only 
to undertake work that they have competence to perform, as well as 
to improve and update their skills, so as to be able to execute their 
responsibilities as professionals.67
63 INTOSAI ISSAI 11b
64 INTOSAI ISSAI 21
65 INTOSAI ISSAI 30a
66 INTOSAI ISSAI 30b
67 INTOSAI ISSAI 30a 
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Standards on the third level, established as fundamental auditing 
principles consist of four parts; basic principles, general standards, 
field standards and reporting standards. INTOSAI stated that 
these standards were developed to establish a framework for public 
audit practices. The basic principles contain logical principles and 
requirements, basic assumptions as well as consistent premises, which 
in particular should be applied when no specific audit standards 
apply to the situation.68 The general standards include standards 
for the expected qualifications of individual auditors as well as 
qualifications for the organization in general. In the general standards, 
it is prescribed that the SAI should adopt policies and procedures for 
recruiting qualified personnel, as well as for continuously training 
and developing the skills of the auditors. Furthermore, the general 
standards include requirements for the SAI to provide written 
guidance, such as audit manuals, to the auditors. Additionally, the 
general standards contain a section where ethical considerations are 
formulated, where aspects similar to those stated in the code of ethics 
are included. However, in the general standards, the situations where 
the standards apply are more specific and directed more towards the 
organization than to the individual auditor.69 The field and reporting 
standards aim at providing guidance in the audit process, covering the 
planning process, supervision and review, standards of compliance 
with laws and regulations, audit evidence and standards for the 
reporting procedures.70
 The fourth and final level of the INTOSAI standards includes 
auditing guidelines, such as implementation guidelines and specific 
guidelines. These guidelines aim at translating the fundamental 
auditing principles into more operational guidelines, which should 
be sufficiently specific to be used by auditors on a daily basis. As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, the ISSAIs build on the international 
standards for the private sector (ISAs). Hence, in the specific ISSAIs 
for auditing guidelines, the adequate ISA is referred to and a practice 
68 INTOSAI ISSAI 100
69 INTOSAI ISSAI 200
70 INTOSAI ISSAI 300; 400
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note for the specific conditions of the public sector is added. The 
development of the ISSAIs is a continuous process, new standards 
are developed and changes are made in the previous standards. 
Currently, more than forty different implementation guidelines have 
been endorsed, covering areas such as terms of engagement, audit 
documentation, planning an audit of financial statements, audit 
sampling, forming an opinion and reporting on financial statements71 
etc. The specific guidelines include areas such as guidelines on 
auditing international institutions, environmental audit, auditing 
of privatizations, IT audit, audit of public debt, and guidelines on 
audit of disaster-related aid.72 In addition, INTOSAI has developed a 
number of documents for guidance of good governance, which cover 
topics such as internal control standards for the public sector and 
coordination and cooperation between SAIs and the internal auditors 
in the public sector.73 
A Supreme Audit Institution
The extensive range of international standards as presented above 
implies difficulties in studying the adoption and possible adjustment 
of standards to local circumstance, at the Supreme Audit Institutions 
in Namibia and Botswana. Accordingly, an operationalization of 
the major features of Supreme Audit Institutions, as stated in the 
international standards and as emphasized in the literature on 
public audit, will be outlined as a model. The use of the literature is 
necessary to sort through all the standards and to decide the feature 
in the standards to study. As will be demonstrated, several aspects 
emphasized in the literature are also argued in the standards to be 
important features of a Supreme Audit Institution. Hence, there is 
no contradiction in basing the model on the standards as well as the 
literature. 
71 INTOSAI ISSAI 1210; 1230; 1300; 1530; 1700
72 INTOSAI ISSAI 5010; 5120; 5210; 5310; 5410; 5440; 5500
73 INTOSAI GOV 9100; 9150
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Independence
The significance of independence in the work of the independent auditor 
is so well established that little justification is needed to establish this 
concept as one of the cornerstones in any structure of auditing theory.
(Mautz & Sharaf 1961, p. 204)
A dominant characteristic of audit in the literature as well as in the 
standards is independence.  When White and Hollingsworth (1999) 
discuss the constitutional role of public sector audit they emphasis 
independence. They consider independence as the most central 
foundation of public sector audit, an independence that they argue 
should be guaranteed by the constitution. White and Hollingsworth 
are not alone in stressing the importance of audit independence, most 
scholars regard independence as the most fundamental part of the 
audit concept and argue that audit as a mechanism of accountability 
relies extensively on the auditors being independent (e.g. Ahlbäck 
1999; Cassel 1996; Flint 1988; Mautz & Sharaf 1961; Power 1999; 
2005 p. 338). Flint (1988) argues that there would be no need for 
an external auditor if the auditors were not independent. Without 
independent auditors, the management of public organizations 
could just as well present their accounts to their stakeholders, who 
would have to rely on them. Likewise, when Ahlbäck (1999) argues 
for the necessity of a body monitoring the public sector to create 
accountability in the democratic society, her argumentation builds on 
the need for an external, independent body. The question she raises 
is not whether independence is necessary, rather to what extent the 
Supreme Audit Institutions are able to conduct independent audit 
of the public sector due to organizational arrangements within the 
government (Ahlbäck 1999). Audit may also be an internal function 
where organizations can use internal auditors who conduct audits at 
the request of the management. However, internal auditors are more a 
management instrument than a mechanism for creating accountability 
to stakeholders (Flint 1988; White & Hollingsworth 1999). 
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The importance of independence is also stressed by the auditors’ 
professional organizations. As previously discussed, the main aim of 
the first declaration of the international community of public auditors 
is the call for independent governmental auditing. This declaration, 
the Lima declaration, also constitutes the founding principle of the 
organization.74 After the funding principles were stated in the Lima 
declaration, INTOSAI created further statements and guidelines on 
independence, such as the Mexico declaration on SAI independence 
as well as guidelines and good practices related to SAI independence.75 
Moreover, in the code of ethics the importance of the individual 
auditors acting independently is also emphasized. Although 
independence is stressed in the international standards, the Lima 
declaration recognizes that an entirely independent Supreme Audit 
Institution is not realistic. Independence should rather be viewed in 
terms of degrees of independence (c.f. Cassel 1996, p. 32). However, 
the standards state the SAI should have enough functional and 
organizational independence to be able to carry out its audit mandate 
and to achieve such sufficient independence, several operational 
aspects are emphasized in the standards. 
 To operationalize independence in the model, three 
significant aspects, which are stressed in the standards of 
independence, were selected. The first is an independent head of the 
SAI, i.e. the Auditor General, which in the standards is acknowledged 
as a key aspect for guaranteeing independence. The standards and 
guidelines on independence recommend the independence of the 
Auditor General be protected in a legal framework, preferably in the 
constitution. In particular, processes of appointment, reappointment 
and removal from the position should be independent from the 
executive and protected in the legal framework to the extent that the 
Auditor General would be able to act without risk or fear of reprisals.76
 The second aspect of independence emphasized in the 
standards, is the possibility of full discretion for the SAI throughout 
74 INTOSAI ISSAI 1
75 INTOSAI ISSAI 10; 11a; 11b
76 INTOSAI, ISSAI 1; 10; 11a; 11b
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the audit process, where there should be no interference from the 
executive or the parliament. According to the standards, the SAI 
should be free to select, plan and execute audits independently, with 
full access to the necessary documents and information from the 
auditee. Moreover, the SAI on an annual basis should be able to report 
independently to the parliament on its audit findings.77 The third and 
final aspect, through which independence is operationalized, is the 
ideal of financial and administrative autonomy from the executive.78 
Independence could be guaranteed and operationalized in the two 
first aspects, but if the SAIs are constrained in terms of resources or 
have no control over the resources, this independence may be difficult 
to realize in practice. To be financial and administrative independent 
implies that the executive should not control or direct the SAIs’ access 
to human or financial resources.79 To sum up, the independence 
of the Supreme Audit Institution is operationalized through the 
three following aspects: (1) Protection of the Auditor General in the 
constitution, (2) Financial and human resources available without direct 
interferences from the executive, (3) Independent selection of audit areas 
and report of audit findings. 
Standardized work procedures 
Another dominant character of a Supreme Audit Institution is the 
actual use of professional audit standards, in terms of the use of 
audit manuals and standardized working papers. As discussed in this 
chapter, requirements of the individual auditor in various parts of 
the audit process are formulated in the professional standards, which 
cover the audit process from guidelines on how to determine risk and 
materiality, planning and executing the audit as well as reporting on 
the findings and expressing an opinion. All procedures, definitions 
and the way to judge various situations are regulated in the standards. 
77 INTOSAI, ISSAI 1; 10; 11a; 11b
78 INTOSAI, ISSAI 1; 10; 11a; 11b
79 INTOSAI, ISSAI 1; 10; 11a; 11b
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However, despite the extensive regulation of work procedures, a 
certain degree of discretion and personal influences always exists in 
professional judgments (Öhman 2006).  
 Auditors constitute a profession which Abbott (1988) argues 
is distinguished by a claim for abstract knowledge and application of 
such knowledge to particular cases; i.e. to become an auditor there are 
requirements for particular theoretical education, as well as applying 
the theoretical knowledge to practical cases (p. 8). This combination 
of theoretical knowledge and practical application implies a certain 
degree of discretion in the professional role. The tension in the audit 
profession, between a high degree of control and trust in formal 
procedures and large degrees of discretion, based on trust in the 
professional judgment has been discussed by several scholars (for a 
review see Power 2003 p. 380-382). Öhman et al. (2006) argue that 
too much focus on formal procedures may negatively impact audit as 
a mechanism of accountability, and they express a concern that the 
focus in audits then becomes “doing things right” instead of “doing the 
right things” (p. 89). In their study, the auditors expressed a preference 
for carrying out audits well embedded in established auditing 
standards and guidelines. The auditors favored audit areas that were 
formally well-guided and paid less attention to the audit’s degree of 
usefulness for the auditee and the stakeholders (p. 105-107).
 Standardized work procedures are also embraced by 
professional audit organizations, and developing standards and 
standardized work procedures constitutes a large part of their 
activities. As discussed above, within the professional community 
there is an extensive range of standards, guidelines and documents 
defining “best practices”, all in order to provide guidance on working 
as auditors. Moreover, the importance of guidance is stated in the 
fundamental declaration, the Lima declaration80, which encourages 
the SAIs to provide audit manuals for the auditors as well as viewing 
the importance of following standards as an ethical consideration 
for auditors. Likewise, the code of ethics states that: “Auditors should 
80 INTOSAI ISSAI 1
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know and follow applicable auditing accounting, and financial 
management standards, policies, procedures and practices”.81
 Power (2003) argues that the increased number of standards 
and standardized work procedures within audit is an expression of 
a demand for legitimacy and control, where management of audit 
organizations tend to emphasize more structured audits, in order 
to control the quality of the audits (p. 381-382). Byington, Sutton & 
Munter (1990) suggest that the increase in standards and guidelines is 
a response from the audit profession to external pressures questioning 
legitimacy. In order to maintain self-regulation and legitimacy for 
the professional monopoly, threats have been handled through 
increasing the issue of standards and guidelines. In a similar vein, 
Jonnergård & Erlingsdottír (2008) argue that usage of manuals 
and standardized procedures may contribute to a higher degree of 
external legitimacy for the profession, at the expense of the individual 
professional judgment. Byington, Sutton & Munter (1990) exemplifie 
the importance of standards for the profession with court cases that, 
in deciding on charges of professional negligence, took adherence 
to professional standards as indicators of whether appropriate and 
sufficient work had been conducted (p. 309). Consequently, the 
performance of the auditors is measured against the professional 
standards, in particular when determining whether any failures exist 
in the audit process (Flint 1988). 
 To conclude, regardless of possible disadvantages or 
advantages with formalized work procedures, in terms of public 
accountability (Flint 1988; Byington, Sutton & Munter1990), interests 
of the auditees and stakeholders (Öhman et al. 2006) or the self-
interest of the audit profession (Byington, Sutton & Munter1990), 
the individual auditors (Öhman et al. 2006) or management in the 
organization (Power 2003), constructing mechanisms for standardized 
work procedures constitutes a significant part of how work in audit 
institutions is conducted. Here, standardized work procedures are 
operationalized through the two following aspects: (1) Existence and 
81 INTOSAI ISSAI 30a § 30
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use of audit manuals,  which build on international audit standards, (2) 
Standardized work procedures are followed and documented. 
Competence
Not everyone may call themselves an auditor; there is a need for 
certain skills and qualifications. Since auditors constitute a profession, 
they are expected to hold certain levels of education and competence 
defined by the profession. Bédard (1989) claims that the members’ 
knowledge and expertise constitutes the core of all professions, and 
argues that the uniqueness in the competence is a typical feature for 
a profession such as auditors (p. 113). In Abbot’s (1988) discussion 
of professions, he argues that professional groups aim to control 
the knowledge and skill within the profession, and in so doing they 
exercise authority over techniques and over the abstract knowledge 
in the area. Through such authority and control, professional groups 
are able to define and redefine their assignment. As discussed in the 
previous section, in their ambition to control the audit professionals, 
a significant part of the work in professional audit organizations 
consists of formalizing work procedures into standards, guidelines, 
manuals and working papers. In addition, the audit profession 
exercises control over the abstract knowledge by determining the 
requirements for becoming a professional auditor. In order to 
guarantee a minimum qualification level for individual professionals, 
and thereby a minimum level of the quality in the audits, the 
professional, standard-making, audit organizations regulate entrance 
to the profession by means of exams (Byington, Sutton & Munter1990; 
Bédard 1989). Beyond entry level requirements for competence, 
expertise hierarchies exists within professional audit firms, where the 
most experienced auditors are found at the top of the organizations, 
or in areas of specialization, for instance taxation (Bédard 1989 p. 
114). The guarantees of competence or professional expertise may 
be regarded as a prerequisite for the trustworthiness of the audits 
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(Cassel 1993; Flint 1988). Similar to standardized work procedures, in 
order to create creditability for audits as trustworthy mechanisms of 
accountability, the competence of the performers is essential. Cassel 
(1993) takes this view of professional organizations, which he claims 
have to guarantee the competence of their individual members, in 
order to create sufficient credibility for the profession (p. 153-155). 
 By Flint (1988), competence is regarded as the first 
requirement of an auditor, a competence attained not only through 
education but also gained through training and experience. He argues 
that competence is important for the trustworthiness of the audits not 
only for the profession but, more importantly, for their opinions and 
statements in their reports. If there is any doubt about the competence 
in the audit’s examination, it is most likely that the audit opinion, 
as well as the report, will not to be trusted. Consequently, the audit 
will be viewed as being of less value in the accountability process. 
Accordingly, auditors ought to have the capacity and qualifications 
necessary to carry out audits in such a way that the audits, as well as 
the audit reports, receive trust among all stakeholders (Flint 1988, p. 
48-51). 
 Another implication of insufficient competence raised by 
Isaksson and Bigsten (2011) is that it could limit independence. In 
their examination into how capacity constraints affect independence 
at the Supreme Audit Institution of Rwanda, Isaksson and Bigsten 
argue (2011) that the difficulties for the SAI to retain the competent 
and experienced staff leads to a situation where the SAI becomes more 
dependent on the auditee. With insufficient competence and expertise, 
the SAI will have difficulties in demanding appropriate information, 
as well as being less able to judge professionally the information 
provided by the auditee. 
 Likewise, the question of competence is regarded as a 
significant issue by the professional organizations (c.f. Bédard 1989 
p. 113), and in the founding principles of INTOSAI the importance 
of adequate competence is raised. The 14th section of the Lima 
declaration states the importance of appropriate qualifications for the 
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audit staff in the execution of audits. Likewise, competence constitutes 
a part of INTOSAI code of ethics, which state that, auditors: “must 
not undertake work they are not competent to perform” and that they 
have: “a duty to conduct themselves in a professional manner at all 
times and to apply high professional standards in carrying out their 
work to enable them to perform their duties competently and with 
impartiality.”82 According to the INTOSAI standards, appropriate 
competence at entry level is not sufficient, continuous development of 
professional skills is also required. The code of ethics requires auditors 
to take individual responsibility for revision and advancement 
of their skills in accordance with the development of their 
responsibility.83 Furthermore, the Lima declaration states that there 
is an organizational responsibility for the SAI to provide professional 
development for the auditors. Through various training programs, in 
universities as well as in internal programs, the SAI should improve 
the professional development, theoretically as well as practically.84 
To sum up, in the model competence is operationalized through 
the two following aspects: (1) The auditors hold the appropriate level 
of education and qualifications, (2) Possibilities to increase levels of 
competence through further education and training abilities.
82 INTOSAI ISSAI 30a § 28 - 29
83 INTOSAI ISSAI 30a § 33
84 INTOSAI ISSAI 1
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Pillars of a 
Supreme Audit 
Institution
Operationalization 
Independence •	 Protection of the Auditor General in the 
constitution
•	 Financial and human resources available without 
direct interference from the executive 
•	 Independent selection of audit areas and report of 
audit findings
Standardized 
work procedures 
•	 Existence and use of audit manuals, which build 
on international audit standards
•	 Standardized work procedures are followed and 
documented
Competence •	 The auditors hold the appropriate level of 
education and qualifications 
•	 Possibilities to increase levels of competence 
through further education and training abilities
Table 2. Operationalized model of a Supreme Audit Institution
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Methodology used in the studies of the SAIs in
Namibia and Botswana
In Namibia and Botswana, two rounds of personal interviews were 
conducted at the Supreme Audit Institutions, the first in June and 
July 2009, and the second in October and November 2010. In the 
first round of interviews, the questions were more general in order 
to encompass a broad spectrum of the auditors’ situation, their 
views on the international standards and how they regarded them in 
their local context (c.f. Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). In the first round 
of interviews the main part of the interviews was conducted with 
auditors in higher positions within the organization, all the interviews 
were recorded with a tape recorder and transcribed. In the second 
round of interviews, more specific questions were asked, based on 
the operationalized model of a SAI. During the second field trip, the 
interviews were written down as field notes and transcribed shortly 
after the interview took place. The reason for not using a tape recorder 
and transcribing the interviews during the second round of interviews 
was due to the already large amount of empirical data collected. There 
was a strong familiarity with the area, several facts had already been 
exposed and some only needed to be confirmed and described more 
explicitly. To obtain a broad picture and not just a top management 
perspective, auditors who worked in middle management positions 
as well as auditors without management responsibility were the focus 
for the second round of interviews. In addition, although with some 
exceptions, in general the auditors interviewed had been educated in 
Namibia and Botswana, respectively.  
 To create possibilities for the auditors, in particular in lower 
positions, to speak freely about their work environment, they were 
ensured confidentiality in the study, i.e. they were assured that 
their names would not be written in the thesis. Additionally, the 
individuals interviewed have been allowed to review the quotations 
taken from their interview and agree to them being used, which 
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they were also promised when the interview was carried out.  
In the second round of interviews, some of the interview subjects 
from the first round were interviewed once again, this was because of 
their special positions or the opportunity to make use of an already 
established connection for further information. As this implies, the 
number of interviews conducted was slightly higher than the number 
of auditors interviewed. At the Supreme Audit Institution of Botswana 
I conducted 25 interviews with 18 officials, and at the Supreme Audit 
Institution in Namibia I conducted 24 interviews with 20 officials.85
85 See the Appendix for a list of all interviews conducted
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CHAPTER 5
The National Audit Office of Botswana
The literature review on development and organizations in chapter 
two resulted in two contrasting propositions. In line with the 
literature on development, the auditors could be expected to express 
the importance of conducting audit in line with their local political 
and administrative cultures and seek legitimacy within their local 
context. If there were an attempt to implement international audit 
standards, the auditors in Africa would express the difficulties of 
introducing such Western models. Most likely, major adjustments 
would have to be made to the standards to make them suitable for 
the local environment.  In contrast, the proposition in line with the 
literature on organizations predicts that the auditors would primarily 
express the importance of conducting audit according to international 
standards. They would try primarily to gain legitimacy from the 
international, professional, audit community and imitate other audit 
organizations. Furthermore, the auditors would view the methods 
prescribed in the international standards as the most appropriate way 
of conducting audits and they should adopt these practices with as 
little adjustment to their political culture as possible. 
 In order to be able to move beyond what the auditors 
argued about the relationship between international standards and 
their local circumstances, an operationalized model of a Supreme 
Audit Institution was outlined in the previous chapter. This model 
serves as an instrument for understanding not only their views but 
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also their actions, and the direction in which they move. The aim 
is not to describe and analyze their everyday practices and how the 
international standards are expressed in such practices, rather how 
they relate to the practices as presented in the model of the SAI, 
outlined in chapter four. 
 The chapter is structured as follows. First, there will be a short 
description of Botswana and an overview of the development of the 
Office of the Auditor General (i.e. the SAI in Botswana). Secondly, 
there will be a presentation of the results; first the auditors views 
about international standards in general, second a presentation of how 
they relate to the practices outlined in the model of a Supreme Audit 
Institution. 
Botswana
Botswana is generally regarded as a successful African country 
with high levels of good governance (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robinson 2003). Since 1965, Botswana has experienced an average 
annual growth rate of around 7 percent (Robinson & Parsons 2006; 
World Bank 2010). This extraordinary growth to a large extent may 
be explained by the discovery of diamonds in the end of the 1960s. 
Primarily comprising the mining industry, the production in the 
country generates a gross national income per capita of 13 204 
(PPP 2008 $).86 In contrast to other resource rich African countries, 
the natural resources in Botswana have been managed well by the 
government and large investments have been made in infrastructure, 
education and health systems (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2003). 
The literacy rate has increased from a situation at independence where 
about 100 Batswana had passed through secondary school (ibid, 
pp. 80-83), to literacy levels of 69 percent in 1991 and 83 percent 
in 2008 (adults above 15 years, World Bank 2008). In addition, 
Botswana is also recognized to be the least corrupt country in 
86 To be compared with South Africa with a GNI of 9 812, Kenya 1 628 or Sweden 36 936, all in 
PPP 2008 $, UNDP (2010) 
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Africa. In Transparency International’s annual corruption perception 
index (CPI), Botswana obtained a CPI level of 5.8 in 2010, which is 
comparable with the average for European countries and much lower 
than the average for African countries. 87
 The Botswana success is explained to a large extent by 
sound economic policies, created by a good political leadership and 
implemented by good political institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson 
& Robinson 2003; Adamolekun & Morgan 1999; Hillblom 2008; 
Maudeni 2001; Robinson & Parsons 2006). However, although the 
country has experienced high levels of growth during a long period, 
inequality in the country is high; accordingly, the country faces 
significant challenges in terms of high levels of poverty, as well as 
unemployment rates around 20 percent (World Bank 2010). 88
 Although Botswana was not a colony in the traditional sense, 
it did constitute a British protectorate during the period between 
1885 and 1966.  During the turbulent period in Southern Africa 
in the nineteen century, the tribes in Botswana faced an uncertain 
situation as the Boers in South Africa traveled north. In the search 
for protection, representatives from the largest tribe, the Tswanas, 
asked the British to let them become a protectorate. Due to Botswana’s 
strategic position, bordering on the German colony of South West 
Africa (Namibia) and the Boer states, rather than its need for 
protection, Botswana was declared as the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
by the British in 1885 (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson2003). 
Together with the other British protectorates, Basutoland (Lesotho) 
and Swaziland, during the period until independence in 1966, 
Botswana was governed by the British high commissioner in 
South Africa, from the administrative capital Mafiking (Mafikeng). 
The British did not spend much on infrastructure or on further 
development in the protectorates (Robinson & Parsons 2006). At the 
time of independence, there were only 12 kilometers of paved road 
in the country and, in addition to the 100 who had passed through 
87 For instance, compared to South Africa with a CPI of 4.5, Kenya 2.1 and Tanzania 2.7 in 2010
88 For a discussion of inequality in Botswana, see Hillblom (2008)
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secondary school, there were only 22 Batswana who had graduated 
from university. Since there was no university in Botswana, they had 
all acquired their education abroad (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 
2003, pp. 80-81). 
 In 1966, the protectorate became the Republic of Botswana. 
The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), won the first elections with 
80 percent of the votes in 1965, and although the number of votes has 
declined since independence, the BDP has won every election to the 
National Assembly following the first elections (Acemoglu, Johnson 
& Robinson 2003; Adamolekun & Morgan 1999). In the constitution 
of Botswana, the power is centralized to the central government. 
The executive power is held by the President, who is elected by the 
National Assembly. The National Assembly consists of 31 elected 
members, and 4 members especially appointed by the President. 
The traditional tribal chiefs are gathered in the House of Chiefs and 
act in an advisory role to the government (Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robinson2003; Adamolekun& Morgan 1999).89 In 1966, when the 
country became independent, the administration faced a challenging 
situation with hardly any educated citizens. As a consequence, the 
new government decided to keep expatriates, primarily British, and 
to continue to use foreigners, as advisors working in the government, 
until there were enough educated citizens to replace them (ibid).
89 For a discussion of the role of the traditional chiefs, see also Jones (1983)
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The Office of the Auditor General 
Prior to independence, the headquarters for the governmental audit 
in the protectorates (then Bechuanaland Protectorate) was placed in 
Pretoria, South Africa. It was named the High Commission Territories 
and included apart from Botswana, also Lesotho (then Basutoland) 
and Swaziland. A senior auditor was placed in each country, in 
Botswana the senior auditor was placed in Mafikeng, which at that 
time was the seat of government.  
 By the time of independence, in 1966, Botswana obtained 
its own national audit office, which in the 1970s was given the 
name Office of the Auditor General (OAG) of Botswana.90  After 
independence, Botswana was unable to finance its audit office so it 
was granted aid by the British. In addition, the British assisted the 
OAG with technical support, as well as providing funds for training. 
The public officials in Botswana could apply for funds and then attend 
training courses or work on attachment in another audit office for a 
time, in the United Kingdom or in another Commonwealth country. 
During the first period after independence, the office was thirty to 
thirty-five people in size, whereof five were qualified auditors, all 
British. An interviewee described the work situation at that time as 
elementary, and that the difference between how they worked then 
and how they work now is large. Unlike now, back then they did not 
audit the accounts of the departments and ministries. They picked up 
on small items and details in vouchers and if they found something 
strange they made individual inquiries about these details. In the 
reports to the Public Accounts Committees in the National Assembly, 
they reported how many inquiries they had sent to the auditee and 
whether the auditee had cooperated with the Auditor General or not.91 
 The first as well as the second Auditor General were both 
British and were only contracted for 2-3 years. The third Auditor 
General was a Botswana citizen who was appointed as Auditor 
90 Office of the Auditor General of Botswana, 1995; Interview 25
91 Interview 25
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General by the President, in accordance with the constitution. It was 
possible for the Botswana government to have British officers working 
in their government due to the quite generous adjustment allowances 
the British government paid the officers. The allowances paid the 
difference between the low domestic salary and a British equivalent, 
and thus made the work in Botswana attractive for the foreign 
officials.  The British government stopped the allowance programs as 
well as the assistance programs to Botswana in general in the middle 
of the 1980s, and the British officers were fazed out of the Botswana 
public administration.92
 Since independence, officers from the OAG have participated 
in various short-term courses abroad with the aim of increasing the 
capacity of the office. Such courses have been provided within the 
Commonwealth, but also within the INTOSAI community. When 
the INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI) was established in 1986, 
the aim was for it to become a focal point to which all developing 
countries could turn for information and advice about accounting and 
auditing programs. The focus in these programs was on increasing 
the basic skills in auditing and accounting practices through 
training (INTOSAI 2004). The IDI in cooperation with the Overseas 
Development Administration in the British National Audit Office 
drew up the first audit manual for the OAG in Botswana. The manual 
was sent to the office in 1993, and a few officers from the OAG were 
sent on a “training the trainers” course covering the content in the 
manual. The idea behind “training the trainers” courses was to train a 
few people in the office, provide them with training material so they 
could train the rest of the staff in their own office, in this case in the 
use of an audit manual. The capacity building projects in cooperation 
with the British National Audit Office and the IDI were not the only 
development cooperation at the OAG. In the 1990s, the Swedish 
National Audit Office (SNAO) developed an institutional cooperation 
program with the office. The development cooperation project 
between the OAG and the SNAO started in 1992 and lasted until 1998. 
92 Interview 25
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In 1998, INTOSAIs Development Initiative was building regional 
organizations through which they could work in the region. In the 
English-speaking countries in Africa, the regional organization 
became the AFROSAI-E. The OAG in Botswana is a member of 
AFROSAI-E, which involves the auditors at the OAG participating 
in seminars and conferences, which are arranged within the 
organization. Apart from participation in the regional activities of 
the AFROSAI-E, the office has also had bilateral agreements with 
AFROSAI-E. 
Best practices, membership and a globalized world 
Changing the work methodology, in line with higher compliance 
with international standards, was generally viewed by the auditors at 
the OAG in Botswana as a positive change in the organization. The 
advantages were argued to be that the work procedures and reports 
would be of higher quality if international standards were followed. 
One auditor explained that without such standards, work in the office 
was not systematic and different sections in the office would work 
in different ways. Following international standards implies a higher 
level of unification of the work within the office, which was viewed 
positively by the auditors. They claimed that by following standards 
it would be easier to recognize the appropriate level for how the work 
should be done, 93 which appeared to be a natural approach for them 
due to their profession. An interviewee argued:
You cannot call yourself an accountant if you don’t follow the 
international standards for accountants. If we want to be regarded as 
an organization with a certain status, we have to follow standards.
(Interview 21)
93 Interview 27
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As professionals, the auditors at the OAG in Botswana regard 
themselves as a as part of the international community of auditors and 
using international standards enables them to benefit from the work 
of other auditors, instead of creating their own standards and work 
methodologies.94  As members of the INTOSAI, they see no reason 
deviate from what this organization recognizes as best practice. One 
auditor argued as follows:  
If there are rules laid down that suit everybody, why shouldn’t you 
follow those rules? The so-called best practices … why should you 
deviate when there already is recognized best practices? Why should 
you create your own rules? Why should you invent the wheel when it 
is already there?
(Interview 25)
The view of this auditor is significant for the interviewees, where 
they argued that there was no real reason for them to create their 
own procedures. Creating their own procedures and standards for 
the office would rather take time and resources, which they did not 
consider available.95 In addition, the auditors at the OAG argued that 
using the same audit methodology in all countries around the world 
could only be to their advantage, since they could then benefit at the 
OAG in Botswana from the experiences of others: 
Maybe you are having difficulties … but if you know other countries 
are doing exactly the same thing then the … you could ask and learn 
from others how they overcame certain problems, if they are having 
any.
(Interview 26) 
The advantages of using the same auditor structures and practices 
around the world are also expressed in more individual aspects. 
Similar systems and practices among the Supreme Audit Institutions 
around the world would open up opportunities for the auditors in 
94 E.g. Interview 24, 23, 36, 25
95 Interview 24,
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Botswana since they could then go anywhere in the world to work.96 
Moreover, familiarity with working methodologies according to 
internationally determined standards would make it possible for 
the auditors at OAG in Botswana also to work in international 
organizations such as the UN, which appoints auditors for 
international assignments. 
 Supporting the literature on organizations and what was 
formulated accordingly in the proposition, the auditors at the OAG 
in Botswana have a clear professional identity, which become evident 
when they discussed their views of the international standards. As 
the two first quotations above illustrates, the auditors regarded it as 
natural for them as professionals to follow the practices drawn up by 
their professional organizations, and they saw no reason why they 
should not follow this “best practice”. The legitimacy for the way 
they conduct their work is directed here towards the international 
audit community, of which they are members, rather than their 
own country.  In addition, the auditors argued there were several 
advantages in using the international standards in their organization, 
it was claimed to improve the actual work in the office and when they 
have difficulties, they could learn from other countries (c.f. Kennedy 
& Fiss 2009). There is little support here for the line argued in the 
development literature about the importance of developing their own 
solutions or the necessity of making substantial adjustments to the 
standards, neither for domestic legitimacy nor for the actual work 
situation. 
 International recognition is not only essential on a 
professional level. In an interview, the importance for the country 
to be able to demonstrate that it was an accountable and open 
nation internationally was highlighted. Here, ratings of nations by 
international organizations like Transparency International were 
mentioned and it was argued that such opinions are respected 
worldwide, and could affect the extent to which foreign investments 
are made in a country. The large impact the opinion of international 
96 Interview 21, 29, 28, 36
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community has on countries means a country is not able fully to 
choose freely, even though the standards are voluntary:
If we want to be role players in this globalized world or village or 
whatever you want to call it, I don’t think we have any choices to 
whether we can follow standards or not. Otherwise you risk you know 
… being irrelevant and redundant
(Interview 26)
Since the Auditor General’s Office ensures that the government 
finances are properly accounted for, the OAG views itself as key for 
demonstrating the trustworthiness of the government. Accordingly, 
it was argued that foreign investors and the donor community are 
interested in whether the office works according to internationally 
recognized standards.97 One auditor claimed that the only 
disadvantages from similar audit procedures around the world would 
be if a country was performing badly and did not want this to show in 
the accounts or in the audit reports. In such cases, if the country used 
its own kind of audit standards it would be possible for it to create its 
own versions. As a consequence, the auditor claimed that common 
procedures and a common understanding of audit practices on an 
international level could only be positive. 98
 The quotation above supports the argument in the 
development literature, i.e. countries in Africa often do not have a 
choice due to the pressure from the international community and 
from donors. Since developing countries may be regarded as having 
more to prove on an international level, they are also much more 
affected by the international community’s ratings and opinions. 
However, the auditor’s opinion, presented above, on how similar audit 
systems and practices in all countries may prevent countries to a 
larger extent from cheating with their finances, can be interpreted as 
97 Interview 28, 22, 26
98 Interview 28
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professional ethics going beyond national borders, thus supporting the 
theory of isomorphic pressures among auditors on an international 
level. For the auditor, it was more important that the finances 
were kept in order in the country and use of common practices 
internationally made it possible to control that the work was done 
properly. “Home-grown” solutions would rather create possibilities 
for countries to present an incorrect picture of their finances, which 
the auditor regarded as undesirable. This view is thus in contrast to 
that presented by development scholars of the importance for African 
countries to develop their own models and structures.
We follow standards - we do not follow standards
Although the auditors argued for the importance of following 
standards, some auditors did also emphasize flexibility in the 
standards. They argued that there may be laws in a country that could 
not be aligned with the standards, in such situations the county’s laws 
naturally had to be followed. The standards have to be customized 
to the legal framework and the constitutional prerequisites.99 One 
auditor who emphasized the importance of the country’s laws added 
that he thought that in general the office followed standards.100 
Another auditor, despite arguing for the importance of following 
internationally recognized standards, also claimed that there is:“too 
big a thing made about the international standards”. He stated that 
before, the standards were: “a bit more relaxedand not as rigid as they 
are today”. Moreover, the same auditor argued that the basics were 
and always had been the same for an auditor, it always concerns the 
verification of assets, expenditures and utilization of resources and in 
the office they followed these basic rules.101
 If these answers indicate that there is room for adjustments 
as well as fairly large deviations from the standards, due to their 
99 Interview 23, 24, 30
100 Interview 23
101 Interview 25
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flexibility and how what is implied in following standards is 
interpreted, this was not agreed upon by all auditors. One auditor 
explained that people in the office may say they were following 
INTOSAI standards in their work when they actually were not: 
The office is always talking about standards, it is only that the staff … 
are not really aware of the standards … The only thing they know they 
would say is that their auditing is in line with INTOSAI standards. But 
if you can ask somebody, can you just tell me about any of the standards 
you know? I doubt that you will get a response. You will find that it is 
just talk.
(Interview 27) 
This auditor claimed that the recommendations in the standards were 
not so different from what they had learned in accounting. She stated 
that the difference between what they do, and the requirements in 
the standards, is references to the standards in the documentation. 
Referring to various standards throughout the documentation 
would be the appropriate procedure according to the standards, 
but according to the auditor, this was not always the procedure in 
the office. As shown in the quotation above, the failure to quote the 
standards was explained mainly as a consequence of the limited 
knowledge about the standards. 102 Another auditor argued that they 
had been “cheating” in the office, since they said that they followed 
standards, when they actually did not. The same auditor stated that 
there was limited flexibility in the standards. According to him, the 
standards are strict, “you can’t say that you are following them, if you 
are not”.103
 Actual adjustments made by the office to the standards will be 
included in the discussion on each criteria of the model in following 
sections. However, when the auditors argued that there was need to 
customize the standards to their circumstances, they were asked to 
102 Interview 27
103 Interview 21
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give examples of such adjustments. The main approach among the 
auditors in the office was that customization mainly comprised minor 
aspects. For example, the Botswana government uses a cash based 
accounting system, and the standards are designed for an accrual 
system, which implies that they cannot use the working papers for 
balance sheets. For the auditors working with central government, 
the major issue with the new manual was that the international 
standards stated that you should audit a ministry as a whole and 
produce a certificate for one ministry. In Botswana, the procedure was 
instead to audit departments, within each ministry. As an example, 
they audited three or four departments within a ministry per year, 
and they then changed departments on an annual basis.104 It was not 
clear, whether they had changed the procedures in the office in line 
with the international standards or if they had kept their old way of 
audit, i.e. by department. Some auditors stated that for various reasons 
they would not change procedures, others claimed that the approach 
to audit ministries as a whole was more beneficial; indicating that 
this new procedure was used.105 Another aspect of the international 
standards, where they had to make adjustments,was expressed by 
an auditor in a management position. The manager claimed that the 
requirements for competences in the standards could be difficult for 
them to fulfill as they had a certain number of people working in the 
section and they had a certain level of education: 
You only have these people, whether the people have the competences 
for this audit or not. You just have to make do with them. That is really 
the main thing.
 (Interview 22)
Apart from the examples above, in interviews it is claimed that when 
they customized the regularity audit manual, which they received 
from AFROSAI-E, they did not actually change anything. Only the 
name on the outside was changed, to become Office of the Auditor 
104 Interview 22, 25, 36, 27
105 Interview 25, 33, 36
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General in Botswana.106 Furthermore, some of the interviewees even 
stated that there was nothing in the standards thatcould not be applied 
in Botswana. 107
 Say that you merely follow international standards 
without changing anything in practice, as illustrated in a quotation 
above, supports both the line development scholars who argue 
this is common for African public organizations as well as what 
organizational scholars who argue this is common for organizations 
in general. However, at OAG in Botswana, it is argued that the partial 
use of international standards is the result of limited knowledge 
and competence concerning audit methodologies among some of 
the auditors. Thus, this does not support the main argument in the 
development literature, where it is argued that the adaptation of 
structures is separated from the actual practice due to large differences 
in the political and administrative cultures in the West and in Africa. 
Rather it supports the less remarkable argument advanced by some 
development theorists, i.e. Western administrative structure and 
practices may be difficult to implement in African countries due to 
differences in capacity and competence. 
 The division between those auditors who viewed the 
standards as very flexible and those auditors who regarded them as 
strict could also be regarded as a consequence of knowledge, where 
the extent of knowledge and socialization within the profession 
affects relations to them. If there is limited education, there is a 
higher chance that an individual auditor are less socialized into 
the requirements of the profession, thus more likely to regard the 
international professional standards more as a general framework with 
large amount of discretion (c.f. Berger & Luckmann 1967).Yet, several 
auditors still claimed that adjustment to their circumstances was 
only minor, more technical aspects, for instance whether to conduct 
audits by department wise or by ministry, consequently the results 
support the arguments presented by organization scholars who claim 
106 Interview 22, 21
107 Interview 28, 29
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the professions’ isomorphic mechanisms influence how organizations 
act (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).  We now turn to a presentation 
of the results according to the operationalization of international 
public audit standards, which was outlined as a model in the 
previous chapter. The three pillars of the model were independence, 
standardized work procedures and competence, and the results will be 
presented in that order in the following sections. 
Independence
The Auditor General – protected in the constitution
A part of independence, which is significantly emphasized in the 
international standards, is protection for the head of the SAI, the 
Auditor General (AG). In the standards, it is stated that the Auditor 
General should be appointed according to specific procedures written 
in the constitution. In order for the AG to be able to also conduct 
inconvenient investigations and publish such reports, it should 
be difficult to remove her or him from the position. To ensure the 
independence of the Auditor General, these procedures should be 
explicitly expressed in the constitution. 
 In Botswana, the procedures for the appointment and removal 
of the Auditor General were established in the constitution by the 
time of independence, and have not been changed since. In Botswana’s 
constitution it states that the President appoints the Auditor General 
and that he or she may stay in the position until retirement at the 
age of 60. Conditions and procedures for removal of the Auditor 
General before retirement age are also stated in the constitution. In 
paragraph 114, it is written that the Auditor General may only be 
removed from the position if there is an inability to perform the duties 
or if there is misconduct. If such a situation occurs, the constitution 
draws up specific procedures for how thisis to be handled. First, the 
National Assembly has to approve an investigation into the removal, 
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the assembly then appoints a tribunal to examine the situation and 
report to the National Assembly. The National Assembly then decides 
whether the Auditor General is to be removed or not from office 
(Government of Botswana 1966). 
 The former Auditor General left office before retirement. 
He was however not removed, in interviews it was explained 
that he wanted to become more involved in politics.108 Unlike his 
predecessors, the current AG has only been appointed for five years, 
with the possibility for reappointment. This is a change in practice, 
from the former appointments that lasteduntil retirement. In 
interviews, various explanations are given for the new practice. Some 
argue that INTOSAI recommends that the AG should be appointed 
for five years, with the possibility to be reappointed once109. Others 
claim that this is a weakness in the position of the Auditor General. 
If the AG becomes uncomfortable, he might not be reappointed after 
the first five years. As a consequence, an interviewee argued, the 
Auditor General has to be more careful in how he acts and what he 
expresses.110 Auditors however did claim that the reform to appoint 
higher public officials on shorter contracts, instead of employment 
until retirement, was a reform that applied to several higher positions 
within the government, not only to the Auditor General. To facilitate 
improvement in the public administration it had been decided to 
make it easier to remove officials from their positions.111
 According to the auditors interviewed, there never has been a 
situation where an Auditor General has been removed, or investigated 
for removal, from office. In the main, the relationship between the 
Auditor General and the government was said to be good, and no 
interference was said to have occurred in the work of the Auditor 
General. It was argued by some that the constitution gave the Auditor 
General sufficient independence, even to the extent that inconvenient 
decisions concerning the President were taken. However, it was also 
108 Interview 28
109 Interview 28
110 Interview 33
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explained that the role of the Auditor General was not to criticize 
the government, but rather to advise it.112 Auditors, who were a bit 
more critical about the change of employment terms for the Auditor 
General, yet argued that employing the Auditor General on shorter 
contracts was not really a problem. To explain, one auditor claimed 
that the Auditor General could be considered as a political position 
where the arrangement,where the President makes the appointment, 
implies a situation where the Auditor General would not criticize the 
government in public. The same auditor added that it would be better 
if the Auditor General were appointed by the parliament.113
 The Office of the Auditor General in Botswana fulfills the 
requirements in the standards for ensuring independence for the 
head of the SAI. It has drawn up conditions and procedures in the 
constitution, which it appears to have applied over the years without 
any conflicts with its national circumstances. This supports the 
argument that the OAG primarily seeks for legitimacy within its 
field of other Supreme Audit Institutions, where in order to become 
legitimate it adopts practices accepted by its professional peers.
 The changes in the term of employment for the Auditor 
General, from permanent until retirement to becoming a period of 
five years, with the possibility to be reappointed once, are difficult 
to interpret. On the one hand, one auditor claimed that the new 
procedures were more in line with the formulation in the international 
standards thus they were moving towards higher compliance with 
the standards. In addition, it was argued that the change in the 
length of appointments to higher positions in the government was 
a change intended to improve the effectiveness of the government 
administration.Thus, this supporting the organization literature and 
what Kennedy and Fiss (2009) argue, i.e. that change in organizations 
is not only due to social motives, but performance improvements have 
also been shown to be important motives for why certain practices 
are adopted in organizations.  On the other hand, as argued by others, 
112 Interview 21
113 Interview 33
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it may imply weaker protection for the Auditor General and as a 
result affect the possibilities for independent action, as required in 
the standards. In addition, the international standards do not give 
guidance on whether the Auditor General should be appointed by 
the President or the parliament. Consequently, although the Auditor 
General is appointed by the President, which was argued by some 
auditors to influence the possibilities for independent action, this does 
not relate to how the international standards are handled by the OAG. 
Financial and human resources are available without direct 
interference from the executive
Another significant part of independence is the operational 
capabilities in the office, in terms of whether financial and human 
resources were available without direct interference from the 
executive. The ideal for a Supreme Audit Institution would be to 
receive its budget directly from the parliament, as well as being able to 
employ officials without any involvement from the government. 
 The Office of the Auditor General in Botswana is part of the 
government structure. This means it receives its budget from the 
President’s cabinet, and it is an integrated part of the government 
in terms of policies that affect personnel and other government 
expenditure.  According to the auditors in the interviews, the 
office is negatively affected by this situation. For instance, when 
the government decides to cut expenditures, the office is seriously 
affected. Some auditors argued that regardless of whether they were 
independent or not, there would not be any major changes, as they 
would still be dependent on public resources.114 These auditors were 
exceptions however, the main approach by the auditors was rather that 
the lack of financial independence was greatly to their disadvantage, 
and they argued that an independent office would improve their 
114 Interview 25, 21
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financial situation. 
 The limited financial independence impacted on personnel 
policies in the office. Auditors in management positions claimed that 
they were short of staff and that they did not always have people with 
the correct competence, a situation that limited their operational 
capabilities.115 The office could not decide what kind of positions 
should be created, or on salary levels, as these procedures were fixed 
within the government. If it wanted to make an exception to the 
government’s general policy, it would have to justify such exception to 
the central government.116 For instance, at the time the field work was 
conducted there was a recruitment freeze within the government. For 
the OAG this meant that the office could not fill the vacant posts in 
the office. One auditor argued, “How can you do a good audit if you 
are not given the resources.”117
 As a part of the limited financial independence, salaries 
appeared to be an important explanation for why the office had 
difficulties attracting the correct competence, as well as retaining 
auditors in the office. Salaries within the government were much 
lower than in the private sector, consequently the office had difficulties 
hiring individuals with higher degrees in auditing. Neither had the 
office any possibility to make adjustments within the office and choose 
how salaries were to be set, in order to keep auditors who performed 
well. Moreover, employment in the office could have implications 
for the possibilities for further training and education. Nevertheless, 
since the office was not able to increase their salaries to the level of the 
private sector, auditors left the office for the private sector, after they 
received the attractive education. 
 The situation at the OAG supports what development scholars 
argue is common for public organizations in Africa. Since they are 
not given sufficient resources, they find it difficult to conduct their 
work appropriately, the low levels of salaries is argued to affect them 
negatively since they have difficulties in recruiting the competence 
115 Interview 21, 22
116 Interview 28, 21
117 Interview 21
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needed as well as continuously losing staff to better paid positions 
(Hilderbrand & Grindle 1998; Klitgaard 1989; Olowu 1999). The 
auditors argued that to a large extent this situation is a consequence 
of them being part of the government structures and not being able 
to take independent decisions about their own resources.Therefore, 
where the inadequate operational capacities were regarded as a 
problem by the auditors, they argued that implementing what is 
laid out in the standards (financial independence) would improve 
their situation. This conclusion, which the auditors drew for ways 
to improve their situation, may be regarded to be in contrast to the 
conclusion drawn by development scholars, i.e. that due to limited 
resources and capacity, what is laid out at the international level needs 
to be changed and adjusted to the circumstances. 
 The auditors’ ambitions for obtaining more financial 
independence were also shown in how they had acted through the 
years. The OAG has made efforts to obtain a change in the legislative 
framework for the SAI, in order to obtain more independence. 
However, this process had been continuously delayed by the 
President’s cabinet, and as a result the changes had never come to 
pass. At the time of this study, the office was negotiating with the 
government for a separation of the “State Financial and Audit Act”. 
The separation would mean that the OAG would operate under its 
own legislation, yet nothing in the content of the act would change, 
i.e. with the new act, they would not have more independence. For 
the auditors in the office however, this was regarded as a first step 
towards independence. The office then planned to expand their 
independence gradually by eventually asking for more budget 
and staff responsibilities. Since the auditors in the office felt the 
government was not at ease with discussing an independent audit 
office, the auditors had reframed the question and instead had 
started with a less threatening issue, such as a mere separation of 
acts.118Although a new act would not involve any actual changes in 
the office, when the act was discussed in interviews, most auditors in 
118 Interview 21, 24, 28
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all positions, were very positive about the legislation and believed it 
would imply more genuine independence for the office for instance, 
the ability to determine salaries and other personnel policies. 119  
The reason for including a description of how they were trying to 
change the legislation under which they operate is to illustrate that 
what the auditors claimed to be important in terms of independence is 
not something that is merely talk. The auditors in the office were also 
taking action to obtain more independence from their government. 
Thus, what it says in the standards was not regarded by the auditors as 
problematic or largely in need of adjustment to their circumstances. 
On the contrary, they viewed their government as an obstacle to 
improvement in their situation. 
Independent selection of audit areas and report of audit findings 
One measure of independence is the possibility for the SAIs to select 
and report independently on public entities. An effect of being an 
integrated part of the government financially could be possible 
interference with the auditors’ work. However, according to some of 
the auditors, this was not the case at the OAG, and they clearly stated 
that their situation with its lack of independence was not a problem 
with respect to the selection of audits and how audit reports were 
written. They argued that the government never interfered with the 
work at the OAG, nor was the opinion of those audited allowed to 
influence the contents in the reports. Consequently, it was claimed 
that the OAG is free to select and report on its audit findings.120
 In Botswana, the reports of the Auditor General are made 
public. An interviewee mentioned that some auditees had complained 
to the office about negative publicity, when they saw the audit findings 
in the newspapers. Other auditors also gave examples of situations 
where auditees had not been comfortable with the content in the 
119 Interview 30, 31, 36
120 Interview 28, 21
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report.121 Nevertheless, they stated that such unhappiness about the 
reports did not cause them to change anything in the content of the 
reports.122 According to several of the auditors, situations such as 
the above, where auditees complained after the reports had been 
published, were unusual due to the design of the audit process. The 
audit process involved discussions between the auditors the auditee 
concerning the findings, before the report is written. Hence, the 
auditee was well aware of the content of the report, and they had a 
chance to comment on the report before it was made public. One 
auditor explained it as follows:  “One or two may not be happy about 
the report but management review was conducted and you had your 
chance, why make noise now?”123
 Although the auditee was argued not to have the possibility 
of influencing the content of the reports, the auditors claimed they 
took explanations as well as the auditees’ situation into account 
before they decide what was to be published.124 In this case, it was 
also explained that the role of the OAG was not to criticize, but 
rather to advise the auditee and the government. Consequently, they 
found no reason to report harshly on the findings for the auditee. 
An interviewee argued that the more advisory approach of the OAG 
was new. Earlier, he said, the OAG had enjoyed criticizing, but it had 
changed its approach and now embraced a more responsible position 
and aimed for its recommendations to result in improvements for the 
auditee.125  The auditor argued that this had made their findings and 
recommendations more acceptable. 
 Taking more of an advisory position towards the government 
was not appreciated by all auditors. Some of the auditors viewed 
this approach as expressing the office’s lack of independence. They 
also claimed that the new approach to audit with focus on internal 
controls made the audit reports harmless.126 It was argued here that 
121 E.g. Interview 24
122 Interview 32
123 Interview 21
124 Interview 21, 24
125 Interview 24
126 Interview 36, 33
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parliamentarians were more interested in how much money had been 
stolen or had disappeared from the government, but the OAG reports 
merely focused on risks and controls, which made the report of the 
OAG not particularly interesting. In addition, it was argued that the 
new “advisory” approach influenced the motivation for conducting 
the work. In addition to the low salaries, the auditors did not find it 
satisfying when they felt that their audit findings in the published 
audit reportswere changed into more harmless formulations of 
risk and internal controls. It was argued that this experience of an 
unsatisfying work situation was partly the reason for the high staff 
turnover.127 The different perceptions among the auditors of whether 
they had an advisory role or if they should take more of a critical 
position towards the government, may be regarded as different ideas 
of the role and responsibility of the auditor. The audit profession has 
been criticized as not living up to the expectations of its stakeholders, 
within this expectation gap auditors have been criticized as writing 
reports which may be difficult for non-auditors to understand as well 
as for not regarding it as their obligation to detect and report on fraud 
and corruption (Cullinan & Sutton 2002; Hanberger 2009; Larsson 
2005; Öhman et al. 2006).This critique of the audit profession applies 
to the situation argued by critical auditors to be the one at the OAG. 
From this aspect, the change at the OAG, towards becoming more 
advisory and not directly reporting on fraud but rather discussing 
internal controls and risks, implies that the office has moved closer 
towards the character of the profession as described in the literature, 
which may be regarded as confirming the influence of professional 
norms on the actions of organizations.
 The non-uniform answers among the auditors, where there 
was a difference noted between auditors in higher and lower positions, 
could be a consequence of a network effect, i.e. auditors in higher 
positions had been involved to a greater extent in international 
networks through AFROSAI-E and INTOSAI and thus adopted 
to a greater extent the international approach to the auditors role 
127 Interview 36
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and responsibility (c.f. Casile & Davis-Blake 2002; Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman 1989; Gibbons 2004; Reagans & McEvily 2003). Another 
interpretation for the answers given in the interviews could be that 
the office, due to its limited independence, was not free to select and 
report on the auditees as it would with full independence. However, 
it was claimed that before it changed the way of reporting, it used be 
much more critical of government entities in its reports. Nevertheless, 
it was no more independent at the time when it reported more 
critically, i.e. it had changed its approach to reporting without any 
changes in independence. Consequently, it is difficult to draw the 
conclusion that the way reporting is conducted today is merely a 
consequence arising from the position of limited independence from 
government. It may also be a change in the view of its professional 
role. 
Standardized work procedures
Existence and use of audit manuals which build on international 
audit standards
When international standards were discussed in interviews, an 
interpretation made by auditors was that the implementation of 
international standards equaled the implementation and use of 
audit manuals. In interviews, the audit manual was explained as 
functioning as guidance for them as auditors. Their daily work was 
conducted according to working papers, which they filled in and 
the audit manual was used when there was uncertainty or where the 
workneeded clarification. 
 The OAG in Botswana over the years has introduced several 
different manuals in the office, starting with the manual produced in 
cooperation with the British National Audit Office and the INTOSAI 
Development Initiative (IDI) at the start of the 1990s. To implement 
the manual in the office, a few people were sent on a “training the 
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trainers” course for a few weeks,where they were given training 
material. When they returned to their OAG they were supposed to 
train the rest of the auditors on how to use the audit manual. The 
British manual was never implemented in the office, an auditor who 
had been trained as a trainer explained that when he returned from 
the course he had to carry out his normal assignment, and there was 
no room for training the other auditors at the office.128
 Within the development cooperation project between the 
OAG and the Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO), between 
1992 and 1998, another audit manual was produced.  While some 
auditors claimed that there were courses and workshops at the time, 
as a part of the implementation of the manual, others argued they 
were just handed the manual without any further explanation or 
training. In a similar manner as the British, the Swedish manual was 
not used at the OAG. There were various explanations for why the 
Swedish manual was never used in the office. One explanation was 
the lack of training, where only a few auditors attended workshops 
on the manual, others were handed the manuals without any further 
explanations of how to handle them.129 The auditors who attended 
the workshops however argued that this was not enough training and 
that it was difficult for them actually to change anything in the office 
after the training.130 One of the auditors added that when auditors at 
the office attended workshops, they would agree on everything said 
there. However, when they returned to work, nothing changed they 
would just continue to work the way they used to.131 Additionally, 
when difficulties in implementing the manuals were discussed with 
another auditor in management position, he advanced the same 
arguments. He argued that the auditors usually agreed while they were 
participating in a workshop, even though they did not understand 
why they should change their work methodology. He added that 
training a few people in the office was not especially effective. The 
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130 Interview 17, 24
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few trained auditors would face difficulties when trying to implement 
the new methodologies in the rest of the office.132 In corporation with 
the AFROSAI-E, the ambition in the office had been to adopt and 
implement a new audit manual in the office. In 2007, two teams with 
six auditors in each were taken through the new audit methodology, 
in a pilot study. The two teams in due course were to train the other 
auditors in the office. The group held two workshops between 2007 
and 2010, where auditors in the office were taken through the audit 
process, in accordance with the new manual. 
 The manual was officially adopted by the OAG in 2008 and 
was originally a generic document produced by AFROSAI-E, which 
was supposed to be customized by each SAI. The customization of 
the manual was described by the auditors at the OAG, as changes 
to minor aspects, such as changing the name on the outside of the 
manual to OAG Botswana as well as referring to their own legislation 
in the manual. In addition, smaller things in the engagement letters 
and the checklist questionnaires were also mentioned as examples of 
customization.133 Another difference between the generic AFROSAI-
E manual and the circumstances in Botswana was the accounting 
system, the Botswana government uses a cash based system, which 
meant the procedures in the manual, which are intended for an 
accrual system, were not possible to use. 
 For auditors who work with central government, the 
AFROSAI-E manual has been problematic, since it was designed to 
audit accounts on a ministry level. In Botswana there are not separate 
accounts for each ministry, the Accountant General only produces 
accounts for the whole government. Hence, the OAG could only 
produce a certificate for the whole government. In the practical work, 
it based the audit risk analysis, sampling etc. on departments, rotating 
between the departments. An auditor claimed that they could change 
the approach and conduct audits based on a ministry level, but they 
could not produce an audit certificate for the ministries as required by 
132 Interview 21
133 Interview 22
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the manual.134 In the office, there were various opinions regarding the 
new approach. While one auditor argued that the ministries were too 
large for the taking appropriate sample sizes, another auditor claimed 
that the new approach was better, since it allowed another level of 
analysis to be done and they would be able to “pick the big things and 
not the small issues like we did before”.135
 Moreover, audit on the ministry level implies that the contact 
person for the auditors will be highest administrative officer at the 
ministry, the Permanent Secretary. Some interviewees argued that 
they did not feel comfortable disturbing such a high official, and 
that the Permanent Secretary was a “very busy man.”136 They argued 
that it was better in practice to have contact with the director for 
each department.137 An auditor claimed he would continue with 
this practice despite the manual’s prescriptions or what others in the 
office did.138 This approach by some auditors, keeping their old way 
of working, was argued by others hindered implementation of the 
manual and had led to an inconsistency of audit methodologies used 
in the office.139
 As illustrated above, the office through the years has tried 
to implement audit manuals and change its audit methodology 
accordingly. It is difficult to determine to what extent the AFROSAI-
E manual has been implemented in the office, since the auditors 
argued that the procedures according to the manual were followed in 
some cases and not in others. Their continuous effort to implement 
manuals based on the international standards, however, may be 
regarded as supporting what could be expected from them according 
to the literature on organizations. In addition, the adjustments 
(customizations) to the manual they claimed they had to make to 
suit their local circumstances were mainly smaller issues. Whether 
the standards should be changed to suit their national arrangements 
134 Interview 22
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or if they should instead change their national arrangements to 
suit the standards differed among the auditors, and there were 
auditors supporting both approaches, thus supporting neither the 
development nor the organization literature. However, the reasons 
for not changing some of the procedures were given in more practical 
terms, for instance that it was easier to discuss with the directors of 
the departments than with the Permanent Secretary and that it was 
difficult to take audit samples of units as large as ministries. Thus, 
what development scholars argue primarily needs to be adjusted to, 
such as resources, competence and cultural features does not appear 
to apply to the case with the customization of the audit manual. 
 However, has confirmation for the line taken by development 
scholars, the problems the OAG has had with implementation 
of the various manuals over the years could be interpreted as 
an underestimation of the training needed to change work 
methodologies in the office (World Bank 2005). To some extent, this 
could be due to limited resources but considering the various donors 
involved in development projects it could rather be a result of poor 
design and a limited understanding of how the auditors needed to be 
trained to be able to work according to the new methodologies. In the 
efforts to implement the manuals, a few workshops were held for a 
few auditors who then were expected to teach the rest of the auditors 
and change the work procedures in the whole office. This confirms 
the arguments of the World Bank (2005), i.e. an important factor for 
explaining why many public administration reforms have failed in 
African countries is wrongly designed development projects. This 
could be understood as an explanation for why the continuous efforts 
and development projects at the OAG did not result in greater change 
in its working methodologies in accordance to the standards.
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Standardized work procedures are followed and documented 
In interviews, it was explained that the auditors did not always use 
the manual in their daily work; the manual functioned rather as 
guidance when they were uncertain of the procedures. It is through 
standardized working papers that the prescriptions in the standards 
and the manual are transferred into the daily practical work of the 
auditors. The extent to which standardized procedures are used 
in the Supreme Audit Institutions is also a criterion in their peer 
reviews, where a great extent of usage of standardized working papers 
is considered “good practice”, in line with international standards 
(AFROSAI-E 2006; 2009) The previous peer review for the OAG 
in Botswana stated that there was limited implementation of such 
standardized working papers in the office (AFROSAI-E 2009).
 So why has the office not managed to implement a greater 
usage of standardized procedures in the office? One auditor 
explained that it could be difficult when you have been used to 
certain procedures to change: “Now when we are thinking we are 
comfortable, now we can do this, now they come and bring in such 
things. You know this fear that you might fail to do that.” 140 For the 
auditors, working according to the audit methodology as prescribed in 
the international standards also implied an increase in their workload. 
The new methodology involved a part with more careful planning, 
which takes a longer time to conduct. In addition, documentation of 
their work was demanded to a much larger extent when they followed 
the standardized procedures according to the standards than the 
auditors had done before. An auditor explained that:  “It is a lot of 
paper work now, but we are trying…“141 Despite the increased work 
load, the auditors argued that the new methodology enabled them to 
work better. Due to the more extensive planning, including a greater 
attention to materiality, they claimed they understand the auditee 
140 Interview 27
141 Interview 29
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better and the execution was more focused.142
In addition, the use of standardized work procedures as well as the 
increased documentation that follows meant more transparency in the 
work conducted at the office. To auditors in management positions, 
such increased transparency in work procedures could result in a 
decrease in their power as well as show possible deficiencies of their 
work.143 One auditor claimed that before the work procedures were 
standardized some managers were keeping important information 
to themselves, which was more difficult when the standardized 
procedures were followed and the documentation increased: “With 
the new methodology everything is open and that will take the power 
away. The supervisor will lose power, since the work can be done 
more easily without him or her.”144 Furthermore, the auditor argued 
that the higher requirements for planning and documentation would 
make the work of auditors in all positions more visible, and since 
the levels of competence were not appropriate in several positions, 
many auditors shortage in skills would be more obvious. The auditor 
claimed that this was the reason why many auditors at the office had 
resisted the changing working methodologies into more standardized 
procedures.145
 In parallel with the implementation of the latest manual, 
the office had invested in audit software, TeamMate. In TeamMate, 
the audit manual and all working papers are integrated. Some of the 
auditors explained that TeamMate has made their work easier, there 
is less paper work, and it is easier to communicate within the office.146 
In TeamMate, all the audit procedures are fixed: “If you want to audit 
expenditures, just click on expenditures, if you want to audit salaries, 
just click on salaries.”147 The extent to which TeamMatewas used in the 
office varied, somebody mentioned that they were using it but other 
142 Interview 36, 33, 29, 21
143 Interview 21, 28
144 Interview 21
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146 Interview 21, 33, 29 
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sections were “lagging behind,”148 another auditor claimed that they 
only take out working papers from TeamMate and fill them in as they 
used to, they were not actually using TeamMate.149
 A manager expressed frustration about the auditors’ lack of 
adaptation to TeamMate. He argued that sufficient training by means 
of workshops had been held in the office. In his opinion, the auditors 
should make a greater effort, not only agree in the workshops and 
then stop using the system when they faced problems.150 Nevertheless, 
auditors working with TeamMate explained that they did not think 
they had received enough training on the system, they also argued 
that there was no technical support and no one to ask if they got 
stuck.151One interviewee claimed that working with TeamMate was 
problematic since no one in the office had any experience of the 
system. When they did not know how to solve an issue, they asked 
their manager, but the manager did not know either. Another auditor 
argued that the office had underestimated the need for training 
required to understand a new system: “I cannot apply it, I don’t know 
what to do.” The auditor made a parallel to learning how to drive a 
car: “You cannot just sit in the car and be shown how to drive, then 
just given the keys and be told: Here you go, just drive now … it is the 
same here, it is not working. There is no technical support to guide 
you.”152
 Efforts to try to implement standardized work procedures 
more in line with the international requirements, as well as the 
investment in TeamMate as audit software and the training conducted 
to implement the use of the program, illustrate the office’s ambition 
to increase the use standardized work procedures, which confirms its 
aim to comply with the requirements in the international standards.
The problems of implementing the software in the office do not 
appear to be related to any specific African circumstances in their 
148 Interview 29
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environment, thus do not confirm what would be expected from 
the arguments put forward by some development scholars.  
To some extent it could be argued that resources are significant, the 
auditors using the system claimed that they had not received sufficient 
training on the program, as well as claiming that there was no support 
available when they had problems (c.f. Glenday 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 
2004; Turner & Hulme 1997). However, it is difficult to argue that it is 
a particular problem for developing countries to encounter problems 
in implementing computer software, of which nobody in the office 
has any experience. It is reasonable to expect this to be the situation in 
an industrialized country as well. In addition TeamMate is relatively 
expensive software, which is not used in all countries, thus resources 
could not be the main reason for the problems in implementing 
standardized working procedures. As stated previously with respect 
to the audit manual, the limited and scattered implementation of the 
software is probably due to an underestimation of the trainingneeds 
and the design of the implementation process. Thus, confirming what 
the World Bank (2005) argued to be a main explanation for the failure 
in implementing public administration reforms in Africa. 
 In general, in the interviews it was argued that standardized 
work procedures were resisted because of the revealing effect these 
would have on the inadequate levels of competence, particular 
in management positions. Thus, due to the fear of being exposed 
and losing power and influence through more transparent 
procedures, auditors in management positions had resisted the 
start of the new methodologies, with standardized procedures 
and more documentation. This may be understood as confirming 
what development scholars argue to be the problem in African 
countries, i.e. there is a lack of appropriate competence, which makes 
implementation of foreign models problematic. This implies that there 
is a need to design the implementation of the new methodologies 
accordingly. At the OAG, it appears as if the implementation of 
standardized procedures would need to have been designed to suit 
the situation where managers and auditors in particular, with lower 
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levels of education, probably had need for extra training and to 
receive extra attention. In addition, working with the standardized 
procedures according to international standards involves an increased 
workload for the auditors in the office, where they need to plan more 
and document more. The auditors did not argue that there was a need 
to change the methodologies prescribed in the standards to suit their 
local circumstances, in contrast to what would be expected from the 
literature on development, instead they claimed that it was natural for 
people in general to resist when more work is imposed. In addition, 
in contrast to what some development scholars argue is necessary for 
public administration reforms in African countries, the OAG has not 
made any attempts to develop its own form of work procedures, nor 
do they claim that this is necessary due to its circumstances.
Competence
Appropriate levels of education and qualifications
To be called an auditor indicates specific levels of qualifications, 
theoretically as well as in practical work. To be a professionally 
qualified auditor, the general requirements are theoretical skills 
in accounting, auditing and finance, practical experience from a 
professional audit firm, all of which is examined by professional exams 
carried out at the end of the practical experience. 
 At the OAG today, 198 people are employed, whereof about 
85 posts are for qualified auditors.153According to the interviews, the 
educational levels among the auditors at the OAG vary. The office 
has about five or six professional auditors, the others have diplomas 
(two-year post high school studies at university or a technical college) 
or degrees (four-year university studies), normally in accounting.154 
An auditor explained that this had changed over the years, when this 
153 Five posts are vacant. In total the office holds 203 positions. 
154 Interview 31
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auditor started to work in the office fourteen years ago the educational 
requirements were much lower.155
 The procedure for introducing a new auditor to the work 
in the office through the years has been to start work as an assistant 
auditor and be attached to an audit team. In the team, guidance in the 
work is provided by senior colleagues, team leaders and managers.156 
Accordingly, the work methodology adopted by the team leader and 
the managers become the accepted audit procedure in the team. This 
was argued to be problematic since employment in the office for a 
longer time generally involves promotion to supervisor or manager, 
regardless of educational level and without any further education or 
training. One auditor stated that: “Higher positions are given based 
on the number of years you have worked, not qualifications.” The 
interviewee argued that this had resulted in several supervisors and 
managers with a low level of education, and claimed that: “These 
people are not qualified for those positions.”157 Hence, adopting new 
methodologies could be more difficult for managers than for auditors 
in lower positions, who have more technical skills.158 Consequently, 
the discrepancy between younger, more technically skilled auditors 
and managers resulted in situations where there were contradictory 
views on how the work should be conducted, and since managers 
hold a stronger position in the office,the OAG has had difficulties in 
implementing new audit methodologies over the years.159
 The state of affairs with limited competence on the 
management level could be regarded as a development problem, 
where the limited availability of higher education created a 
situation where the number of qualified officials was inadequate.
Thus this would confirm what some development scholars 
argue is essential for understanding the character, as well as the 
possibility for implementing, administrative reforms in African 
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public administrations. As illustrated above, although the number 
of well-educated citizens has increased greatly in Botswana since 
independence, it still affects the Office of the Auditor General and may 
explain many of the difficulties in the implementation of new working 
methodologies in the office.
 However, it is likely that the lack of appropriate competence at 
management level will change over time since the required education 
levels at the office are much higher today than when several of the 
managers were employed. Thus, the action taken at the office is to 
raise the education level required for entry level, which confirms 
the proposition according to organization scholars, i.e. the OAG in 
Botswana is gradually conforming to the way levels of competence are 
regarded within their organizational field. 
Possibilities to increase levels of competence in the SAI through 
further education and training abilities
Due to continuous updating of international standards and 
requirements for increased competence, the importance of being able 
to further educate and train the auditors in the office is significant 
for a Supreme Audit Institution. The OAG in Botswana offers a wide 
range of courses, for auditors as well as for administrative officials. The 
courses and training take place in Botswana at different companies, 
organizations and at the university, as well as abroad at different SAIs 
and organizations. In cooperation with the AFROSAI-E, auditors 
at the office participate in various courses and seminars arranged 
regionally, the OAG has had a bilateral agreement with AFROSAI-E 
as well, through which training courses in audit methodology and 
TeamMate have been held for the auditors in the office. In addition, 
courses are arranged within the Commonwealth and auditors in 
the OAG have attended courses in India, Pakistan and the United 
Kingdom (Office of the Auditor General of Botswana 2005; 2009). 
Although courses are arranged within the Commonwealth, they are 
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open for auditors from around the world, and they do not require any 
particular agreement between the SAIs.160 Apart from shorter courses, 
the office sponsors one or two auditors per year to go through the 
education and training needed to become a professionally qualified 
auditor, in accordance with the requirements in the professional 
standards for the private sector.161 
 Due to the continuous development of international 
standards, AFROSAI-E holds a yearly technical update for the SAIs 
in the region. The OAG in Botswana send a few people there every 
year to receive updates of the standards. However, as the office holds 
no training function or a plan for implementing the yearly updates, 
there is no strategy for how the updates are to reach the rest of the 
auditors in the office.162 In addition, when the TeamMate software 
was introduced in the office, a few workshops were held to train the 
auditors in the use of the software system. In the interviews, it is 
claimed these workshops were not sufficient training, and several of 
the auditors argued that they needed further training on the system. 
Since all auditors were new users of TeamMate, there was little 
expertise in how the system should be used. They could e-mail the 
trainers from the workshop to ask questions, but this appears to have 
been an insufficient solution: 
If you get stuck, you cannot work. You ask your boss and he is also 
stuck. The facilitators were available on e-mail, but if you get stuck 
and then you e-mail, maybe you will get a response the week after.163
(Interview 33)
In the office, no further training on how to use Team Mate was 
planned. Neither was there any thoughts expressed in the interviews 
about the situation, where some auditors claimed they needed 
technical support to be able to handle the system. Additionally, the 
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OAG has applied and received funding from the Commonwealth, the 
money is to be used to pay for an expert who is to work and support 
the office for two years. However, it did not appear as if such an expert 
will be involved in training the auditors on TeamMate or performing 
any updates for the auditors in terms of audit methodologies.164 
The above presentation of the various courses the auditors attended 
internationally illustrates how auditors at the OAG participate in a 
professional community of auditors in worldwide.This contributes 
to an understanding for how they as an organization within an 
international field of SAIs create a common identity, where they 
share a common cultural understanding about the nature of public 
audit, an understanding which is strengthen continuously through 
participation in courses and networks. As would be expected from 
the OAG, following the arguments of organization scholars, the office 
supports further education and training for the auditors in various 
ways, and through such efforts, they move towards adherence to the 
practices described in the international standards. 
 Nevertheless, the participation in various courses was decided 
on an individual basis and there was no overall strategy to ensure that 
the whole office moved towards uniformity in the way they applied 
audit methodologies. In addition, there were no plans for further 
training in the audit software, TeamMate, and strategies to ensure 
that all the auditors in the office were exposed to the annual updates 
of the standard were lacking. To some extent, this may confirm 
what development scholars argue, i.e. the aim in making the entire 
office comply with audit standards and use audit methodologies 
accordingly, is not realized by the actions they take in the office. 
However, explanations for absent strategies are difficult to relate 
to any particular cultural features as argued by some development 
scholars. Neither would limited resources be an adequate explanation, 
since the office chose to invest in relatively expensive software, which 
was not necessary in order to use standardized working papers. In 
addition, they also managed to receive funds for employing an expert 
164 Interview 23, 21, 25, 33
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to support them for two years. Again, the most plausible explanation 
would be an underestimation of the actual training, support and time 
needed to change the work procedures among all of the auditors, in 
the entire office.
1
CHAPTER 6
The National Audit Office of Namibia 
Since the previous chapter illustrated how the SAI in Botswana related 
to international public audit standards, a comparable presentation 
will be given here on the SAI in Namibia. The structure in this chapter 
is built up similarly. First, there will be a short country review and a 
description of the development of the Office of the Auditor General. 
Secondly, there will be a presentation of the results, where the 
auditors’ views and opinions are first presented and then the chapter 
will show how the office relates to the operationalized model for the 
SAI, as presented in chapter four. 
 Constituting a young democracy in Africa, Namibia received 
its independence from South Africa as late as 1990. South Africa 
took control over Namibia (then South West Africa) in connection 
with the First World War, although its annexation of the territory was 
disputed internationally (Du Pisani 2010). Prior to the annexation 
by South Africa, Namibia was a German colony. From a situation 
where trade, missionary activities and minor conflicts existed among 
Europeans and various tribes inhabited the land, Germany gradually 
colonized large parts of the territory at the end of the nineteen century 
(Melber 2010). In 1884, Germany declared the territory a German 
protectorate, “German South West Africa”, and signed “protection 
treaties” with the local chiefs (ibid, p. 29). Initially, mainly economic 
interests were present; private companies exploited the natural 
resources and made large profits by trading. Eventually the German 
10
government established a fully-fleshed colonial state apparatus. The 
German administration tried to tie the local communities to their 
governance, local chiefs who cooperated were rewarded, and those 
who did not were executed or forced to cooperate (Melber 2010).
 The German colonial power was repressive and exclusive; the 
administration was designed exclusively to favor the white minority. 
Land was extensively expropriated from Africans to enable the white 
settlers to invest in large scale farming. The expropriation of land 
was supported by the German colonial administration, and it ruined 
the income bases of several tribes. As the mining industry grew, 
construction started on a railway and there was an increasing demand 
for labor on the white owned farms, the colonial administration 
forced the Africans to work in these sectors. Although resistance 
existed among the colonized Africans throughout the colonial period, 
the increased repression during the enforced labor caused the Africans 
to increase their resistance. The increased resistance escalated into 
several guerilla wars, where the German colonial administration met 
the rebellions with an increasing degree of violence (Melber 2010). 
The administration executed rebellious leaders, confiscated land and 
eventually murdered large numbers of Africans. For instance, around 
10 000 Namas, out of a population of 20 000, died during the wars of 
resistance. The German administration gained full control over the 
territory in 1907, and the surviving members of the African tribes 
were forced into labor under slave like conditions (Melber 2010). 
 In the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, power over the territory was 
transferred to the Principal Allies and Associated Powers, which in 
turn granted a mandate of  administrative and legislative powers to 
the Union of South Africa (today South Africa). The mandate was a 
compromise between self-sovereignty and full annexation, which was 
advocated by some of the Allied and Associated Powers (Du Pisani 
2010). The mandate was supposed to include a fair degree of self-
determination and included a supervisory power for the mandate 
by the League of Nations (ibid). As a consequence of the political 
developments in South Africa, South African rule in South West 
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Africa continued and increased the racial segregation and oppression 
of black people that the Germans had started (Du Pisani 2010; 
Lindeke 1995). 
 Black resistance was shaped in various ways during the years 
of South African rule, and in the 1960s the first black political parties 
were created. There was political struggle within the country and from 
Namibians in exile, where one of the main actors was the South West 
African Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO). Internal political 
struggle as well as the international and regional political development 
in the 1970s and 1980s, eventually paved the way for independence in 
1990 (Du Pisani 2010). In the first democratic elections held in 1989, 
SWAPO gained the majority of the votes, receiving 41 out of 72 seats 
in the National Assembly (Lindeke 1995), and since independence 
SWAPO has been the governing party. In the 2009 elections, they 
received 70 percent of the votes to the National Assembly (African 
Election Project 2010). 
 The Namibian constitution adopted by the National Assembly 
in 1990, provides for the division of power between the legislative, 
executive and judiciary. The President is elected by the people and 
holds large discretionary and executive powers (Erasmus 2010). At 
the time of independence, the new Namibian government faced 
the challenges of a country with historic legacies of deep conflicts 
and racial segregation, and as a consequence very high levels of 
inequality along ethnic lines. In order to put the injustice of the past 
behind them, the country signed an act of reconciliation. Although 
sensitive issues, such as land reforms, still remain to be solved by the 
government (Chomba 2009). 
 Literacy rates have steadily grown since independence, from 
a level of 76 percent in 1991, to 88 percent in 2008 (adults above 
15 years, World Bank 2008). Namibia in the last decade has had 
an average annual growth of 3 percent165 and has a Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capital of 6 323 (2008 US$ PPP, UNDP 2010). 
Although the GNI is comparatively high for Africa, due to one of the 
165 The figure is based on the years 2000, 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009 (World Bank 2009) 
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world’s highest levels of inequality and differences in income (UNDP 
2010) the country still faces significant poverty levels as well as 
unemployment rates of around 20 percent (World Bank 2009).  
The Office of the Auditor General
Prior to independence, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) in 
Namibia was part of the South African Auditors General’s Office. 
The Swedish government supported the independence movement in 
Namibia by providing humanitarian assistance to Namibians in exile 
and at the time of independence in 1990, the Swedish International 
Development Agency (Sida) started a major program to strengthen 
the capacity of the public administration in the country. The main 
focus of the program was on three fields, central banking, statistics 
and the Office of the Auditor General (Bergström 2008).
 At the time of independence in 1990, the size of the office 
was a total of 85 posts, where 53 were positions for qualified auditors. 
Out of the 53 positions, 28 were vacant. Consequently, quite a few 
unqualified staff worked with the audits. The office had problems 
with recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff. One 
principle reason for the inability to keep qualified staff was argued 
to be low salaries, which were much lower in comparison with the 
private sector (Guteberg & Bull 1995). As a consequence of the limited 
number of qualified auditors, there was a lack of audit planning, and 
limited use of audit techniques. Furthermore, the OAG hardly used 
any modern technical aids, such as computer based audit programs 
or statistical audit techniques. Evaluations of the office stated that the 
OAG had a long way to go before it could reach the standards of the 
audit techniques and methodologies used in the private sector as well 
as in the state audit offices in developed countries (Guteberg & Bull 
1995; see also Hyltander & Watkins 1993). The Sida funded capacity-
building project was organized as an institutional cooperation 
between the Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO) and the Office of 
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the Auditor General (OAG) in Namibia. The first project was for four 
years and was carried out between 1994 and 1998. Further support 
was provided in two subsequent projects between 1999 and 2003, and 
between 2004 and 2006. 
 In their evaluation report, Guteberg and Bull (1992) 
concluded that the main cause of the long-term problems at the OAG 
was the shortage of appropriate skills (p. 12). In accordance with their 
recommendation, the activities in the project were focused mainly 
on different types of training. Working groups and committees were 
established and given responsibilities for the different activities. The 
training provided was given to all staff at all levels, not exclusively 
the auditors. The team leader for the project in the final evaluation 
of the program expressed the idea that the training was to combine 
continuously theoretical training with “on the job training”, where 
the auditors apply the new theory in their practical work. To achieve 
continuous training and guidance in work situations, the projects 
were built around a project team of four long-term advisors, three in 
financial audit and one in performance audit, who worked in the office 
for several years (Bergström 2008).
 In addition, the projects also included a focus on training 
management, middle as well as senior. Gradually, the OAG 
management took over the responsibility for the overall staff training 
in the office from the project team. This was a strategy to reduce the 
risk of creating dependency on the long-term external consultants 
and instead make management the natural starting place, to which the 
staff would turn when they needed guidance (ibid).
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You cure the flu the same way in Namibia as you do in 
Sweden – best practices, clearer guidance and to follow 
standards as far as possible
The above analogy about the flu was drawn by a senior manager at 
the OAG in Namibia. According to him, the way international public 
audit standards should be regarded is not particularly complicated. 
He argued that auditing was to be viewed in the same way as medical 
treatment and explained that nobody would argue that a doctor 
should treat Swedish people with the flu any differently than people in 
Namibia. Similar to the medical treatment, the manager claimed that 
the audit methodology should stay the same in all countries, although 
the environment may differ.166
 Other auditors, at various levels in the organization, had the 
same unproblematic approach to international public audit standards. 
They argued that there was no reason for them to develop their own 
audit standards; rather such a process was viewed as unnecessary 
work. An auditor made the following clarifying statement: “it is 
a waste of time and money if you make your own standards and 
procedures.”167 Instead, the auditors argued that using the same 
audit methodology around the world and having one internationally 
accepted best practice within auditing is an advantage. For the 
auditors at the OAG in Namibia, following international public audit 
standards was regarded as guaranteeing the use of this best practice, 
and thereby improving the quality of their work.168 One auditor 
explained that auditing is about ensuring that the taxpayer’s money 
and the public resources are used properly. Hence, higher quality in 
their work was a better guarantee for the use of those recourses:
It is the taxpayers guarantee that the money is used properly, that 
there will be a proper control. This is the main point of thinking. This 
guarantee will increase if the work is done according to standards.
(Interview 47)
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It is argued that not only the taxpayers in Namibia are interested in 
how the Namibian government spends their resources; a manager 
argued that the donor countries were also interested in how the 
Namibian government spends their taxpayer’s money, and thus are 
interested in them being properly accounted for.169
 The auditors at the OAG argued that the audit procedures 
they used now were basically the same as those before they introduced 
international standards in the office. There has just been more work 
added to the procedures, i.e. more planning, better ways of sampling, 
more attention on judging risk and materiality, and in the end also 
more documentation.170 However, a manager argued that it was 
now clearer what the auditor is supposed to do, when they followed 
working papers in line with the international standards.171 Similarly, 
another auditor argued that following international audit standards 
was something that all auditors wanted to do, since that is “the correct 
way” of conducting audit.172 A similar approach was taken by one 
auditor when the audit manual was discussed; the auditor said that it 
was important to have the audit manual otherwise there would be no 
clear guidance on how to handle various situations.173
 Due to the extensive range of standards, it is actually 
impossible for any SAI to follow all the international standards. 
When this was discussed in an interview, an auditor in a management 
position explained his view in the following way:
I don’t think we are quite up to standards, but as far as possible we are 
going in that direction. … I think with the planning part we are quite 
up to standards, even with the execution part. I am not quite sure … I 
don’t think we are that up to standards with the reporting part yet.
(Interview 41)
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The manager added that the office was taking it step by step, and 
currently they were working with the reporting so they eventually 
will make progress in that part. Moreover, another auditor said the 
continuous updates to the standards made it difficult for a SAI with 
small resources to comply with all the new and updated standards. At 
the time of the interview, the OAG was in the process of completing 
its new audit manual and the interviewee said that it would not 
be long before it had to change it again, due to the updates to the 
standards.174
 To the auditors at the OAG,following the international 
standards as far as possible appeared natural and unproblematic, and 
they argued it was a part of their professional role as auditors. For 
them, the international audit standards gave guidance in the best 
way to conduct audit, which in turn,they argued, provided a higher 
quality forthe work. This confirms the description put forward by 
organization scholars, i.e. the auditors regard the regulation provided 
by similar international organizations in their field to be the legitimate 
way to conduct audit, and how performance improvement may be 
important motives behind why certain practices are adopted by 
organizations (Kennedy & Fiss 2009). In contrast to what would be 
expected from the way development scholars argue, auditors at the 
OAG in Namibia regarded it as unnecessary and a waste of time 
and resources to start developing their own standards and work 
procedures. 
 Donor countries were mentioned as one reason for why it 
was important for the office to follow the international standards, 
thus confirming what development scholars argue are the reasons for 
African countries adopting foreign practices, i.e. they do not really 
have any choice but to adopt Western standards, since donors will so 
demand (Abrahamsen 2000; Hyden 2006). This was mentioned by a 
manager in a high position in the organization, in the other interviews 
donors were not mentioned as an argument for why standards should 
be followed, rather they argued following standards was a part of their 
174 Interview 47
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professional role as well as part of the membership in the professional 
organizations AFROSAI-E and INTOSAI. Thus confirming what 
organization scholars say is the nature of organizations, i.e. imitating 
other SAIs as well as complying with the norms within their 
profession.
The audit community – learning, sharing and recognition
The OAG in Namibia is a member of AFROSAI-E as well as 
INTOSAI. This membership was significant in the interviews, 
where the auditors regarded the membership as implying that they 
should follow the regulation issued within the organization. One 
auditor expressed the view that they have no choice but to follow 
the standards since they were members of these organizations.175 
However, the main approach among the auditors was to highlight 
the advantages they saw in using the same audit methodology within 
the international as well as regional cooperation. The auditor who 
expressed the view that following the standards was not voluntary 
also went on to argue about all the advantages of using similar 
methodologies among the SAIs in the world.176
 One advantage of using the same audit methodology within 
the region and internationally, is argued by the auditors to be peer 
reviews. As discussed in chapter three, peer reviews are carried 
out within the regional organization AFROSAI-E on a regular 
basis. In the peer reviews,“good practices” at the office, in line 
with the international requirements, are recognized and areas for 
improvements are highlighted. Based on the peer reviews, the SAIs in 
the region are then ranked on how well they fulfill the requirements 
in the international audit standards.177 Although the importance 
of the SAI’s position in terms of the ranking was highlighted in the 
interviews, the auditors argued to a greater extent that peer reviews 
175 Interview 57
176 Interview 57
177 Interview 52, 59, 55, 49 
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were an assurance for the quality of their work. One auditor argued 
that if all SAIs conducted audits structured in different ways, it would 
be difficult conduct peer reviews and if there were no peer reviews 
there would be no one to say whether they conducted audit in an 
appropriate way and were heading in the right direction.178
 The auditors’ focus on the importance of learning and helping 
each other as auditors, and how a similar methodology can then be an 
advantage, is very significant, not only with regard to peer reviews.179 
One auditor gave an example of how the office purchased new audit 
software. Through AFROSAI-E, they met auditors from Uganda who 
had long experience with the same software and they had been able 
to learn from the mistakes the auditors in Uganda had made with 
the system. In this case, the Ugandan auditors also visited the OAG 
in Namibia and auditors at the OAG planned a trip to visit the OAG 
in Uganda to learn how they used the software.180 In the same way 
as the auditors at the OAG have received help from the experience 
of other countries, they have also helped other SAIs. For instance, 
the office has sent auditors to the SAI in Ghana to help them out 
with some difficulties they were experiencing with their auditing. 
The auditor who gave the example argued that such cooperation 
would not be possible if the SAIs did not work according to the same 
methodology.181 In addition, using similar methodologies around the 
world means that the auditors at the OAG in Namibia were able to 
work, not only in Ghana but also in other countries outside Africa, 
as well as in international organizations such as the UN. The UN 
appoints auditors for international assignments; hence, if auditors in 
Namibia were to use a different methodology they would not be able 
to participate in such missions.182
 The main opinion among auditors at the OAG in Namibia was 
that there were no disadvantages in using the same audit methodology 
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around the world. One exception was when an auditor argued that 
one risk in harmonizing methodologies around the world would be 
if certain countries were too narrowly focused. He claimed that the 
risk in such situations would be that good ideas from other countries 
might not be recognized. However, the auditor did not claim that this 
was the case with the current standards and work methodologies. The 
example he gave was a situation that arose in a regional workshop, 
where he thought some people dominated the discussion at the cost of 
others.183 Another difficulty with harmonizing work procedures could 
be a lack of resources. Auditors mentioned that they sometimes found 
it difficult to keep up with the requirements in the standards due to 
limitations in resources. When they argued that the lack of resources 
impeded their possibilities to follow the standards, they did not only 
claim it was a current problem for the office, they also argued that 
limited resources were a problem for the auditees.184 For instance, in 
the standards, there might be requirements of a separation of duties 
between officials in a government office, however the resources 
available for the auditee may only allow one person to be employed, 
hence they are unable to fulfill the requirements in the standards.185
 The membership in the professional organizations appeared as 
an important aspect for why the auditors at the OAG viewed following 
and implementing the standards as appropriate to their organization, 
thus confirming the importance of professional networks and 
associations for adhering to certain organizational models (DiMaggio 
& Powell 1983; Gibbons 2004; Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings 
2002; Wedlin 2007). Following the professional standards was also 
regarded as making it possible to improve their work by letting their 
peers from other countries review their work and, as the quotation 
above illustrates, advise them on whether they are “on the right 
track”. This also confirms their focus on using legitimate practices as 
defined by their professional peers in other countries, in contrast to 
using practices defined as appropriate out of local circumstances in 
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their country. Moreover, there was also a practical dimension to the 
use of international standards, where the auditors argued that the 
use of similar methodologies around the world means they could 
receive help, as well as help others SAIs,in overcoming difficulties. 
In addition, it opens up opportunities for individuals to work in 
other places than the OAG in Namibia. This practical dimension 
also contributes to confirming the auditors at the OAG as a part of a 
professional community, which does not have any national borders. 
 Confirming what development scholars argue is an important 
aspect of the transferability of models between Western countries 
and developing countries, the auditors claimed that it was sometimes 
difficult to fulfill the requirements in the standards since the OAG and 
the entities they audit do not have enough resources (Gyimah-Boadi 
2004). Nevertheless, the auditors’ solution to this situation was not to 
argue about the importance of making adjustments to the standards 
to suit their local circumstances, rather they claimed that they were 
taking it step by step and were gradually meeting the requirements 
in the standards, which confirmed their professional ambitions 
to comply with the standards as far as possible, as outlined by the 
organization literature.
Copy and paste – local adjustments
The adjustments the office has made to the standards in relation to 
the operationalized model for a Supreme Audit Institution will be 
discussed in the following section of the chapter. Nevertheless, in 
the interviews the auditors were asked what, in their view, were the 
adjustments they had to make to the standards to adopt them to their 
specific circumstances. One manager claimed that with the standards 
it was just to “copy and paste”, and that it was not necessary to make 
adjustments186. The overall answers from the auditors confirmed this 
manager’s view and argued that the standards were introduced into 
186 Interview 40 
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the OAG without any major changes. Some auditors emphasized that 
they had to look at the laws of the country, to ensure that the audit 
procedures were carried out according to the State Financial Act.187 
However, these auditors’ argument was in line with the rest of the 
auditors in the interviews, i.e. the audit approach is mainly the same 
and the things that need changing or that cannot be used were only 
minor. Such minor issues may be related to specific software, which is 
used for the financial statements, which may differ between countries, 
or that the reports may differ in the way they are structured.188 In 
addition, in Namibia they use the cash based system for the state 
finances, and since the standards are based on the accrual system, they 
have to make some adjustments accordingly.189
 The auditors’ approach above may be regarded as confirming 
the influence of isomorphic pressures on the organization, i.e. they 
did not regard introducing the standards in the office as problematic 
despite the fact that the standards were foreign. The auditors’ approach 
to the standards, in relation to their local circumstances, may be 
regarded to be in contrast with what is described in the development 
literature for how African public administrations should respond to 
foreign structures, i.e. they would claim it was important to develop 
their own models and point out the difficulties in implementing 
foreign structures in their local context, due to the lack of legitimacy, 
or due to differences in the levels of development. 
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Independence
Protection of the Auditor General in the constitution
In article 127 in the Namibian constitution, the procedures for 
appointing the Auditor General (AG) are laid out. The article states 
that the Auditor General is appointed by the President on the 
recommendation of the Public Service Commission. Before the 
Auditor General is finally appointed, the appointment has to be 
approved by the National Assembly. The Auditor General is appointed 
for five years with the possibility to be reappointed for another five 
years. In the article, procedures for the removal of the Auditor General 
are also given. To remove the Auditor General from her or his position 
requires a two-thirds majority of the votes of all the members of the 
National Assembly. The constitution states that such a removal is only 
possible on the grounds of mental incapacity or gross misconduct.190 
The current Auditor General was appointed in 2003 hence his second 
term as Auditor General will end in March 2012. The predecessor 
of the current AG was appointed in 1993, and was the first Auditor 
General of Namibia.191
 When independence was discussed with a manager in a high 
position in the OAG, the manager was concerned about the fact that 
they did not meet all the requirements for independence in the legal 
framework. Currently the OAG’s assignments are laid out in the State 
Financial Act and the manager would like the OAG to come under its 
own Audit Act. However, a draught for a new Audit Act had recently 
been approved by the government and was now being processed by 
the legislature. The manager explained that coming under their own 
legislation was not a requirement in the standards, however it was 
regarded as “good practice” and if the OAG wanted to be perceived as 
independent it should come under its own act.192
190 The Constitution of Namibia, Chapter 16, Article 127
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There was not much difference between the content of the new act 
and what was prescribed about the OAG in the State Financial Act; 
the manager claimed that over 90% was the same. One difference 
would be a change in the budget procedures. The AG wanted to have 
a body in the parliament that tabled the OAG’s budget, rather than 
the procedures where the budget is tabled by the Ministry of Finance, 
which was the situation when the interviews were conducted. Another 
difference would be the creation of an oversight mechanism for the 
OAG. The OAG appoints its own auditors, and the manager argued 
that this: “is not the right way, we appoint someone who will audit us 
and then report to us… how can that be reliable, in theory that is not 
good.” The manager claimed that the office actually had full functional 
independence, i.e. they did what they wanted to do and there was 
no interference with their work. However, he was very aware of how 
their lack independence could be perceived by others and argued that 
donors as well as investors would want the OAG to be formally fully 
independent, in which case formal procedures became important.193
 When independence was discussed with other auditors, 
it was mentioned that the Auditor General could be considered as 
a political position. Due to the AG’s position, where he or she is 
appointed by the government and is not fully independent, it could 
be difficult for him or her to be critical towards the government and 
produce inconvenient reports. The auditors argued that the current 
arrangement might imply a risk that inconvenient reports could result 
in the Auditor General not being reappointed.194
 The OAG in Namibia fulfills the requirements in the 
standards for having procedures for the appointment and removal of 
the Auditor General laid out in the constitution. In the appointment 
process, the National Assemblyisalso involved through approving 
the person appointed for the position. Thus, there is adherence to 
the international legitimate procedures for appointing the head of 
the SAI, without any apparent conflicts with the local circumstances. 
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This confirms the isomorphic influences of legitimate practices from 
an organizational field. In addition, the auditors were aware of their 
limited independence in certain areas, such as not coming under their 
own legislation or when appointing their own auditors. Further, they 
were moving towards more independence by making efforts to adopt 
new legislation and to create an independent oversight mechanism. 
Financial and human resources are available without direct 
interference from the executive
The Namibian Office of the Auditor General is part of the government 
structure. It receivesits budget from the government, like all other 
ministries within the government. The budget is tabled by the 
Minister of Finance and then approved by the National Assembly. 
The OAG cannot change the budget or change between budget items. 
However, it has possibilities to move the money and decide how the 
money is to be used within the budget.195
 When the office recruits new personnel, for the higher 
positions, the proceedings have to go through the Public Service 
Committee (PSC), which is the office of human resources for the 
whole government, placed within the Prime Ministers’ office. The 
PSC determines whether or not there will be a new recruitment to the 
office. The OAG itself places the advertisement for the new positions 
andit selects and interviews the applicants. After the employment 
proceedings, the OAG sends its recommendation to the Public Service 
Committee, which takes the formal decision.196 For entry positions, as 
assistant auditors, the office does not need to use the PSC, it decides 
on the recruitment process itself.197
 Being a part of the government structure also implies that 
the salaries are fixed. One manager claimed that the OAG could 
recommend the Public Service Committee to give a certain salary 
195 Interview 40
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to the auditors, but salaries for higher positions were determined 
within the government.198 However, other auditors argued that all 
salaries were determined within the government.199 The government 
recognizes and gives a higher salary to certain professions; however, 
being an accountant is not recognized as a profession. Only those 
holding professional qualifications as an auditor, such as the 
ACCA(the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants)provides, 
could receive a larger salary: “So we are on the normal grade for the 
whole government” an auditor explained.200
 One auditor in a management position expressed the view 
that the lack of decision power for the salaries as well as limited 
powers to decide on recruiting certain expertise was the largest 
consequence of the limited independence. Since the office was unable 
to decide on the salaries, it was difficult for it to keep the experienced 
auditors. An increased workload and difficulty in carrying out the 
audit work properly were some of the consequences of experienced 
auditors leaving the office, which was mentioned in interviews: 201
At the end of the day you have people who have only two years’ 
experience. You can’t really send them into a client alone … these 
assignments are tougher, it needs more experience
   (Interview 42)
The new Audit Act was interpreted by several auditors as an increase 
in their independence, in terms of financial and human resources. The 
auditors believed that the office could work more effectively if it was 
more independent in those areas, due to the increased opportunity to 
decide on salaries and personnel policies.202 The problem of attracting 
and retaining qualified staff confirms what some development 
scholars argue to be a major problem in African public organizations. 
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Due to low salaries and better opportunities elsewhere, the expertise 
and knowledge built up within the organization disappears 
continuously (Klitgaard 1989; Hilderbrand & Grindle 1998; Olowu 
1999). Several auditors regarded this situation to be an effect of 
their limited independence from the government, and they argued 
that the situation would improve if they were more independent. 
This is in line with how could be expected to act according to 
organizational scholars, their ambition is to move towards higher 
compliance with professional legitimate structures, i.e. a higher degree 
of independence. The views expressed by the auditors when it came 
to their situation with limited financial independence are also in 
contrast to how they would be expected to respond according to the 
literature on development, i.e. the solution expressed by the auditors 
to the situation with high staff turnover and low salaries was to 
change the situation in their organizationso there would be a higher 
degree of compliance with foreign structures, rather than adjust the 
requirements in the standards to their situation in Namibia.
Independent selection of audit areas and report of audit findings 
According to a manager in a high position in the organization, the 
OAG decides independently on the whole scope of audits, it is only 
the recruitments that are conducted through the central government. 
Furthermore, the office also alternates the individual auditors among 
different areas in the government. This was done to avoid auditors 
becoming partial or too attached to the auditee.203 The alternation of 
auditors in the divisions was argued by one auditor to be an advantage 
of the work, otherwise there was a risk they would be “too relaxed” 
with the client. In addition, he claimed that they would be bored if 
they kept working with the same client for too long.204
203 Interview 40
204 Interview 50
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The auditors claimed they could choose their audit areas according to 
their assignments as auditors. However, when there were politically 
sensitive issues they might abstain from further investigation. This 
was only mentioned within performance audit and not financial 
audit. Such a political sensitive issue to which they referred was 
the question of land reform and redistribution of land, where the 
Namibian government is struggling to solve the situation. The auditors 
argued that to abstain from politically sensitive issueswas easily 
understandable, and they did not appear to be disturbed that they 
were not approved to carry out the audit. The auditors claimed, since 
the question was already being investigated politically, a performance 
audit within the same area would not add any value to the question, 
and there would also be difficulties in giving recommendations since 
the area was highly politicized.205
 When possible complaints from the auditees about the audit 
reports were discussed, the interviewees argued that audit procedures 
per se prevent probable complaints.206 Throughout the audits, the 
auditors discuss the findings with the auditees and when a draught of 
the report has been compiled it is sent to the auditee for comments, 
which are included in the report. Although, some auditors mentioned 
that auditees had complained to them about various things in the 
reports,207 it appeared to be unusual for this to be due to the audit 
process. 
 In the office there were divided opinions on their role as 
auditors, whether they should be more advisory or if they should 
be more critical, as well as whether they should have extended 
possibilities to investigate fraud and corruption. One auditor stated 
that the OAG merely expressed its audit opinion in the reports. It 
did not report on fraud or continue to take further action in cases of 
fraud, which the auditor would have liked them to.208 This auditor also 
argued that the OAG was “too kind” to the auditee when it wrote its 
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reports. Likewise, another auditor claimed that the office was careful 
in its reporting since the office wanted to maintain good relations with 
the auditee.209 These auditors expressed frustration with this situation 
and argued that this approach gave them less work satisfaction when 
the reports were written in this way. One auditor claimed that: “You 
feel like there is no reward in the end.”210
 The frustration the auditors expressed over the reports not 
only concerned the choice of formulation or decisions not to include 
every finding in the report, it also concerned how they felt that they 
reported on similar findings every year and how there were few 
changes or consequences in keeping with their findings.211 Other 
auditors had a different view of the auditor’s role and how the audit 
report should be written. One auditor claimed that the role of the 
auditor was not to criticize the auditee, rather they should advise 
them: 
When the review is being done we make it softer. The aim is not to 
beat someone with a stick. You can severe the relationship with the 
auditee. But if you put it nicely you will get a better relationship.     
(Interview 52) 
The auditor quoted above argued that the advisory role is the proper 
role for the auditor, something he also taught in class when he 
functioned as a trainer. When the other auditors’ frustration was 
discussed in the interview, he admitted that he understood their 
frustration, since they had to report on the same findings every year. 
However, he worked within performance audit and they changed 
audit area every year, thus he did not face the same situation. 
 The OAGs’ approach, being advisory rather than criticizing 
government entities, may also be illustrated by the way it handles the 
media. Since 2009, the OAG has a new public relations officer; the 
reason given for the recent establishment of the position was that it 
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was a consequence of the requirement from INTOSAI and AFROSAI-
E. The government had earlier viewed such a position as unnecessary. 
Since the OAG is a part of government, the public relations had 
been managed in the Ministry for Information, Technology and 
Communication.212
 The auditors as well as the official responsible for the public 
relations argued that the media frequently reported on the findings of 
the OAG.213 The OAG then responded to the journalists’ articles about 
the findings, in order to clear up any possible misunderstandings. The 
OAG never issues press releases about the auditees with respect to the 
audit findings, rather they take more a protective approach towards 
the auditee in relation to the media, and sometimes they write press 
releases together with the ministries.214
 It is difficult to interpret to what extent the OAG actually 
selects and reports on audit findings independently. The differences 
in opinions, whether it is being “too kind” in its reports, or whether 
the appropriate role for auditors is “not to beat someone with a 
stick”, could be interpreted as various views of the auditor’s role. As 
illustrated above, the OAG’s approach is to be more advisory than 
critical towards the government entities, in line with the literature 
on the nature of the audit profession, this appears to be in line with 
how the audit profession is characterized. Auditors in the literature 
are criticized for not paying attention to stakeholders’ interest in 
focusing and reporting on fraud and corruption (Cullinan& Sutton 
2002; Larsson 2005; Öhman et al. 2006), as well as for not providing 
revealing information in their audit reports (c.f. Hanberger 2009). In 
addition, the auditors who argued for the advantages of the OAG’s 
more advisory position were also auditors who were greatly involved 
in the regional networks. Thus, the advisory position could be 
regarded as the influence of the professional norm and an interest for 
adhering to the character of the profession.
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Standardized work procedures
The existence and use of audit manuals which 
build on international standards
The need for an audit manual was already discussed in the first 
reports of the development cooperation project between SNAO and 
the OAG of Namibia in 1993. In the report, it was stated that the 
office needed an audit manual to give the staff clear guidance on 
the different parts of the audit process, so as to be able to meet the 
auditing standards requirements (Hyltander & Watkins 1993, p. 14). 
However, there already was an audit manual in the office in 1993 and, 
according to the report, this manual had been developed by British 
National Audit Office and sent to the office when the country joined 
the Commonwealth. According to the report, there was no trace in the 
office that the manual ever had been used (ibid). 
 Consequently, there was an aim in the project to develop an 
audit manual, but this was not achievedfully. In the interviews, the 
manual from 2004 was referred to as when the office first adopted an 
audit manual. The earlier efforts were not recognized, not the British 
version nor possible efforts to develop a manual within the Swedish 
project. The auditors argued that in the Swedish project they were 
introduced to several working papers and through the working papers 
they started to work more in accordance with the audit standards.215
 The manual, which was adopted by the OAG in 2004, was 
developed in cooperation with AFROSAI-E. By the time the Swedish 
project ended, the office was involved in the regional cooperation 
within AFROSAI-E, and the Auditor General of Namibia became 
the chairperson of AFROSAI-E, when SADCOSAI and AFROSAI-E 
merged into one organization in 2004. The office joined seminars and 
activities in the regional cooperation and through AFROSAI-E they 
received an audit manual. One interviewee described the adoption of 
the manual as follows: 
215 E.g. interview 41, 44, 45, 46
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After they left the office, we joined one of the seminars with AFROSAI-
E and then we got a template, which we then customized, brought 
home and customized. That was our first manual.
(Interview 41)
On the question of what such customization consisted of more 
specifically, the two things the auditor quoted above mentioned were; 
first, that the office was not fully independent, it was still a part of 
the government structure, which meant that it had to adjust to such 
circumstances. Second, other countries could possibly have an audit 
system with a court of auditors, which made them different from the 
countries using a Westminster system, which is the case in Namibia.216
 When customization of the audit manual was discussed with 
other auditors, they argued that the customization of the manual 
concerned minor issues and that nothing major in the manual 
was changed or could not be used. The cash based system used in 
Namibia was one such aspect where customization meant that the 
proscribed procedures in the manual concerning accrual systems 
were not applicable in Namibia.217 Another interviewee stated that 
in a customization of an audit manual, there was a need to consider 
the laws in the country and the office had to write the manual so it 
would suit the procedures in Namibia’s State and Financial Act. Yet, 
the same auditor argued that the basic principles within audit have to 
be there and that the modifications made to the manual were minor. 
For instance, the auditor mentioned the software used for financial 
accounting. In Namibia, they use ORACLE, consequently in the 
manual they had to look at the control mechanisms within ORACLE 
and write the manual accordingly. Other countries may use a different 
software system consequently write their manual so it suits such 
software systems.218
 When the manual was introduced in 2004, the office held a 
training session. There was a trainer from AFROSAI-E, who came and 
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presented the manual as well as gave them training.219 This manual 
since the first introduction has been updated twice. An auditor in a 
management position explained that when the manual was introduced 
in 2004, there was some resistance from the auditors working in the 
office. The auditor believed that the resistance to the manual in 2004 
was due to the increase in work the new manual implied, and that the 
auditors viewed the increased workload as forced upon them by the 
management. However, the auditor claimed that this reluctant attitude 
to the manuals had now changed. She believed that the auditors in the 
office now recognized that the methodologies in the manuals were 
not ideas from the management but requirements in the international 
standards. This, she argued, led the staff in the office to accept the 
new methodologies and the increased workload involved.220 Another 
auditor in a management position claimed that the 2004 manual had 
been received quite well but the continuous updates to working papers 
met with some resistance from the auditors, due to the increased 
workload involved.221 Although the office updated its manual 
regularly, when the standards were updated on an annual basis, it did 
not change the manual it just added the working papers accordingly.222
 In the interviews, the auditors described the manual as being 
important. The manual provided guidance in their work and in cases 
of uncertainty, regarding definitions or if they needed clarification on 
how to handle situations. A fairly new auditor expressed it as follows: 
“If there was no manual, one would say this, another would say that 
and there would be no clear guidance.”223 The auditors claimed they 
used the manual more when they are new at work, and as they gained 
practical experience they used it less frequently.224
 As illustrated above, the auditors regarded the use of an audit 
manual based on the international standards as an aid to give them 
guidance on how the audit work should be conducted, and as the 
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auditor quoted above said, if there were no such guidance there might 
be different views on how to conduct the work. This confirms their 
professional approach to the standards, as giving them appropriate 
guidance, instead of regarding them as foreign ideas, which were 
difficult to implement in their context. The efforts the office made to 
adopt a manual and continuously update it, show that the office takes 
action to adhere with international standards as would be expected 
from the theory of isomorphism.
 The resistance the manual met at first, when it was 
introduced, is difficult to interpret in terms of the explanations 
provided for failed reforms by development scholars, i.e. the manual 
met resistance due to specific cultural features or that the manual 
lacked legitimacy due to its external origin. The explanation provided 
in the interviews, i.e. the manual involved a general increase workload 
and therefore it was not met with enthusiasm; appears to be a more 
plausible explanation. Particularly since a manager claimed that 
the attitudes changed when the auditors understood that it was a 
requirement in the international standards, i.e. external requirements.
This contrasts with what would be expected based on the development 
literature, and rather confirms the importance for the auditors to be 
recognized by the international audit community. The introduction 
and use of audit manuals was also probably a network effect of 
the involvement in the regional cooperation. The Auditor General 
became the chairperson for AFROSAI in 2004, and it is reasonable 
to believe that this had a large impact on the office’s approach to the 
audit manual and the international audit standards and made the 
office more likely to comply as far as possible with the international 
standards (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman 1989; Gibbons 2004).
 It is difficult to interpret whether their attitude towards 
customization should be regarded as supporting the description in 
the development theory. On the one hand, the auditors argued that 
they needed to consider the country’s laws and their situation,where 
they lacked full independence, and this was a political situation to 
which adaptations had to be made, which is in accordance with 
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some development scholars (c.f. Grindle 1998b). On the other hand, 
when customization of the manual was discussed the majority of the 
auditors argued that the main approach in the audit methodology did 
not change with customization of the manual, and gave examples of 
minor more technical issues, such as software systems, which could 
differ between countries. These adjustments, i.e. more technical, are 
difficult to interpret as being the kind of adjustments that are argued 
to be important in the development literature, where scholars argue 
about the socio-economic as well as cultural context (ibid.)     
Standardized work procedures are followed and documented
The training of the auditors throughout the Swedish development 
cooperation project, between 1994 and 2006, was via large amounts of 
training in classrooms, but also with a large focus on practical “on the 
job training.” Since no manual was developed, the training was based 
on working papers designed in accordance with international audit 
standards. The introduction of working papers into the project was the 
point of reference when the introduction of standards in the office was 
discussed.225 It was explained that it was then the work methodology 
became more structured.226
 Today, the procedure for updating the OAG on new standards 
is through working papers. Auditors from the office participate in 
the AFROSAI-E annual technical update workshops, where they 
receive updated working papers, which are then introduced to the 
auditors in the office. The auditors participating in the technical 
updates are part of the office’s audit guidance committee. The audit 
guidance committee’s assignment is to ensure that the office is updated 
on the latest standards. Additionally, the office has two auditors in 
higher management positions who participate in INTOSAI working 
groups. Through the working groups, they receive the latest standards 
225 Interview 41, 45, 
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and changes, which they eventually provide to the audit guidance 
committee in the office. Each year, the office holds a workshop for all 
of the auditors on the updates to the standards. The changes in various 
areas are divided among the chief auditors, who also function as 
trainers: 
So, after the technical guidance committee people have come back, all 
the trainers sit with them and we pick a topic each, and then we present 
that topic to the rest of the staff. It would be too much for one person 
to cover it all.
 (Interview 57)
The chief auditors in the office try to ensure that the same working 
papers are used throughout the office. Hence, they meet regularly and 
review the working papers to see what they agree on and whether 
there are any differences between the teams in the office.227 The chief 
auditor is described as a team leader for an audit unit. They work 
with the auditors throughout the audits, as well as reviewing the work 
of the auditors in their unit. In addition, all chief auditors, but one, 
function as trainers during the introduction course for new auditors 
as well as in the yearly update of standards. 
 The updates of the standards and changes in the work 
methodologies are not always met with enthusiasm by the auditors. 
For them, updates in the standards always involve an increased 
workload. In the interviews, it was claimed that the auditors hardly 
had the time to get used to one working paper before they had to 
replace it with another. One auditor argued as follows: 
Changing to new working papers is really a hassle. You get use to them 
[the working papers] and you have your normal deadlines, at the same 
time, as you have to learn what the new working papers require.
(Interview 50) 
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206
All auditors in management positions argued that the staff complained 
about the updates and the continuous change in working papers.228  
One of the managers said that she actually thought it was a bit strange 
that the updates always involved more work. To her, the advancement 
in work procedures ought to mean that the work was facilitated, not 
the opposite.229 Another auditor argued that sometimes the auditors 
wanted the changes, since the changes may imply a more effective way 
of conducting their work.230 However, this appeared to be something 
of an exception according to the other interviewees. Some auditors 
argued that the workshops for the updates were too short, and that 
they didn’t have the time to go through the changes properly. Yet, 
since the trainers were chief auditors in the office, they were available 
after the workshops and there were opportunities to ask for guidance, 
if the auditors became stuck in the new methodologies.231 On the 
question of whether, as auditors,they were able to continue to work 
the way they used to, or if they actually changed their work according 
to the updates, it was explained that there was no option but to change 
the methodology according to the updates. One auditor explained it in 
the following way: 
It is compulsorily, you have to do it that way. If you don’t do it, you are 
wasting your time because you have to redo the work. If you do it the 
old way, you will have to do it again the new way.
(Interview 56) 
In a peer review of the office from 2007, the office was complimented 
for the increased use of standardized working papers, as well as 
for having a well-structured audit planning process (AFROSAI-E 
2002). As described above, resistance to the constant updates to 
working papers was argued to be due to the increased workload 
228 Interview 45, 57, 49, 44
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for the auditors. However, another dimension was pointed out 
by some auditors. One auditor claimed that the resistance to the 
implementation of new working papers often came from people who 
had worked long in the office, who might not be so used to computers, 
as well as often having a lower level of education.232 Similarly, another 
auditor claimed that some auditors feared every new methodology 
introduced and argued that they were afraid of losing their jobs, 
certainly when the new young staff is more highly educated and has 
a higher level of understanding of the processes. The auditor asked: 
“There is new young staff who are arriving and know so much more 
than the seniors, should they then be the managers?” And he added: 
“Maybe we should slow down the process.”233
 As illustrated in this section, the OAG continuously update 
sits working papers and it has a clear structure for how new working 
papers are to be introduced and implemented in the office on a regular 
basis. The middle management, the chief auditors, works together 
so the sections and their audit teams will use similar procedures. In 
addition, the chief auditors also conduct the annual workshop on the 
updates, where they teach the auditors about the changes. This creates 
a situation where chief auditors, who also lead the audit teams in the 
practical daily work, are well informed and harmonized in their views 
of the standards and their support and guidance is also available in the 
office even after the formal training. In addition, managers at a higher 
position in the office are also involved in the INTOSAI working 
groups on the standards; hence their expertise is also available. Due 
to these procedures, it appears as if the working procedures are 
harmonized in the office, and that standardized working papers are 
continuously implemented in the entire office. The auditor quoted 
above claimed that there was no real option but to change the work 
in accordance with the new working papers. Otherwise, she argued, 
you would just have to redo the work. In a previous review, the office 
was also complimented for its extended use of standardized working 
232 Interview 58
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papers. These answers illustrate how the office as routine continuously 
undertakes actions to keep updated so as to work according to 
new requirements in the standards, which in turn may be regarded 
as confirming the impact of isomorphic mechanisms, such as 
professional norms, on practices in a public sector organization, even 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 The difference between some senior officials and the 
junior staff may be regarded however, as an aspect that needs to be 
considered in developing countries. The more junior auditors argued 
that the problems in implementing some of the new standards were 
due to a lack of competence among some auditors who had worked in 
the office for a long time and had a lower level of education. Likewise, 
auditors holding such positions may be afraid that they are unable to 
conduct their work as well as the younger more educated staff, thus 
resistance may be a strategy for handling this situation. However, it 
appears as if this is not a major problem that affects the office from 
working according to the standards to any great extent.  
Competence
The audit staff holds the appropriate level of education and 
qualifications
A lack of auditors with the right qualifications as well as problems 
with attracting and retaining qualified staff were serious problems 
for the office at the start of 1990s, according to evaluation reports 
(Guteberg & Bull 1992; Hyltander & Watkins 1993). Besides, one 
report stated that the general educational standard of undergraduates 
was low in the country,in particular there was a lack of basic 
knowledge in mathematics. Therefore, only five to ten percent of the 
enrolled students eventually passed graduation (Guteberg & Bull 
1992). At the start of the 1990s, the size of the office was a total of 85 
posts, where 53 were positions for qualified auditors. Out of the 53 
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positions, 28 were vacant; hence, major recruitments of new audit staff 
were made during the project. Today, there are 113 positions at the 
OAG, whereof 103 are filled. Including assistant audit positions, 81 
positions are audit positions, 75 of these are filled, and out of the 75 
around 60 are assistant auditors. 234
 Already at the start of the 1990s, the OAG aimed to recruit 
auditors with a bachelor degree, however, it was difficult to find 
enough applicants for the positions (Hyltander & Watkins 1993).
Receiving applications from qualified persons today does not however 
appear to be a problem. The OAG visits the university and the 
polytechnic and receives several applications from students who are 
interested in working in the office. Apart from degrees in accounting 
and finance, the office has accepted diplomas as an equivalent level of 
education for becoming an auditor. In the interviews, it was argued 
that the requirements will change; from 2010 the office will only 
accept applications from individuals with a bachelor degree. The 
reason given in the interviews varied; some argued it is due to the 
difficulty inevaluating diplomas in relation to bachelor degrees. A 
bachelor degree is the same in all Africa, while a diploma stretches 
from one year to four years’ education. Consequently, there have 
been discussions in the office on whether the higher education a 
bachelor degree implies should be measured in terms of a higher 
salary, which appears not to be the situation today. Another officer 
argued that the change in educational requirements was line with 
the professionalization of the office. The office aims to move towards 
professional qualifications such as the ACCA when it educates its 
auditors. Then, the interviewee argued, it might be difficult for 
someone holding a diploma or with a lower level of education to 
manage such an education.235
 Currently in the OAG, three auditors are study to become 
professionally qualified auditors according to ACCA, which is the 
professional education required to be a chartered accountant. They 
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are the first ones in the office who will obtain this professional 
qualification. One interviewee argued that these auditors would like to 
have a higher salary when they finished the course. However, because 
the OAG is a part of the government structure, it will be difficult for 
the office to satisfy such possible demands. The interviewee argued 
that it would be easier to have a retention plan for these auditors, if the 
office was independent.236
 Although the three auditors taking the ACCA professional 
qualifications are the first, the OAG has an internal training course 
and internal examinations for new auditors. A manager in a higher 
position stated that you cannot become an auditor in the office 
unless you pass the training and the OAG’s tests.237 When auditors 
are recruited to the office, they are employed as assistant auditor and 
are attached to an audit team to assist a senior auditor.238 In parallel 
with the work, the assistant auditors are trained in classes run by 
the chief auditors and the more senior auditors in the office. After 
two years training and work experience, the assistant auditors take 
the exams in the office and if they pass, they receive a certificate and 
become an auditor in the office. To pass the examination, their overall 
performance is reviewed, the exams as well as their performance at 
work during the two years.239
 Auditors in management positions argued that several of the 
auditors who had passed the internal training course left the office 
for other positions in the government, where they normally received 
a management position in one ofthe other ministries.240 Despite the 
high staff turnover, a manager argued that at least the auditors stayed 
within the government. The OAG issues an audit certificate, which 
is not recognized outside the government, the manager argued that 
this reduced the leakage of people from the government to the private 
sector.241
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Some auditors in management position complained about the 
implications of the high staff turnover. Apart from having fewer 
auditors for the daily work, for the managers the high staff turnover 
meant they constantly had new inexperienced auditors in their teams. 
Inexperienced auditors require more guidance at their work, which in 
the end increased the work burden for the others.242 Reasons for the 
high staff turnover were claimed to be the low salaries as well as the 
limited career opportunities in the office, the office is small and there 
are few management positions for experienced auditors.243
 As illustrated above, the office has aims to be more 
professional and, in pursuit of this ambition, it has taken actions 
such as sending auditors to obtain an ACCA, as well as raising the 
education requirements at entry level at the office. These actions 
confirm the office’s alignment to isomorphic pressure to be more 
legitimate in terms of the way competence is regarded within its 
field of audit organizations. In addition, the office has an internal 
training program within the office where its trains new auditors 
who,at first,start as assistant auditors. Then, after passed exams, they 
are promoted to auditors. This could also be interpreted as a way 
for the office to adhere to the professional ideals of special training 
and qualifications as arequirement for entering the profession (c.f. 
Abbott 1988), as well as a way for the office to sustain harmonized 
work procedures in the office. Since the assistant auditors are trained 
in joint sessions in the office, there is less room for team leaders and 
middle managers to influence the audit practice in their sections so it 
deviate from the officially adopted work procedures in the office. Thus, 
the action taken bythe office,to keep the training centralized, may be 
regarded as a strategy to maintain high compliance with the standards. 
 As expected from the development literature, the high staff 
turnover was a problem in the office. However, since the office issues 
its own certificate it does not primarily lose staff to the private sector 
but rather to other government ministries, where auditors receive 
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higher salaries. The high staff turnover does not appear to have 
impactedon the office’s approach to the international standards to 
any great extent. The recruitment process (where a higher level of 
theoretical education is demanded) and the requirement to become an 
auditor in the office (to follow the internal training program) make it 
probable that the office will maintain work procedures in line with the 
requirements in the international standards.
There are possibilities of increasing the level of competence in the 
SAI through further education and training abilities
As discussed above, the OAG has an integrated way to educate its 
new employees so they become certified auditors. The organization 
in the office also provides for annual training and update of standards 
for auditors at all levels. In this process, the office has created 
an internal audit guidance committee, which participates in the 
AFROSAI-E’s technical updates, where it receives the latest updates 
to the international standards on a yearly basis. The committee also 
receives information about the standards from two senior managers 
who participate in INTOSAI working groups. The audit guidance 
committee has the responsibility for ensuring that the office is kept 
up-to-date on the standards, and in this process it involves the chief 
auditorswho function as trainers at the annual workshop that is 
arranged for all of the auditors. The chief auditors select areas in the 
updates that they present to the rest of the staff at the workshop.244
 In the 2007 peer review by AFROSAI-E, the OAG in Namibia 
was criticized for not providing sufficient training for the permanent 
staff (AFROSAI-E 2007). According to the interviews carried out in 
2009, it was mainly the new auditors who were expected to participate 
in the annual update to the standards. The more experienced auditors 
had the opportunity to participate but if they chose not to, they 
244 The chief auditors are middle managers who also function as team leaders in the audit teams 
in the office, i.e. they lead the daily work of the auditors
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received the working papers via e-mail and had to read the updates 
themselves. If there was anything unclear the auditors had to ask 
somebody in the office.245 In the interviews carried out in 2010, this 
appeared to have changed. The auditors claimed that the workshops 
on the updates were compulsorily for all of the auditors, assistant 
auditors as well as experienced ones.246
 Outside the office, the auditors receive additional training 
mainly through the cooperation with AFROSAI-E. The auditors in 
the office participate in its regional courses, such as the performance 
audit course and a course in management.247 On occasions, trainers 
from AFROSAI-E have been invited to the office to hold courses, in 
the office recently a course had been held on time management.248 The 
three auditors who are studying for an ACCA, will be the first auditors 
in the office to receive such a qualification. One manager explained 
that sending the auditors on this professional training was a question 
of resources, and the office’s limited resources only permitted a few. 
The manager also argued that he would like the office to be able to use 
electronic working papers, such as the TeamMate system. Nonetheless, 
he argued that at present such a system was too expensive for the 
office.249
 Some Supreme Audit Institutions, like the SAI in the U.K. 
and the SAI in India, send anannual program with different types of 
training to SAIs around the world. A few of the auditors in the office 
had attended courses in the U.K., China and India over the years. 
However, according to a manager in charge of training at the office, 
the auditors at the office rarely participated in these courses, and it 
was not done on a regular basis.250
 The actions taken by the office as presented above, show 
how the office clearly provides structures for increasing the level of 
competence in the office through further education and training. 
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The office’s internal training program, the annual updates as well as 
sending auditors on professional training for the ACCA, confirms 
how it has taken actions to comply with international standards as far 
as possible within the office.
 Limited resources affects the office, its small resources has 
not allowed it to send more auditors on professional training for the 
ACCA or on courses at other SAIs abroad over the years, neither has it 
had the means to purchase the audit software TeamMate (c.f. Glenday 
1998; Turner & Hulme 1997). Nevertheless, the office participates in 
the regional events and has managed to build up a training structure 
within its limited resources in order to continuously train and update 
the auditors on the standards in the office, which may be regarded as 
confirming the office’s commitment to complying with the standards. 
 The clear commitment in the office could be regarded to be 
an effect of the involvement in regional and international networks 
and groups involved in standard-making bodies, since several auditors 
on various levels in the office were involved in such activities. For 
instance, the office has auditors in high management positions who 
participate in the INTOSAI working groups and its Auditor General 
has been the chairperson for AFROSAI-E for several years, as well as 
several auditors act as trainers in regional courses within AFROSAI-E. 
It is likely that this participation influences the organization to move 
in the direction of following standards as far as possible.
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CHAPTER 
A Professional Community Across 
National Borders
The starting point for this study was the observed differences in 
the literature on the relationship between public organizations 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and foreign, i.e. Western or international, 
administrative structures and practices. The two bodies of 
literature, the literature on organizations and the literature 
discussing development in African countries formulate different 
understandings for how African public organizations respond to 
foreign administrative structures and practices. As previously argued, 
both bodies of literature cannot be accurate in their descriptions and 
conclusions, and the aim throughout this study has been to test these 
two theoretical approaches empirically within one area of public 
administration in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this study, the case has been 
the area of state audit, i.e. Supreme Audit Institutions; consequently, 
the more specific aim for testing the theory is for it to contribute to 
a better understanding of the way African public auditors handle 
international public audit standards in relation to their context. 
 To highlight the content and the differences between the 
two bodies of literature and to enable a method for testing them 
empirically, two propositions were formulated respectively. According 
to the literature on development: Auditors in African countries could 
be expected to express the importance of conducting audit in line with 
the circumstances in their local context, and they would primarily 
seek legitimacy within their local context. This can be contrasted to 
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a proposition based on how the literature on organizations would 
describe the public auditors: Auditors in African countries could be 
expected to express the importance of conducting audit according to 
the international standards. They would primarily seek legitimacy 
within the international professional audit community and regard the 
international audit standards as the most appropriate way of conducting 
audit, as well as imitating more successful audit organizations.
 Thus, the development literature regards the local, domestic 
context as the main sources of legitimacy for African public 
auditors. Following this strand of the literature, the auditors would 
prefer to develop their own national standards and practices, 
since using Western standards would be problematic due to their 
lack of legitimacy in the local environment. Additionally, scholars 
argue here that in practice it would be problematic to use Western 
standards in an African context due to the large differences between 
African and Western societies, which consequently would lead the 
African auditors to aim for structures and practices more in line 
with their local circumstances. In contrast, organization scholars 
emphasize the importance for organizations to be legitimate within 
their organizational field, i.e. organizations of the same kind, within 
the country as well as around the world, are the main source of 
legitimacy for African public audit organizations. This is a significant 
difference, since for African auditors it should then be important to 
follow the standards described by their international professional 
association, and they should be less interested in developing their own 
domestic standards. In addition, organizational scholars emphasize 
that organizations are not only affected by professional norms; they 
are also likely to imitate similar organizations that they perceive 
as successful. Such perceptions are spread through various ways, 
for instance through professional associations, ranking lists or the 
general public. While development scholars regard the foreignness 
of administrative structures as problematic, when they are to be 
implemented in African countries, such foreignness should not 
have a major significance according to organizational scholars. The 
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compatibility between Western organizational structures and country 
contexts outside the West is also debated among organizational 
scholars, although to a limited extent,and empirical studies, in 
particular on African countries, are lacking.  
 Since there was a possibility that African audit organizations 
had tried to implement international public audit standards, the 
proposition based on the literature on development also predicted 
how such attempts would be regarded and handled by African public 
audit organizations: If they attempted to implement international audit 
standards, African auditors would express the difficulties in introducing 
such foreign models. Most likely, major adjustments would have to be 
made to make the standards suit the local environment of the African 
Supreme Audit Institutions. In contrast, according to the organization 
literature the African audit organizations would have a different 
position concerning the standards: Most likely, the African Supreme 
Audit Institutions would adopt the standards with as little adjustment as 
possible. One strand of the development literature does not completely 
reject the possibilities for implementing Western administrative 
structures. As illustrated in the proposition, they clearly emphasize 
the importance of adjusting these models to the specific features in 
an African context however. Such features are argued to be largely 
cultural features, such as the significance of particularistic informal 
networks and rules, but also limited available resources, competence 
or inadequate technical capacity. In order to restrict explanations 
related to resources, the focus of the study is on countries that are 
not among the poorest in Sub-Saharan Africa. The literature on 
organizations predicts instead that the audit organizations should 
implement the standards as far as possible, and it does not really 
consider adjustments. Plausible explanations for the absence of such 
discussions are likely to be similarities in context and culture between 
industrialized countries, where the majority of these studies have 
been conducted, as well as the moral dimension in the relationship 
between countries, which is highly significant for the relations 
between Western countries and Sub-Saharan Africa, is not prevalent 
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in discussions on the transferability of reforms between Western, or 
industrialized, countries. 
 In addition, within the organization literature, resources, 
competence and available technical capacity are no longer regarded 
to be of principle importance for how organizations adopt 
various structures; instead, the focus is on more cultural cognitive 
mechanisms, such as a common professional identity and a perception 
of the appropriate behavior for their kind of organization. Similar to 
the discussion on adjustments to reforms, the absence of resource-
bound explanations within the organization literature is probably 
a consequence of it being mainly based on studies in industrialized 
countries, where access to such resources are no longer crucial for 
adapting various structures and practices. 
 Throughout the chapters in this thesis, the empirical results 
from the arenas and from the SAIs in Namibia and Botswana have 
been presented and analyzed. Hence, the reader of the complete study 
will already have an understanding of what African public auditors 
express in regard to the international standards, as well as how they 
handle them in their audit organizations. However, to clarify the 
results, a general discussion of the results follows in this chapter. The 
discussion is centered on three themes, which are found significant 
in all three cases examined in the study, and the content in the two 
propositions are discussed within these three themes. 
The profession
A significant result from the study is the unproblematic approach the 
auditors showed towards the international public audit standards. 
Throughout the study, auditors in the arenas, as well as at the SAIs in 
Namibia and Botswana, argued it was natural to have existing best 
practice in auditing, described in common by the profession, and 
as auditors they explained following such practice was part of their 
professional identity (c.f. DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Greenwood, 
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Suddaby & Hinings 2002; Scott 2001). There was little support in 
the study’s results for a state of affairs where the auditors would like 
to have a specifically African way of conducting audit, or for the 
SAIs wanting to try to build audit structures on traditional domestic 
institutions. On the contrary, the interviews and observations 
demonstrated how the auditors regarded it as an advantage to use 
common international practice, and how they preferred to follow 
these practices, rather than responding to their own domestic 
circumstances. This was significant during the observations, 
interviews and informal conversations at the arenas, as well as in the 
studies of the SAIs in Namibia and Botswana. 
 It was evident how the regional secretariat had the ambition 
for all SAIs in the region to comply better with the requirements in 
the international standards. This was demonstrated by the production 
of all the guidance material, such as manuals and guidelines, as 
well as the means by which it chose to highlight good examples of 
practice at conferences and courses in order to create peer pressure 
on the SAIs, to push them in the desired direction. Although the 
secretariat emphasized its role as an enabling organization as well as 
how the SAIs in the region should define their own needs, within the 
secretariat, local norms among the SAIs in the region were discussed 
as being a problem, and they discussed the strategy it should use to 
change the audit norms in the region. The choice of strategy from 
the secretariat demonstrates that it is aware of the significance of 
professional identity for auditors at the SAIs in the region. Namely, 
it decided that the best approach for making the SAIs in the region 
change would be to argue that prevailing reporting procedures were 
not in accordance with the international standards. Thus, by explicitly 
demonstrating to the SAIs what was expected of them as professional 
audit organizations, i.e. following the international standards, the 
secretariat expected the SAIs to change their local norms.
 However, the attitude regarding local circumstances as 
obstacles that the auditors had to overcome was not a top down 
approach from managers at the regional secretariat. It was also present 
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at observations and informal conversations with regular auditors at 
the arenas. At the arenas, auditors described how as auditors they 
faced similar problems in their countries and how the differences 
mainly consisted in the manner they had reached different levels of 
development. Ordinarily, this also implies that different areas within 
their audit organizations had achieved various levels of development, 
for instance, some of the SAI may have an effective performance 
audit unit established for many years, while other SAIs may only be 
in the phase of establishing the first basics for such a unit. Meeting 
within the regional networks was felt to strengthen the auditors in 
their work to change their own organizations, since they could benefit 
from the experiences of other SAIs, and then use those experiences 
as arguments for convincing their own organizations to undergo the 
same changes.  
 Apart from auditors arguing in interviews at the SAIs in 
Namibia and Botswana for the importance for them as auditors to 
follow standards, the results also illustrated how the organizations 
over the years had taken actions continuously and moved towards 
higher compliance with the requirements in the international 
standards, sometimes in conflict with domestic political interests. 
At both the SAI of Namibia and the SAI of Botswana they have 
made efforts over the years to introduce manuals and standardized 
working papers in accordance with the international standards. 
Although the degree of implementation differed, both organizations 
continuously made new efforts in cases where the implementation of 
earlier manuals or working papers had been limited. In addition, both 
organizations sent their auditors on various courses and participated 
in development cooperation programs to strengthen the auditors’ 
professional competence, so as to achieve higher compliance with the 
professional requirements for auditors. 
 An illustrative example of the significance of their 
professional identity and their ambition to attain legitimacy within the 
professional audit community is how both the OAG in Namibia and 
the OAG in Botswana attempted to change their national legislation 
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to become more independent from their governments. Because the 
auditors’ demand for independence was not met with enthusiasm by 
their government, managers at the OAG in Botswana decided to use a 
new strategy and endeavor instead to achieve independence gradually. 
Their first step was the adoption of separate legislation for the OAG, 
after which it intended to ask for more budget control, more control 
over staff etc., and step by step eventually achieve independence.  
The above results from the study demonstrate how both organizations 
have a distinct professional identity in line with established 
international standards, and how they constantly undertake 
actions to move in the direction of what is regarded as appropriate 
behavior for such organizations. In the case of independence, the 
auditors desire to become more legitimate within their professional 
community outweigh the domestic political interest from their own 
governments. These results may be considered as supporting what 
was outlined in accordance with the theory of organizations, i.e. the 
African auditors would express the importance of conducting audit 
according to the international standards, and they would primarily 
seek legitimacy within their professional audit community and regard 
the international audit standards as the most appropriate way for 
conducting audit. Accordingly, there is little support for the prediction 
based on the development literature, i.e. the African auditors would 
primarily seek legitimacy within their local context, and they 
would express the importance of conducting audit in line with the 
circumstances in their local context. 
 It is interesting to note that, for auditors, international 
legitimacy does not appear to contradict the way they regard local 
legitimacy. When the auditors argued about the importance of 
conducting audit according to the standards, which in their view is 
the best way to conduct audit, they claimed that by using this best 
practice their work would be better executed. Therefore, the citizens 
of their countries would get the best value for their money and the 
state finances would be kept better in order. Thus, there appears to 
be no conflict between legitimacy internationally and legitimacy 
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on a domestic level. This result differs from the way legitimacy for 
administrative practices is regarded within the development literature, 
where it is argued that external structures and models will not 
encompass any legitimacy at the local level. From this study of state 
auditors, this does not appear to be the case, however.  
 For the auditors, complying with that described in the 
international standards was not only important because of their 
professional role; it was also regarded as improving their work. As 
argued by Kennedy and Fiss (2009), performance improvements 
may be important motives for organizations adopting certain 
practices, apart from their wish to be socially legitimate. Although 
new work methodologies met resistance from some auditors due to 
the increased workload involved, the auditors still argued that the 
increased planning and documentation led to a genuine improvement 
in the quality of their work, for instance through better, more precise 
execution of the audits, better sampling methods and more careful 
documentation of the work. Additionally, it was argued that the 
use of audit manuals as guidance meant fewer conflicts within the 
office over the way the work was supposed to be conducted, and 
for more recently recruited auditors the guidance this provided was 
described as helpful for learning about the work. Not only work 
procedures according to the standards were regarded as improving 
the quality of the auditors work, several of the auditors also argued 
that independence from their governments would improve their work 
situation and the performance of the organizations, for instance, 
through the possibility to decide independently on salaries as well 
ason how to manage resources. Furthermore, perhaps becoming 
rather more like private audit firms and charging clients would, 
according to the auditors, most probably make the organizations more 
efficient and put greater pressure on the public organizations they 
audited to deliver better information to the auditors (c.f. Kennedy & 
Fiss 2009).
 As claimed above, these results may be regarded as being 
similar to the way the behavior of organizations is understood in the 
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literature on organizations, consequently they differ from the way 
public administration reforms in African countries are discussed 
within the development literature. The auditors did not appear to be 
interested in creating unique or “home-grown” solutions in line with 
their local circumstances. Neither did the African auditors argue 
for the necessity of making major adjustments to the standards to 
suit their local circumstances in order to create sustainability for the 
reforms. Nevertheless, how to interpret the local adjustments they 
made is difficult, and I will return to this in the following section on 
voluntarism and notions of customizations.  Despite the adjusting the 
standards to their prevailing situations, the auditors argued in favor 
of all the advantages arising from using the same audit methodology 
around the world and how following the requirements in the 
standards as far as possible meant better quality in their work. Apart 
from the way several auditors stated that making their own standards 
was unnecessary and a waste of resources, in one interview, a state of 
affairs where each country created its own audit structures and audit 
methodology was also described as anopportunity for a country to 
cheat with its finances, and from the auditor’s perspective, this was not 
a desirable situation. 
 The professional identity of the African auditors was 
confirmed continuously within their professional networks. The 
results from the arenas illustrated how the auditors through training 
courses, workshops and conferences came to know one another 
and how they shared ideas and practical experiences within these 
networks. Since as professionals the auditors were receptive to 
what was regarded as appropriate behavior, by their professional 
peers and people they knew within such networks, the SAIs in the 
region are likely to become harmonized in their audit structure 
and practices over time (Berger & Luckmann 1969; Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman1989; Gibbons 2004; Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings2002; 
Sevón 1996; Wedlin 2007). 
 Both the SAI in Namibia and the SAI in Botswana were 
involved in professional networks in several ways, which may 
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explain their harmonized views and their actions for complying with 
the requirements in the standards. Although, the SAI in Namibia 
appeared to work according to audit methodology in a more unified 
manner in the office, as well as constantly ensuring that the entire 
office was updated on the changes in the standards. This could be 
an effect of stronger involvement in the professional networks (c.f. 
DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Casile & Davis-Blake 2002; Gibbons 2004; 
Reagans & McEvily 2003). At the SAI in Namibia, the Auditor General 
for several years has been the chairperson of AFROSAI, senior 
managers in the office participated in the INTOSAI working groups 
thatdraw up new standards, and several of the auditors at a lower level 
functioned as trainers for other SAIs in the region. Although the SAI 
in Botswana was involved in the regional networks, its participation 
was more limited than the situation in Namibia, which contributes to 
an understanding of why Namibia appears to have higher compliance 
with the international standards in the entire office, than is argued to 
be the casefor the office in Botswana. 
 These results from the thesis confirm that normative 
and imitative mechanisms that have been demonstrated to be 
significant for influencing the behavior of organizations in Western, 
industrialized, countries may also be regarded as valid for African 
public organizations. Although, these mechanisms are emphasized 
primarily within the literature on organizations, some development 
scholars have noted similar effects in administrative reforms in 
African countries. Professional integrity and the sense of belonging to 
an international community of peers among public officials was in the 
study of Hilderbrand and Grindle (1998) demonstrated to contribute 
to a higher level of performance in those organizations. However, 
in their conclusions Hilderbrand and Grindle (1998) emphasize the 
importance of the embedded nature of organizations in their local 
environment, and they do not pay any attention to the importance of 
professionalism for the implementation of reforms (p. 48). Likewise, 
Leonard (1987) states that public officials in Africa may be affected 
by socialization processes via their professional identity, which may 
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be reinforced in networks and international conferences. However, he 
does not develop this argument further instead, he argues strongly for 
the importance of developing organizational models in line with an 
“African logic”, which builds on the social reality in Africa and that: 
“any simple attempt to transfer Western managerial technologies is 
likely to end in failure” (p. 908). The results from this study do not 
support such conclusions and there is no support for a particular 
African logic among the auditors that would hinder them from using 
international public audit standards. 
A practical dimension
An unexpected but significant result from the study, was how the 
auditors not only regarded it as natural to follow the international 
audit standards due to their profession, but how they also emphasized 
the practical advantages in all countries around the world using 
the same audit structures and methodologies. The advantages were 
discussed in terms of creating possibilities for cooperation between 
the SAIs in the region, as well as creating career opportunities for 
individual auditors.
 For the SAIs in southern Africa to use similar methodologies 
implies that they have the possibility to help each other if they 
have problems in their organizations. During the regional courses 
and conferences, they discuss any problems they may have in their 
SAIs and give each other advice on how to handle the situation 
based on their own experiences. This constituted a significant part 
of the conferences and courses, and a great deal of the meetings 
was structured around exchanging experiences and searching for 
advice within the professional community. For the individual SAIs, 
a practical dimension might mean that it could also participate in 
bilateral cooperation within the region. For instance, the SAI in 
Namibia had sent auditors to help the SAI in Ghana, which had 
problems in its office, as well as exchanging auditors with the SAI in 
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Uganda regarding an audit software program with which the SAI in 
Namibia had little experience. The similar structures and practice also 
allowed the SAIs in the region to share resources, in terms of holding 
courses together in the region as well as using auditors from SAIs in 
the region as teachers. Such practical regional cooperation would not 
be possible if they did not share a similar understanding of how the 
work is supposed to be conducted.   
 Likewise, in their ambition to comply with the requirement 
in the standards, auditors also argued how important it was to be 
able to conduct quality reviews at the SAIs. Such assessment of the 
work, conducted by their peers from other countries was regarded 
to be helpful for the auditors, in order to know whether they were 
performing their work appropriately.  It would be difficult to conduct 
quality reviews if the assessment teams, as well as the organization 
they reviewed, did not share similar ideas of what should be 
considered appropriate audit structures and practice. 
 Although it was mentioned that harmonized structures might 
enable strong regions such as Europe to assist weaker regions like 
Africa, the scope for the practical cooperation was mainly regional, i.e. 
when the auditors discussed the advantages for SAIs in using similar 
audit methodologies, they mainly referred to cooperation and how 
they assisted each other within the region, not internationally. Using 
similar methodologies on an international level became significant 
for them as individual auditors with respect to their opportunities 
for creating career opportunities. The auditors were aware of how 
international organizations, such as the United Nations, used auditors 
and how their opportunities to work in such organizations depended 
on whether they were familiar with the internationally accepted 
audit methodologies used in those organizations. Likewise, if the 
auditors worked according to the same audit methodology used in 
other countries it would create possibilities for them to move to other 
countries and to be able to work there as professionals. 
 This practical dimension to using similar methods and 
structures across countries has a significant development aspect. 
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Both for the auditors as individuals, since it opens up opportunities 
outside their organization and country, but more significantly for 
organizations with scarce resources, regional cooperation of the kind 
illustrated in the study may imply valuable support for developing 
their organization. 
 Despite its apparent importance, as argued by the auditors, 
for developing countries, a practical dimension in using similar 
administrative practices among African countries is not discussed in 
the development literature on public administration reforms in Africa 
(c.f. Abrahamsen 2000; Jones & Blunt 1993; Leonard 1987; Turner 
& Hulme 1997; Wunsch 2000). The emphasis in the development 
literature on finding specifically African solutions may be considered 
as providing support to the way auditors argue here for the benefits in 
using similar systems within Africa. Although, the difference between 
the auditors in this study and the way scholars within development 
literature argue is that the auditors did not consider it problematic 
that the systems used and benefited from within the region originated 
from an international level. The auditors did not regard the audit 
methodologies as foreign, although they, of course, were aware of their 
origin in Western countries.
 Neither is a practical dimension for isomorphic mechanisms 
discussed within the organization literature. It is reasonable to 
believe that practical advantages do not have a similar importance 
in industrialized countries since organizations in industrialized 
countries presumably would access such resources principally within 
their own country and are not dependent on support from a regional 
cross-national network to the same extent. Although a practical 
dimension is not discussed explicitly within the body of organization 
literature, this result is still interpreted as supporting what should be 
expected of the SAIs according to this literature, i.e. organizations 
and professionals regard themselves primarily as part of a field of 
other similar organizations and professionals, and this organizational 
environment is of more importance when they reflect upon their 
work, than their local domestic environment. Thus, an extension 
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of the theory of isomorphism, of significance in a development 
context, would be a practical dimension for how similar structures 
and practices across countries enable close cooperation among public 
sector organizations in developing countries and an increased ability 
to share resources.
Voluntarism and the notion of customization
The ambitions of the secretariat in the sub-regional group AFROSAI-
E are clear, it wants to harmonize audit structures and practices 
within the region and bring them more in line with the requirements 
in the international standards. However, its approach for pushing its 
members to move in this direction is largely based on the principles 
of voluntarism. The secretariat emphasizes that it is an enabling 
organization and it encourages its members to define and express 
their own need for support. To guide the SAIs then in the appropriate 
direction, the secretariat presents what it perceives as successful 
modes of organization at conferences and courses as well as in 
manuals and publications of best practices, the use of all of which 
is voluntary. Similarly, the peer reviews, which could be regarded as 
control mechanisms for complying with standards, are voluntary for 
the members, they do not have to subject themselves to such a control, 
unless they so desire. This approach, which does not use coercive 
methods but instead influences the behavior of the organizations 
by presenting the most successful organizations and methods, is a 
well-recognized behavior among organizations and, in studies from 
Western, industrialized countries, such processes have proven to lead 
to harmonized structures and practices within the field (c.f. DiMaggio 
& Powell 1983; Deephouse 1996; Sauder & Lancaster 2006; Slack & 
Hinings 1994; Wedlin 2007). 
 Additionally, the emphasis on voluntary mechanisms and the 
way the secretariat of AFROSAI-E characterizes itself as an enabling 
organization, may be understood as a part of its nature as a meta-
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organization. Meta-organizations build on voluntary membership 
and they have no possibilities of issuing sanctions or in any other 
way enforcing their members to comply with the regulations, since 
exclusion is rarely an option (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008). 
 The focus on voluntarism by the AFROSAI-E, however, 
may also be regarded as an awareness of the moral dimension when 
introducing administrative reforms in African countries, i.e. externally 
imposed structures on the African countries are problematic per 
se, regardless of the actual possibilities of implementation (c.f. 
Abrahamsen 2000; Hyden 2006). As with notions of customization, 
which will be discussed later, by emphasizing the voluntary aspect, 
the regional secretariat avoids critique for being imperialistic and 
imposing structures on the countries. Instead, it is able to claim that it 
enables organizations to develop as they desire. 
 By some auditors, the membership in the professional 
associations is regarded as implying a state of affairs where they 
do not have any choice but to follow the standards drawn up. This 
more coercive nature of membership in the professional association 
was also noted in the speeches at the large congress for all SAIs in 
Africa (AFROSAI). At this conference, there was a clear call from 
a representative of an African professional audit association saying 
that all auditors were required to follow the standards and that 
the organization he represented had the authority to withdraw the 
license auditors need to conduct their work professionally. Although 
this statement illustrates a more coercive aspect of the professional 
commitment, the authority of the association represented by the 
speaker is still limited for the individual SAIs. Within their countries, 
they have the possibility to create their own certificates and licenses 
for auditors, which was also done by the SAI in Namibia. A similar 
distinct message on the importance of implementing the international 
public audit standards, regardless of differences in government 
structures, came at the same congress from the next President of the 
AFROSAI, the Auditor General of South Africa. He made it clear that 
differences in development as well as in how African countries differs 
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in size may imply that they have different needs but, despite this, all 
African countries should still aim for compliance with the standards 
(c.f. Boli & Thomas 1999).
 Although the professional associations may be understood 
here as strict and inflexible respecting the importance of following 
the requirements in the standards, the documents produced within 
INTOSAI emphasize the importance of customizing the standards 
and guidelines to the local circumstances in each country. Hence, 
there is a certain ambiguity in the organizations’ authority towards 
their members, i.e. on the one hand, they strongly encourage their 
members to comply with all requirements in the standards drawn up 
by the organization, on the other, there is a certain amount of built in 
flexibility in the standards and guidelines by means of the notion of 
customization (c.f. Ahrne &Brunsson 2008; Brunsson & Jacobsson 
1998; 2000).  The idea of customizing the guidance material was 
also evident in the sub-regional group, AFROSAI-E, in its guidance 
documents as well as during conferences and courses. For instance, 
when discussing the implementation of a performance audit manual, 
teachers at the course emphasized the importance of not “copying 
and pasting” the manual, rather they should look in to the specific 
conditions at their SAI and adapt the manual accordingly. 
 The focus on customization may be interpreted as the way 
meta-organizations balance their authority between voluntarism and 
compliance with common rules (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008). Ahrne and 
Brunsson (2008) argue that the lack of authority is one reason for why 
these organizations often use voluntary regulation such as standards 
in order to hold the organization together. Similarly, the idea of 
customizing the guidance material to the circumstances in each 
country may be an additional aspect of the lack of authority combined 
with an ambition to harmonize structures and practices among the 
members. Through constantly applying notions of customization, it 
may be regarded as less of a commitment for members to adapt the 
regulation, since there will be a flexibility in how to follow them (c.f. 
Abbott & Snidal 2000). 
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The notion of customization could also be interpreted as a similar 
expression of the awareness of the differences between developing 
and industrialized countries, which are expressed by the development 
literature as adjustments to the circumstances in African countries. 
The knowledge of differences in levels of technology, infrastructure 
and education as well as cultural and political differences between 
countries may have led the INTOSAI and its regional groups, 
AFROSAI and AFROSAI-E to state explicitly that adjustment of the 
guidelines to circumstances in each country needs to be considered. 
Consequently, the notion of customization could be regarded as 
supporting the formulation in the development proposition, i.e. major 
adjustments in the standards are necessary to make them encompass 
the African environment. Still, an important difference exists between 
the auditors’ notion of customization and what development theory 
prescribes regarding adjustments to the specific African context. 
 When customization is discussed within the AFROSAI and 
AFROSAI-E communities, it is argued that each country within the 
region needs to customize the adaptation of standards to their own 
circumstances. The idea that each country needs to customize the 
adaptation of standards can also be found on an international level, 
where the international documents produced by INTOSAI state that 
each country has to take its circumstances into consideration and 
adopt the standards and guidelines accordingly. This is a significant 
difference from the idea presented in the development literature of 
there being specific African circumstances that make international 
standards difficult to implement. The distinction made by the 
development literature between the West and Africa in terms of 
different political and cultural circumstances is quite simply not made 
by the auditors. Thus, on closer examination of the auditors’ notions 
of customization, they do not provide any particular support for the 
proposition outlined in accordance with development theory, where 
customizations needs to be made to make the standards encompass a 
specific African context. Despite this difference between the empirical 
results and the prediction based on the theory of development, 
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customization constitutes a substantial result for how auditors relate 
to the standards in relation to their local context. Thus, in the next 
section there will follow a more detailed discussion of how the notion 
of customization may be understood in the auditors’ context. 
 As noted above, similar to voluntarism, customization may be 
interpreted as a way to handle the moral dimension in administrative 
reforms (c.f. Abrahamsen 2000; Hyden 2006). In the professional 
associations’ ambitions to harmonize and impose universal 
structures on all countries, they are able to avoid critique for being 
imperialistic by emphasizing the need for customizing the guidance 
material. Similarly, it may regarded as strengthening the domestic 
legitimacy with respect to the standards and guidance material, since 
customization is argued to make the guidelines country specific and 
thereby better owned by the country. 
 When standards and guidelines, such as the audit manuals, 
were discussed with the auditors working at SAIs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, they argued that they customize guidelines, such as the 
manuals, to the circumstances in their countries. When the auditors 
were then asked to specify what such circumstances could consist of 
and how they made customizations, the auditors, both at the arenas 
and at the individual SAIs, went on to argue how customization 
mainly consisted of minor, more technical aspects, for instance the 
type of computer software used or if they lacked a mandate to conduct 
audits in certain areas due to their national legislation. They argued 
that despite these adjustments, the basics in auditing and the audit 
standards were still followed.
 It is difficult to interpret the scope and significance of 
customizations, mainly for three reasons. Firstly, because the auditors 
in the main consider what is drawn up in the national legislation 
as a minor issue to which they need to adjust their work while, in 
the development literature, national legislation could be considered 
as a significant aspect to which significant adjustments need to be 
made. Consequently, the development literature and the auditors in 
the study may discuss similar needs for adjustments; however, they 
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discuss them differently. While the development literature emphasizes 
the importance of adjustment for the sustainability of reforms, the 
auditors regard the adjustments to be minor, more technical aspects, 
and they prefer to emphasize the similarities among all the SAIs and 
the benefits for them in using similar systems in all countries. Besides, 
in the study we have seen examples of how the auditors have tried to 
change their national legislation in order to fulfill the requirements in 
the standards better. Hence, even though the notion of customization 
may be regarded as supporting statements made in the development 
literature, the auditors’ previously discussed actions, together with 
their attitudes where they consider national circumstances more 
as minor aspects in respect to their work, may be interpreted as 
supporting the proposition formulated in accordance with the 
organization literature, i.e. auditors would adopt the standards with as 
little adjustments as possible.
 The second reason why the scope and significance of 
customizations is difficult to interpret is difficulties the auditors 
claimed they sometimes have in fulfilling the requirements of the 
standards, due to limited resources and limited correct competence in 
their organizations, and in the public organizations they audit. These 
statements confirm the explanation according to the development 
literature, i.e. resources and available competence restrict how 
Western models may be transferred to developing countries. The 
way organizations need to handle the standards in regard to these 
limitations is not regarded by the auditors however as a part of the 
customization or an adjustment to the audit standards, as they are 
described by the development literature. Rather, it is regarded as a 
current situation that has emerged out of the limited resources and 
education available several years ago, when several auditors were 
recruited.
 The lower level of education among several senior staff is 
a significant feature of how limited competence may influence the 
way the SAIs work in accordance with international standards. In 
particular, at the OAG in Botswana this was regarded to be a problem, 
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since inadequate competence among several managers had hampered 
the use of new audit methodologies over the years. Although the 
younger, more recently recruited, auditors had a higher level of 
technical competence, they were socialized into the work by their 
senior managers and due to the hierarchies in the office structure, 
it was difficult for junior officials to change the work procedures in 
the audit teams. As noted by Hilderbrand and Grindle (1998), the 
difference in competence between senior and junior staff is a well-
recognized situation in developing countries, which influences the 
way organizations can adapt administrative reforms. Although the 
OAG in Namibia at the time of independence,at the start of the 
1990s, was far from working according to international standards, 
any inadequate competence among senior staff has not hindered the 
use of new audit methodologies to the same extent in this office as it 
has at the OAG in Botswana. In the large development cooperation 
project in Namibia, the importance of educating the managers in the 
office was identified at an early stage, and throughout the cooperation, 
management was in particular focus since they would become the 
focal point for the auditors to turn to for advice, after the project team 
left (Bergström 2008). This appears to have been a successful strategy 
since today, the office has a unified approach towards the standards 
with which they work and continuously update the work according to 
the requirements in the international standards. 
 The situation of limited resources and limited competence in 
certain positions supports the argument of development scholars on 
the situation in public organizations in African countries. Available 
competence within these countries and within the individual 
organizations is nonetheless constantly changing, as the higher 
education system in these countries expands and recently recruited 
officials have higher levels of qualifications than auditors recruited 
several years ago. Today, the SAIs in Namibia and Botswana do not 
appear to have any problems finding students with university degrees 
for employment in the offices. 
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Although resources are significant aspects for explaining how the 
organizations are able to fulfill the requirements in the standards, 
as well as a reason for why the staff turnover at the SAIs is high, it is 
not the full explanation for how the offices handle the standards. As 
mentioned, the SAIs in Namibia and Botswana are to a large extent 
very similar in the way they regard and handle the international 
public audit standards. Yet, the SAI in Namibia appears to fulfill the 
requirements in the standards to a greater extent. If resources were 
the main factor determining how standards are handled by the SAIs, 
it would be difficult to understand the differences between Namibia 
and Botswana.  Botswana is cherished in the literature for its good 
governance as well as how, as a resource-rich country, it has invested 
well in infrastructure and education for its people. Namibia at the 
start of the 1990s was a country plagued by deep conflicts along 
ethnic lines, and its economy is nowhere near the size Botswana’s 
economy. At the SAI in Botswana, auditors have been sent over the 
years to various courses, various development cooperation projects 
have been implemented. Recently, it also invested in computer 
software, which was described in Namibia as being too expensive for 
the office to buy, although it would have liked to. In Namibia, they 
have also sent their auditors to various training courses although 
to a lesser extent than in Botswana, as well as having been involved 
in various development cooperation projects. Thus, at first glance, 
there are no major differences in the type of activities that have been 
carried out over the years. However, when the activities carried out 
in the offices, in particular the development cooperation projects, are 
examined further, it can be seen that they have been managed quite 
differently in the two offices. Consequently, a plausible explanation 
for the differences in development could be the way the development 
cooperation projects have been designed and implemented in the two 
offices. This will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
 The third and maybe most difficult aspect in interpreting 
adjustments of the standards, is the vastness of the standards and how, 
as a result, this implies a large amount of flexibility when using them. 
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To say simply you are following international standards does not 
actually have to mean much, and it is impossible for any SAI to fulfill 
the requirements in all standards. Accordingly, when customizations 
are discussed in practice this must still concern a limited number of 
standards and guidelines. In the study, this vastness was handled by 
outlining an operationalized model for a Supreme Audit Institution 
based on what is emphasized in the standards and in the literature 
on audit. The model was then applied to the SAIs of Namibia and 
Botswana. The results from the study demonstrate that the SAI of 
Namibia and the SAI of Botswana fulfill several of the aspects outlined 
in the model; although it is sometimes difficult to interpret the 
extent to which some of the criteria are achieved, such as the use of 
standardized working papers and if the auditors have the appropriate 
level of competence. More important to note is that although not 
all efforts have been equally successful, both organizations have over 
the years continuously tried to change their situation to achieve higher 
compliance with the standards, and this applies to all criteria in the 
model. Thus, instead of discussing the extent to which the two SAIs 
fulfill the various criteria in the model, a more accurate description 
of the overall result would be that both the SAI in Namibia and the 
SAI in Botswana are continuously moving in the same direction, i.e. 
gradually conforming to the requirements in the international public 
audit standards. 
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CHAPTER 
Conclusions
In the previous chapter, three main themes of the results in the study 
were described and discussed in relation to the way the two different 
bodies of literature describe the features and reforms to the public 
administrations in African countries. In this final chapter, there will be 
a general concluding discussion of the results and their implications 
for theory and practice and suggestions for further research within the 
field will be outlined.
 A major result of this study is that the way in which 
organizations and professions are described as acting in Western 
countries by organization scholars, appears to be significantly similar 
in Sub-Saharan African contexts, in arenas as well as at the level of 
individual organizations. Throughout the study, a distinct professional 
identity among African public auditors has emerged. This professional 
identity has been shown to involve an attitude where the auditors 
regard themselves to be part of a professional community without 
national boarders and where they consider the international standards 
for auditing as the most appropriate and legitimate way of conducting 
audit. 
 In their strivings to comply with international professional 
standards, the auditors continuously make various efforts to reform 
their own organizations, sometimes in conflict with domestic political 
conditions. As discussed at the beginning of this study, despite 
organizational theory’s claim to universalism, there has been a lack of 
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empirical studies in developing and African countries. Consequently, 
there has been little understanding of whether this theory is actually 
appropriate in African contexts, or if it ought to be regarded as 
“West-centric”. However, when tested on state audit organizations in 
African contexts, the theory and the propositions outlined accordingly 
appear to be valid, and the mechanisms, which are argued to create 
homogeneity in structure and practice among organizations within 
a field in industrialized Western countries, appear to work in similar 
ways in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 One implication for the theory of organizations in a 
development context may be how these homogenizing mechanisms 
also have a clear practical dimension for the organizations. The 
auditors surprisingly often argued in favor of all the advantages arising 
from using similar audit structures and methodologies internationally 
and regionally, from a practical perspective. Through harmonized 
audit structures and methodologies there were possibilities for 
pooling resources and “helping each other out” among the Supreme 
Audit Institutions in the region, and this also created career 
opportunities for individualson a regional and international level. As 
illustrated in the study, this dimension is noteworthy for a region with 
limited resources. Within the contemporary literature on isomorphic 
mechanisms there is little discussion of such practical dimensions and 
their ensuing advantages for a developing country. It is reasonable to 
believe that this inadequacy is a consequence of the limited studies 
conducted in developing countries.
 Another implication for the use of organization theory in 
Sub-Saharan African contexts would be that resources, for instance in 
terms qualified persons and levels of payment, still have a substantial 
influence on the way organizations are able to undertake reforms, 
although in the literature they are argued to no longer constitute a 
major impact on the behavior of organizations. Even in Namibia 
and Botswana, which were countries chosen to limit explanations 
related to resources, limited resources, for instance inadequate levels 
of education in higher positions of the organization, still affected 
23
the possibilities for reforming the organizations and complying with 
international standards. Limited resources and lack of capacity in 
the development literature are argued to be causes for the limited 
possibilities of implementing Western administrative structures 
and practices in African countries. This argument however may be 
considered less interesting since levels of education and capacity 
eventually change. As noted in the interviews, levels of education at 
the SAIs within the AFROSAI-E region are constantly rising and the 
qualifications among younger public officials are much higher today 
than when several of the managers were recruited.   
 Rather, the more interesting argument presented by 
development scholars is the way African political and administrative 
culture is described as being significantly different from the Western 
bureaucracy, an argument which in turn implies that it is difficult 
to implement administrative structures and practices deriving 
from Western countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. African public 
sector organizations are described as being based on personal rule 
and informal networks, where kinship and patrimonial structures 
constitute the foundations for the way these organizations operate. 
Western public administrations, on the other hand, are considered to 
be based on “Weberian structures”, i.e. bureaucratic structures based 
on formalism, impersonal rule and meritocratic recruitment. These 
differences in character between public administrations in Western 
and in African countries within the development literature are argued 
to imply that African public organizations need unique “home-grown” 
solutions, more in line with their specific character.  
 In this study of public auditors, it is difficult to find 
support for these arguments and conclusions. In interviews and 
during observations, both at the arenas and at the individual SAIs, 
when problems in implementing work procedures according to 
international standards were discussed there was nothing in the 
discussions indicating that such difficulties were a result of differences 
in the political and administrative cultures in Western and in African 
countries. Rather, the explanations concerned limited education and 
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qualifications necessary to be able to perform the work according to 
the international standards, as well as lack of motivation among the 
auditors to change the work procedures. Such lack of motivation could 
be interpreted as a lack of legitimacy for the standards due to their 
external origins, or that the standards could be ill suited for the local 
contexts. Still empirical support for such statements was not found 
in the study. Resistance to changes in work methodologies among 
auditors in lower positions were explained to be the consequence 
of the increased workload actually involved in changing the work 
procedures, with demands of increased planning and documentation. 
Since work procedures more in line with the requirements in the 
international standards involved more planning, documentation and 
a higher transparency in the work performed, resistance to change, 
or lack of motivation, among auditors in management positions was 
explained as a consequence of the way these new procedures involved 
a loss of their powers and how it also exposed inadequate competence 
among the managers. 
 Naturally, informal networks and corrupt practices may exist 
in these organizations, as they do in organizations and politics in other 
parts of the world (c.f. Szeftel 1998). The substantial difference is that 
if such networks and practices exist, it did not impact on the auditors 
approach to the international audit standards or their adoption of 
such structure and practices in their organizations. When informal 
networks and corrupt practices are revealed in Western countries, few 
would argue that this means that features of the Weberian bureaucracy 
are inappropriate in these countries and organizations. Yet, this is the 
conclusion drawn when public administrations in African countries 
are discussed.
 The literature of development appears largely to have 
neglected the importance of a professional identity among public 
officials in African countries and the way professional norms 
concerning appropriate modes of organizing and conducting their 
work spread among professionals. With some exceptions, such 
as Hilderbrand and Grindle (1998), and Mungiu-Pippidi (2011), 
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within this literature there is little discussion of the professional 
identity of public officials in African countries and how this identity 
may determine what they consider to be appropriate structure and 
practices. Additionally, development scholars appear to have paid little 
attention to how the use of international administrative structures 
and practices could actually be regarded as an advantage for African 
countries, as argued by the auditors in this study. 
 In addition to the description of difference in character, 
development scholars argue that Western administrative structures 
and practices lack legitimacy in African countries (e.g. Abrahamsen 
2000; Ayittey 2006; Carlsson 1998; Dia 1996; Ekeh 1975; Englebert 
2009; Hyden 2006; Leonard 1987). Lack of legitimacy is argued to 
explain limited implementation of various administrative reforms 
as well as being a reason for the importance of African countries 
developing their own solutions. Totally in contrast to this perception, 
African public auditors regarded procedures prescribed in the 
international standards as the most legitimate way of conducting 
audit, and had difficulties in finding reasons for why they ought to 
develop their own methodology. The auditors rather regarded such 
ideas as a waste of time and resources. In addition, legitimacy for 
external structures and practices did not appear to be in conflict 
with domestic legitimacy, as described in the development literature. 
Instead, by using the internationally described best practices for 
auditing, the auditors argued that their citizens would receive better 
value for their money and the resources in the country would be 
better spent, which in turn was likely to lead to domestic legitimacy 
for the audit practices used. For understanding legitimacy for various 
political and administrative structures and practices, the picture 
presented within the development literature may be regarded as too 
simplified. As illustrated in this study, other dimensions of legitimacy 
exist; organizations operating within a field of similar organizations 
may desire to achieve legitimacy within this field, regionally and 
internationally, and public officials may have a professional identity to 
which they turn primarily for their legitimacy. 
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As discussed in previous chapters, part of the development discourse 
is based on a moral argument, where the introduction and use of 
Western structures in Sub-Saharan African countries is seen as 
inappropriate from a moral perspective. The auditors in this study, 
however, had a more pragmatic approach to the international 
standards, and did not appear to regard the Western origins of the 
international public audit standards as problematic. Apart from 
being understood as arising from a professional identity, this more 
unproblematic approach towards the standards may be related to 
the voluntariness of the standards, and the way the standard-making 
organizations emphasize this voluntariness as well as the importance 
for each country to customize to suit specific local circumstances. 
Even though such customization does not distinguish African 
countries from Western, it still allows for flexibility in using the 
standards and it may thus be easier to avoid possible critique for 
being imperialistic. Hence, although the auditors did not search for 
specific African solutions, the voluntariness of the standards and the 
participation in the international community creating the standards, 
emerged as important aspects for understanding the auditors 
approach to the international standards, from a moral perspective. 
 The coercive focus in the development literature on how 
Western standards are imposed on African societies is certainly to be 
understood, considering the historic relationships between Western 
and African countries and the asymmetric balances in political and 
economic power between the Global South and the Global North, 
where donors also have a large influence on many developing 
countries. Thus, could not accountability towards donors and donor 
pressure be regarded as mechanisms influencing the results of this 
study? At the large AFROSAI congress, where Auditor-Generals from 
all the African countries met, donors were often mentioned in their 
discussions. In general, donors demand separate accounts for the way 
their money has been spent and, under circumstances where several 
donors are involved simultaneously, this becomes complicated and 
requires a lot of administration by the auditors. For instance, it was 
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regarded as problematic to audit hospitals and health clinics due to the 
large amount of donor funded medication and equipment. In these 
situations, the auditors have difficulties in controlling the economic 
transactions, since there is a mix of public funds and donor funds, and 
the staff at the hospital may refer to the foreign partner for data on the 
equipment. 
 Although donors and donor funding appear to be a significant 
part of the audit environment in several of the African countries, 
the impression from the observations at the congress was that these 
situations do not impact on the way the auditors related to the use 
of international audit standards nor that donors were where their 
primary accountability were directed. For instance, during the 
discussion among Auditor Generals on the problems of verifying 
transactions in the health care sector, the reason mentioned for why 
they considered the circumstances problematic was the ways they, 
as auditors in these circumstances, had difficulties in ensuring that 
poor people, who were in greatest need of the public health care, 
actually received the care to which they were entitled. Consequently, 
although donors may be important actors in developing countries, 
African public officials, such as the auditors in this case, may also 
feel they are accountable towards poor people in their own countries. 
In addition, a suggested solution to the difficulties in verifying the 
transactions, presented by another Auditor General, was an increased 
use of performance audit, i.e. another recognized international audit 
methodology. 251
 At the level of individual SAIs, the significance of donors was 
mentioned by a senior manager at the OAG in Namibia, where he 
regarded the donors’ perceptions of the country and the organization 
as important aspects for why the OAG had to implement the 
international standards.252 Nevertheless, in other interviews, both at 
the SAI of Namibia and the SAI of Botswana, donors were not brought 
up; neither did they appear to influence the auditors’ approach to 
251 Observation 11th AFROSAI Assembly
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the standards, not for senior or middle managers, or the auditors 
in lower positions. A manager in Botswana brought up foreign 
investors and ratings by international organizations as reasons for the 
importance in following international audit standards. He claimed 
that it was important for the country to demonstrate that it followed 
international regulation, since the contemporary world is a globalized 
place, where they wish to be role players. The manager mentioned 
Transparency International’s ratings and argued that it was important 
for Botswana to prove that it was accountable as a nation, in order 
to attract foreign investment.253Although developing countries could 
be regarded as having more to prove to foreign investors, this kind of 
argument may be relevant for many countries in the world, and not 
specifically for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 Although coercive forces are still significant for many Sub-
Saharan African countries from several aspects, development theory 
may be extended by paying more attention to the mechanisms of 
voluntary regulation. By adding this dimension to the understanding 
of administrative reforms, the view of African public officials could 
be expanded to regard them also as actors with certain agency. An 
agency allowing them the choice of following certain regulations for 
reasons such as professional identity, where their professional ideals, 
constructed through education and in networks, may shape what they 
regard as appropriate solutions. Through considering public officials 
also as professionals, the understanding of public administration 
reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa would probably be more nuanced. An 
understanding less determined by historical experiences and instead 
more oriented towards the way contemporary identities among public 
officials are shaped in a globalized world, even in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 To what extent could the results in the study be referred to 
the fact that countries selected for the individual case studies were 
Namibia and Botswana? Both countries are involved in regional 
and international networks, which probably have affected their 
commitment to implementing the international standards and 
253 Interview 26
245
complying with the various requirements therein. In addition, they 
are both classified as middle income countries, which imply that to 
some extent they have resources to develop their offices and they 
now have possibilities to employ people with university degrees. 
From a development perspective, Botswana is often mentioned as a 
country in Africa where good governance has historic roots and is 
well established in the country (c.f. Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 
2003). Namibia, on the other hand, has a history of oppressive 
colonial rule and ethnic conflicts and received its independence as 
late as 1990. Using the development literature as the starting point, it 
would be reasonable to believe that the OAG in Namibia would have 
much more difficulty in implementing and applying the international 
standards than Botswana. According to the results of this study, this 
does not appear to be the case. There may be several reasons for why 
Botswana has not implemented the international standards to the 
same extent as Namibia. One explanation found in the study is the 
way the OAG of Namibia has been involved to a greater extent in 
regional and international cooperation at all levels of the organization, 
and we will return to the significance of this aspect later on in the 
chapter.
 Another aspect found in the study, contributing to the 
understanding of the differences between the organizations, is the 
way the support for these organizations has been designed over the 
years. In Namibia, the projects to reform the organization largely 
focused on practical “on the job” training during several years in 
the office. This “on the job” training was carried out by experienced 
auditors who were also available as continuous support in the office 
over the years. Likewise, in the project it was decided that everyone 
who worked in the office would receive training, not just a smaller 
group, which was the case for several projects in Botswana. In order to 
create a sustainable situation after the projects at the OAG in Namibia 
came to an end, the focus was in particular on the management in 
the office after the project’s initial phases, in order to encourage the 
auditors to turn to them for guidance once the project members had 
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left the office. Considering the way the management is described as 
hampering the development at the OAG in Botswana, this focus is 
likely to have contributed to the more rapid development in Namibia. 
The OAG of Botswana over the years has undertaken various 
programs to build capacity in the office. In general, the programs 
have been short term where the approach has been to educate a few 
auditors in the office for a few weeks. These auditors in turn would 
teach the rest of the auditors as well as implement the changes in the 
office. According to interviews with auditors at the OAG in Botswana, 
this approach has had limited effect on the office over the years. 
 Considering the results in this study and the differences 
in the design of the projects, this study’s policy implications are to 
follow the example of the capacity building projects in Namibia, i.e. 
not to underestimate the time and the need for practical training 
for everyone in the organization to create real change in the office 
and make it sustainable (c.f. Glenday 1998). Only training a few 
individuals in an organization and leaving the responsibility to them 
to change the work procedures in the rest of an office, is likely to 
be a project design that will fail or have very limited impact on the 
organization. In addition, this study illustrates the way managers 
are likely to have a large effect on the offices thus, when designing 
administrative reforms in developing countries, special focus on 
ensuring training and education for managers would be likely to lead 
to a larger impact and higher sustainability of the reforms. 
 It is difficult to say to what extent the results from Namibia 
and Botswana are transferrable to other African countries, with 
higher levels of corruption and maladministration, as well as to 
other groups of professionals. As noted above, it is plausible to 
believe that the extent to which public officials in other African 
countries identify themselves with an international community 
and regard internationally described practices as most legitimate is 
affected by the extent to which they are entangled in international 
networks and communities, in particular professional ones. This 
kind of generalization of the results may be regarded to be supported 
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by organization scholars who have illustrated how integration in 
networks influence organizational behavior, where the closer the 
organization becomes involved in professional networks the more 
influenced it will be by their norms (Casile& Davis – Blake 2002; 
Gibbons 2004; Reagans &McEvily 2003).   
 This has also been demonstrated by development scholars. 
In Hilderbrand and Grindle’s (1998) study of capacity building 
projects in developing countries they note how the sense of being 
a professional and belonging to an international community of 
professionals was associated with higher levels of performance. 
Additionally, Mungiu- Pippidi (2011) notes that the historical and 
contemporary lessons from creating governance change at the 
domestic level, demonstrate that professionals are groups that have 
been proven to be important for achieving significant sustainable 
governance reforms (p. 120-121).   
 In a similar vein, and as noted in the first chapter, the 
impact of international organizations on domestic norms has been 
demonstrated in several studies in the literature on international 
relations. In addition to the focus on coercive and conditional 
relationships in international relations, where changes in domestic 
policies are regarded as the consequence of economic conditionality or 
coercive compliance related to access to membership in organizations, 
within this literature there are a number of studies arguing for the 
impact of socializing processes through participation in international 
organizations  (e.g. Bearce & Bondanella 2007; Checkel 2001; 2005; 
Cortell & Davis 1996; 2000; Finnemore 1993; Greenhill 2010; 
Holzinger, Knill & Sommerer 2008; Ikenberry & Kupchan 1990; 
Johnston 2001; Kelley 2004; Sandholtz & Gray 2003). International 
organizations may be regarded as promoters of norms as well as an 
actual locus where the socialization process of participants takes 
place (Checkel 2005; Finnemore 1993). For instance, Holzinger, Knill 
& Sommerer (2008) demonstrate how membership in international 
organizations has made member statesover time change their 
environmental policies to become stricter as well as more harmonized 
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among the members. In addition to more expected results where 
legal requirements to adhere to international requirements had a 
large impact on domestic policies, Holzinger, Knill & Sommerer 
(2008) note a striking impact on nation states of, what they label: 
“transnational communication”. In their definition of transnational 
communication, they include: “The diffusion of professional 
knowledge via transnational networks or ‘epistemic communities’” 
(p. 559), illustrating the effects of socialization among professionals 
within an international community. In Greenhill’s (2010) study, he 
demonstrates that levels of engagement in international organizations 
promoting human rights had a powerful influence on how well the 
individual state performed with respect to human rights practices at 
the domestic level. Similarly, Sandholtz and Gray (2003) argue in their 
article that international norms have a significant impact on domestic 
norms, where the extension of the influence depends on the level of 
the country’s integration in international organizations and networks. 
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a strong anti-corruption 
movement within the international community, consequently 
Sandholtz and Gray (2003) argue that the more an individual country 
is involved with the international community, the lower its levels of 
corruption are likely to be, and the results from their cross-national 
study strongly support their proposition. In order to create a change in 
domestic norms, some scholars argue however that there is a need for 
these norms to have a preexisting legitimacy within the state (Cortell 
& Davis 1996). As previously discussed and as illustrated in this 
study, such legitimacy may exist within professional groups, which 
are socialized through education as well as through their professional 
communities (c.f. Berger & Luckmann 1969; DiMaggio & Powell 
1983).
 To conclude, as illustrated by the results of this study, 
professional norms and the influence of regional and international 
networks on domestic policies may be regarded as essential for 
understanding the nature of public administration reforms. Yet, 
the number of empirical studies of the way these mechanisms 
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influence the behavior of public administrations in Sub-Saharan 
African countries is still limited. Although the results from this 
study are supported theoretically and empirically by the literature on 
organizations and international relations, they are still in contrast to 
much of what is argued in contemporary literature describing African 
states and administrations. Thus, to develop the understanding for 
how public officials in African countries handle international norms 
and standards in relation to their local context, there is a need for 
further empirical studies in this field. In future studies, widening 
the theoretical perspectives of the African public officials and to 
regard them also as professionals, who may have a different view of 
legitimacy and a different approach to the appropriateness of using 
various structures and practices, could contribute to a more nuanced 
understanding of African public administrations than provided by the 
existing literature on African state and administration today. Adding 
such dimensions to African public sector organizations would also 
reduce the more deterministic view of development, where primarily 
historic legacies are regarded as shaping contemporary institutions. In 
this study, it has become apparent that the norms of accountability, as 
they are expressed within the international public audit community, 
despite their origin in Western countries and despite the asymmetric 
balance between the Global North and the Global South perhaps 
are no longer to be regarded as Western, at least not for the actors 
who relate to these norms in their daily work. Maybe it is time to 
rethink the view of African public officials and no longer merely 
regard them as stuck in their colonial or cultural past, forced to deal 
with inappropriate foreign ideas, but instead regard them as actors 
who desire to shape the future of their work together with their 
professional peers, even across national borders. 
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you for always being truly supportive and believing in me and all my 
ideas, regardless (well almost) of what they have consisted in. Finally, 
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amazing love.  
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APPENDIX
List of interviews, observations and documents 
from the arenas 
Interviews
10 Former Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat 
11 Consultant, AFROSAI-E Secretariat 
12 Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat
13 Assistant Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat
14 Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat 
15 Technical Specialist, AFROSAI-E Secretariat       
16 Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat
17 Manager, AFROSAI-E Secretariat
Observations
11th AFROSAI Assembly, Pretoria, South Africa, October 13-17, 2008, 2.5 days 
AFROSAI-E Technical committee meeting, Pretoria, South Africa, October 29-31, 
2008, 2.5 days
AFROSAI-E, Training course for managers in performance auditing, Wilderness, 
South Africa, November 17-21, 2008, 4 days
AFROSAI-E, Technical update work shop, Wilderness, South Africa, November 24-
26, 2008, 3 days 
AFROSAI-E, Long-term advisors meeting, Wilderness South Africa, November 28, 
2008, 1 day
AFROSAI-E, Planning meeting with donors, Wilderness, South Africa, December 
1-2,  2008, 1.5 days 
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Documents
AFROSAI-E (2006) Corporate Plan and Budget for 2007-2009
AFROSAI-E (2006) Report on Independent Mid-term Review
AFROSAI-E (2008) Annual report for 2007 and Work Plan for 2008 
AFROSAI-E (2007)Transversal Activity Report of the Supreme Audit Institutions in 
the AFROSAI-E region
AFROSAI-E (2008) Regularity Audit Manual 2006 (amended 2008)
AFROSAI-E (2007) Performance Audit Manual 
AFROSAI-E (2008) Developing Performance Audit. Lessons Learnt from the Office of 
the Auditor General of Botswana
List of interviews at the Office of the Auditor 
General of Botswana 
20   Officer, OAG Botswana, June 22,2009
21   Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 22 and 26, 2009 and October 22, 2010 
22   Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 23, 2009 
23   Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 23, 2009 and October 22, 2010
24   Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 23, 2009 and October 22, 2010 
25   Middle Manager, OAG Botswana, June 24, 2009 and October 17, 2010 
26   Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 24, 2009
27   Middle Manager, OAG Botswana, June 25, 2009
28   Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, June 26, 2009 and October 20, 2010
29   Auditor, OAG Botswana, June 26, 2009 and October 17, 2010 
30   Auditor, OAG Botswana, October 17, 2010
31   Senior Manager, OAG Botswana, October 17, 2010
32   Auditor, OAG Botswana, October 20, 2010 
33   Auditor, OAG Botswana, October 20, 2010
34   Officer, OAG Botswana, October 20, 2010
35   Auditor, OAG Botswana, October 20, 2010
36   Auditor, OAG Botswana, October 21, 2010
37   Middle Manager, OAG Botswana, October 25, 2010
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List of interviews at the Office of the Auditor 
General of Namibia
40 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, June 30, 2009 and October 28, 2010
41 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, July 1, 2009 and October 28, 2010 
42 Middle Manager, OAG Namibia, July 1, 2009 and October 28, 2010
43 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, July 2, 2009
44 Middle Manager, OAG Namibia, July 2, 2009
45 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, July 2, 2009
46 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, July 3, 2009
47 Senior Manager, OAG Namibia, July 6, 2009
48 Auditor, OAG Namibia, June 30 and July 7, 2009
49 Middle Manager, OAG Namibia, October 28, 2010
50 Auditor, OAG Namibia, October 28, 2010
51 Auditor, OAG Namibia, October 29, 2010
52 Auditor, OAG Namibia, October 29, 2010 
53   Officer, OAG Namibia, November 1, 2010
54 Officer, OAG Namibia, November 1, 2010
55 Middle Manager, OAG Namibia, November 2, 2010
56 Auditor, OAG Namibia, November 2, 2010 
57      Middle Manager, OAG Namibia, November 2, 2010
58 Auditor, OAG Namibia, November 2, 2010
59  Auditor, OAG Namibia, November 2, 2010
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Interview guides 
All interviews, at the arenas and the SAI of Botswana and Namibia, started with a 
presentation of me and the study. In the presentation, it was made clear that the study 
was conducted as a PhD thesis at the University of Gothenburg, and that the study 
had no connections to or any funding from the Swedish National Audit Office or any 
donor agency, such as the Swedish development aid agency (Sida). At the beginning 
of the interview confidentiality was assured, i.e. the persons interviewed were told 
that the names of the people interviewed would not be written in the thesis; instead 
all interview subjects would have numbers. Additionally, the people interviewed 
were assured that they would be able to see and give clearance of the statements they 
made during the interviews, if they were to be used as quotations in the thesis. Such 
clearance was also given for the quotations used in the study. Not all auditors were 
asked all questions in the interview guide, the questions that were asked depended 
on their position in the organization and to what extent the question had been 
sufficiently investigated through other interviews, documents or observations. 
Interview guide, AFROSAI-E secretariat, 200
1. Tell me about AFROSAI-E and how it works
2. Tell me about your position and your work in the organization 
3. How did AFROSAI-E start?
4. What was the thought behind starting AFROSAI-E? 
5. How has the organization developed?
6. How do you regard the role in the organization? 
7. What is the role of AFROSAI-e in relation to INTOSAI, AFROSAI and the 
two other sub-regional groups in Africa?
8. Do you have international standards with which you work in accordance? 
9. Isthere any other regulation or guidelines that AFROSAI-E must have in 
mind when working? 
10. How are the standards created within INTOSAI, are there any conflicts 
about what may constitute good practices?
11. Does AFROSAI-E adjust the international standards?
12. If yes, how are the standards adjusted and for what reasons? 
13. How do the standards adjusted by AFROSAI-E, or created by AFROSAI-E 
differ from the standards coming from the international level?
14. How would you describe the relationship between AFROSAI-E and the 
member-SAIs?
15. How is it decided what courses AFROSAI-E will hold, what new manuals to 
issue etc.? 
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16. Can the member-SAIs decide what activities AFROSAI-E should 
undertake?
17. When you make special arrangements in certain countries, how is it 
decided which countries should be involved in bilateral activities and which 
activities should be undertaken?
18. Does AFROSAI-E have any authority over the individual member-SAIs, in 
terms of what should be introduced, and the way it is done?
19. What do the memberSAIs want to obtain regarding audit structures and 
practices? 
20. How much alike or different are the SAIs within the AFROSAI-E, do they 
work in similar ways or in different ways? 
21. If the member-SAIs work in different ways in what do the differences 
consist?
22. Are there any advantages/ disadvantages for the SAIs to work in similar 
ways?
23. Are there any advantages/ disadvantages for the SAIs to work in different 
ways?
24. Is it voluntary for the SAIs to follow the international standards?
25. If everything is voluntary for the SAIs, what makes the SAI actually follow 
the international standards?
26. May a country pick and choose which standards it follows and which 
standards it does not want to follow?  Can you give any examples? 
27. May the SAI itself choose how to follow the standard?
28. Are there different ideas on how to implement the standards?
29. Are the SAIs much alike or are the different in the way they follow the 
standards? 
30. When you create the manuals, do you change the standards in any way?
31. What does customization imply? Can you give any examples? 
32. In what way will the activities of AFROSAI-E create change at the member 
SAIs?
33. Do you think those changes will be sustainable? Why/why not?
34. (According to the observations made at the AFROSAI congress 2008) There 
appears to be an idea of harmonization, i.e. that all SAIs around the world 
should be similar in structure and practices. What is your opinion about 
that? What are the advantages and disadvantages? What do you believe the 
SAIs in the region think about this?
35. What do you think are the most determining factors of a successful SAI?
36. What are the major changes you have seen at the member-SAIs throughout 
the years?
37. What are the biggest challenges for the SAIs in the region at the moment? 
         What do you think are the solutions to their challenges? 
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Interview guide, the SAI of Botswana and Namibia
In the first round of interviews at the SAI of Namibia and Botswana, in 2009, the 
questions were of more general character. During these interviews the aim was also 
to establish a view of the office’s general development as well as the development 
cooperation projects they had conducted and with what partners. In the second 
round of interviews in 2010, more specific questions were developed based upon 
the information collected in the first round, as well as questions based on the 
operationalized model for a SAI. When new auditors were interviewed in the second 
round, they were also asked the questions of more general character as stated in the 
2009 interview guide, in case there was no overlap. 
Interview guide, the SAI of Botswana and Namibia, 200 
1. Tell me about your position and how long you have worked in the OAG? 
2. What is your background?
3. When you started working, how were you introduced to the work within 
the audit office? 
4. Was there a manual or working papers that you followed, or how was the 
work conducted? 
5. What was the situation like in the office when you started working, what are 
the differences compared to today?
6. How has international standards been introduced in the office over the 
years?
7. Have you noticed in your work that international standards have been 
introduced? ,
8. If so, when did this happen?
9. How were they introduced to you? 
10. Have there been any external organizations in this process? 
11. What do you think of the standards and how they were introduced?
12. How has your work changed after the standards were introduced?
13. What are the challenges with the standards? 
14. When international standards are used in a national context, you have to 
adapt them to your own environment, and maybe make some changes. 
What may such changes consist of?  
15. Are there things/standards that are not applicable, not possible to 
implement here?
16. If there is a conflict between the standards and the circumstances here in 
Botswana/Namibia, how is this handled?
17. How do you experience the relationship between your local circumstances 
and what is written in the international standards? 
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18. How do you feel about how you conduct audit and what is said in 
international standards? 
19. How come that practice developed?
20. What are the implications of the practice?  
21. When new things are implemented in an organization, there might be 
resistance. In the case of working procedures, why do you think it is difficult 
to change? 
22. Have you taken part of any international exchange, workshops or training 
courses, for instance within AFROSAI-E?
23. Do you think it is important to follow the international standards? Why/ 
why not? 
24. What do you think about developing your own standards and guidelines, 
instead of using the international ones?  
25. (According to the observations made at the AFROSAI congress) There 
appears to be a drive for harmonization, i.e. that all SAIs around the world 
should be similar in structure and practices. What is your opinion about 
that? What are the advantages and disadvantages? 
26. What are the main challenges of the office today? 
Interview guide, the SAI of Botswana, 2010
1. Would you like to give a description of the situation at the office prior to 
independence? 
2. Would you like to give a general description of the development of the office 
between independence and the IDI/British cooperation in the 1990s?
Information regarding the IDI and British project
1. Was it one or several projects? 
2. How were the projects constructed?
3. What did the projects aim at and how were they designed?
4. What did they do in the projects? Who in the office participated in the 
projects?
Information regarding the projects in cooperation 
with the Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO)
1. When was the development project conducted, was it in parallel with the 
British project?
2. What did the project aim at? 
3. What happened within the project, who were involved and what did they 
do? 
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4. Are there any evaluations? 
5. Is there an ongoing project now? 
A description of the cooperation with and involvement in AFROSAI-E 
1. When and how did the cooperation with AFROSAI-E start? 
2. Has there been and are there projects/ training in cooperation with 
AFROSAI-E? Who has been involved and what did they do?
3. Was there a manual in 2002 from AFROSAI-E and a new one in 2008? 
What was the difference between them? 
INDEPENDENCE
Independence for the head of the SAI, through fixed procedures for appointments, 
reappointment and removal from the position, in the constitution 
1. The section P112 and P114 in the constitution, how does it work in practice 
when a new Auditor General is appointed? 
2. What is the relationship between the Auditor General and the President’s 
office?
3. What is the relationship between the Auditor General and the Prime 
Minister’s office?
4. When was the current deputy Auditor General placed in the position to 
work as Auditor General? 
5. Why has there not yet been any new Auditor General? 
6. What happened to the last Auditor General? 
7. What was it like when he was appointed? 
8. How many years does the Auditor General stay in his position? 
9. Who led the office prior to independence? 
10. Has any Auditor General been removed from office? 
11. Have there been any conflicts between the President’s cabinet and Prime 
Minister’s office and the Auditor General? 
12. Last time, we discussed that you were trying to get an act that claimed 
independence, but it was delayed by the President’s cabinet, what act did 
that concerning? 
13. What would such an act mean for the office? 
14. Last time, we discussed that you are relying on the state financial act and 
that you had been discussing an own audit act. Is that a requirement in the 
standards?
15. What would it mean for the office to have its own act?
16. Do you think that you have sufficient independence from the ministries and 
the President’s/ Prime Minister’s cabinet? If not, what is lacking? 
17. What difference would more independence make to your work?
18. Have there ever been any occasions when the government has interfered or 
has had opinions on your work?
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19. What is the view from the President’s cabinet and Prime Minister’s office 
about giving more independence to your office?
Financial and human resources are available without direct interference from the 
executive 
1. Is the office a part of the government structure? 
2. How you regard the state of affairs where the office is not financially 
independent from the government? 
3. Several managers have said that they needed more resources and that they 
are short of staff. Would that change if the office received its resources from 
the parliament?
4. Would it be easier to achieve resources for such, if you had your money 
from the parliament instead of the President’s office? 
5. Can the office decide what competence is needed and then hire that 
competence? 
6. What does a recruitment process look like? 
7. Who decides who will get the position? 
8. What is your opinion about these procedures? How does it affect your 
office? Would you like to change it, and if yes, how would a change make a 
difference to your office? 
9. How were you recruited to the office? 
10. Are your salaries decided by the management in the office or by central 
government? 
The SAI having the possibilities of selecting and reporting on the public entities 
independently
1. How do you select your audit areas? 
2. Can you select anything that you want to audit? 
3. Can you write what you want in the audit reports? 
4. If the auditee/the ministries don’t like what is written in the report, what 
actions do they take? 
5. Has any auditee/ministry ever complained about what is written in the 
reports? 
6. If yes, how was it handled? 
7. Has there been any interference with the auditors work from anyone in the 
government, 
8. What is your opinion, how independent are you in selecting audits areas 
and reporting on audit findings? 
9. What is the relation to media? 
10. Does the office send the reports to media? 
11. Are the audit reports and audit findings discussed in media? 
12. How is this viewed from the auditee/ government? 
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13. What happens if public officials complain about them being criticized by 
the media? 
14. Tell me about the procedures in the Public Accounts Committees. 
FORMALIZED WORK PROCEDURES 
The existence and use of audit manuals that are built on international standards
1. Was there anything wrong with the British audit manual- why couldn’t it be 
used? Was there anything with the manual thatmeant it could not be used?
2. Was anything wrong with the Swedish manual - why couldn’t be used? Was 
there anything with the manual thatmeant it could not be used?
3. Was anything wrong with the AFROSAI-E manual from 2002 - why 
couldn’t it be used? Was there anything with the manual thatmeant that it 
could not be used?
4. The latest manual, from AFROSAI-E 2008, how does it differ from the other 
manuals? How does the office work with its implementation in relation to 
earlier efforts on implementing manuals? 
5. How have the manuals – old and new been received by the auditors?
6. Customization of the manual, what does it imply more specifically? 
7. How is the manual used in the daily work? 
8. Why do you need a manual? 
Standardized work procedures are followed and documented
1. May I see some working papers? 
2. How do you use working papers practically?
3. Is there one working paper for each type of audit? 
4. How standardized is the audit process, is there room for individual 
judgment?
5. What is the difference with working according to the new methodology, the 
working papers, and the old way of working? 
6. Did the office use working papers before, when it (according to itself) did 
not work according to standards? 
7. What does the use of working papers mean to you, in your daily work? 
8. Why have some been resisting the change of working methodologies? 
COMPETENCE
The audit staff holds the appropriate level of education and qualification 
1. What did levels of education among auditors working at the office look like 
at the time of independence?
2. What is it like now? 
3. How many employees are there in total at the office? 
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4. How many of them are posts for qualified audit grade officers? 
5. How many of those positions are filled with qualified auditors? 
6. When the office employs auditors today, what qualifications do you require? 
7. Are the peopleemployed trained to become auditors at the office, or 
elsewhere? 
8. Do they pass a test? 
9. What do thelevels of education in Botswanalook like in general, at the 
universities, number of student taking accounting, what recruitment base 
does the office have today? 
10. How has this developed, over the years from independence? 
11. Is staff turnover a problem? How does it affect the office? 
There are possibilities of increasing the level of competence in the SAI through 
further education and training abilities 
1. What further education and training opportunities do the auditors have in 
the office? 
2. Do you think you have enough training and educational opportunities? 
3. What courses have you attended within the office? 
4. Do you lack anything, in terms of further education? 
5. After the implementation of the new manual, how do you consider further 
updates on standards? 
6. How do they get updated on the standards? How do they receive and get 
training on the new working papers?
Interview guide, the SAI of Namibia, 2010
Would you like to give a more fully description of the office prior independence 
A description of the cooperation with and involvement in AFROSAI-E 
1. When and how did it start? 
2. How are they involved? 
3. Has there been and are there projects/ training in cooperation with 
AFROSAI-E? Who has been involved and what did they do?
4. Was there one manual in 2002 from AFROSAI-E and a new one now in 
2008? What was the difference between them? 
INDEPENDENCE 
Independence for the head of the SAI, through fixed procedures for appointments, 
re-appointment and removal from the position, in the constitution 
1. When was the current AG appointed? 
2. What was it like when he was appointed? 
266
3. How many more years will he be in his position? 
4. Who was before him? 
5. Who led the office prior to independence? 
6. How does it work in practice, when an AG is appointed? 
7. Has any AG been removed from office? 
8. Have there been any conflicts between the President’s cabinet/Prime 
Minister’s office and the AG? 
9. What are the relationships between the AG and the President’s/Prime 
Minister’s office? 
10. You mentioned the office relied on the State Financial Act and that it would 
like its own audit act. Is that a requirement in the standards? 
11. What would it mean for the office to have its own act?
12. Would you like to explain a bit about the oversight mechanism you 
mentioned at the pervious interview?
13. Do you think that you have sufficient independence from the ministries and 
the President’s/Prime Minister’s cabinet? If not, what is lacking? 
14. What difference would more independence make to your work?
15. Have there ever been any occasions where the government has interfered or 
has had opinions on your work?
16. What is the view from the President’s/Prime Minister’s office about giving 
more independence for your office?
Financial and human resources are available without direct interference from the 
executive
1. Is the office a part of the government structures? 
2. How do you regard the state of affairs where the office is not financially 
independent from the government? 
3. Several managers have said that the office needs more resources, would that 
situation change if you received resources from the parliament?
4. Can the office decide what units they need and then hire the competence? 
5. How does the office recruit people, what does the process look like?
6. How were you recruited to the office? 
7. Who is on the Public Service Committee? 
8. What are entry positions? 
9. In previous interviews it was mentioned that positions are not fixed within 
the office, what does that mean?
10. Can the office decide what competence it needs, how many people should 
work in different areas? 
11. Who takes the decisions about salaries in the office? 
The SAI having the possibilities of selecting and reporting on the public entities 
independently
1. Has there ever been any interference from the President’s office or the 
ministries with auditors work?
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2. Can the auditors select what they want to audit? 
3. How do the performance auditors choose their audit areas?
4. Can they write want they want in the reports? 
5. If the auditee, the ministries, don’t like what is written in the report, what 
do they do? Do they say anything, take it anywhere?   
6. Has any auditee/ministries ever complained about what is written in the 
reports? 
7. If yes, what happened? How was it handled? 
8. Has there been any interference with the auditors work from anyone in the 
government, any conflicts or any restrictions made? Any occasions that may 
be remembered? 
9. Why doesn’t the office have a public relations officer? 
10. What is the relation to media? 
11. What is your impression, how independent are you in selecting the audits 
and reporting about the findings? 
12. In previous interviews, it was mentioned that the reports were sent to all 
media houses, do the media write about the reports and findings? 
13. How is this viewed from the auditee/ governments? 
14. Do they like to be written about and to be criticized publicly? 
15. The public hearings in the PACs committees, tell me about the procedures 
and what happens there. 
FORMALIZED WORK PROCEDURES 
The existence and use of audit manuals that are built on international standards
1. In the development cooperation project, did you discuss creating and 
starting to use a manual? 
2. What were the reasons for not creating one?
3. Which was your first manual? 
4. The manual from 2002 from AFROSAI-E? 
5. Why can’t that manual be used?
6. How have the manuals been received by the auditors over the years? 
7. Customization of the manual, what is that specifically? 
8. How is the manual used in the daily work? 
9. Do you use it, and if yes, how? 
10. Why do you need a manual? 
Standardized work procedures are followed and documented 
1. May I see some of your working papers? 
2. How do you work with working papers practically?
3. Is there one working paper for each type of audit? 
4. How standardized is the audit process, is there room for individual 
judgment?
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5. What is the difference between working according to the new methodology 
– including the standardized working papers – and the old way of working?
6. Did you use working papers before, when you (according to themselves) did 
not work according to standards? 
7. What does the use of working papers mean to you in your daily work? 
8. Why have some been resisting the change of working methodologies? 
COMPETENCE
The audit staff holds the appropriate level of education and qualifications 
1. What did levels of education among auditors look like at independence, in 
the 1990s?
2. What is it like now? 
3. How many employees are there in total? 
4. How many of them are posts for qualified audit grade officers? 
5. How many of those positions are filled with qualified auditors? 
6. When the office recruits auditors today, what qualifications do you require?  
7. Are the people recruited trained to become auditors at the office, or 
elsewhere? 
8. Do they pass a test? 
9. How do the general levels of education in Namibia appear, at the 
universities, number of student taking accounting, what recruitment base 
do the office have today? 
10. How has this developed, over the years from independence? 
11. Is staff turnover a problem? How does it affect the office? 
There are possibilities of increasing the level of competence in the SAI through 
further education and training abilities 
1. What further education and training opportunities do the auditors have in 
office? 
2. Do you think you have enough training and educational opportunities? 
3. What courses have you attended within the office?
4. In terms of further education, do you lack anything?
5. How do you keep updated on the standards? How do you receive training 
on the new working papers? 
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